# The Story of Jarvious – Aff File

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### Story

I originally read this at the start of the aff, but later took it out.

Sgro 12 [(Jonathan, worked at Regional Housing Legal Services for Equal Justice America) “Intentional Discrimination in Farrakhan V. Gregoire: the Ninth Circuit's Voting Rights Act Standard Results In the New Jim Crow” 57 Villanova University 139 (2012)] AT

Jarvious Cotton cannot vote. . . . Cotton's family tree tells the story of several generations of black men who were born in the United States but who were denied the most basic freedom that democracy promises--the freedom to vote for those who will make the rules and laws that govern one's life. Cotton's great-great-grandfather could not vote as a slave. His great-grandfather was beaten to death by the Ku Klux Klan for attempting to vote. His grandfather was prevented from voting by Klan intimidation. His father was barred from voting by poll taxes and literacy tests. Today, Jarvious Cotton cannot vote because he, like many black men in the United States, has been labeled a felon and is currently on parole. If current incarceration rates hold, three in ten of the next generation of African-American men will be disenfranchised at some point in their lives. In states that disenfranchise ex-offenders, as many as forty percent of African-American men will permanently lose their right to vote. Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) with the intent to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting. In part due to the VRA, people of color are no longer subject to racial intimidation or literacy tests at the ballot box; however, a more subtle and insidious mechanism has replaced these explicit methods to suppress the minority vote: felon disenfranchisement. Forty-eight states maintain felon disenfranchisement laws--only Maine and Vermont permit inmates to vote. These laws, like their racially explicit predecessors, overwhelmingly affect people of color due to racial bias in the criminal justice system. Presently, the United States imprisons a larger percentage of its black population than did South Africa at the height of Apartheid. In fact, roughly thirteen percent of African American men, or 1.4 million, are disenfranchised, a rate seven times the national average.

# 1AR Contention Add-Ons/Framings

## No Donkey Votes

### 1AR No donkey Votes

#### The rise in total invalid ballots is tiny compared to the increase in turnout.

Hill 06 [Lisa Hill. “Low Voter Turnout in the United States: Is Compulsory Voting a Viable Solution?” Journal of Theoretical Politics 2006 18: 207. Sage Publications] AJ

Martin Wattenberg (1998a: 20), who has briefly considered the potential for compulsory voting to address America’s turnout problem, concluded that ‘it is debatable’ whether it is really desirable to ‘force’ turnout rates into the 90 per cent and above range. His main concern is that ‘people with limited political knowledge’ would tend to vote in a fashion which Australians call ‘donkey voting’, that is, thoughtlessly numbering their ballot from 1 in descending order.36 Notwithstanding the error in assuming that ‘donkey voting’ is ‘a perversity peculiar to compulsory voting’,37 in fact, the level of the donkey vote is not high in Australia (estimated at between 1 and 3 per cent) (Goudie, 2000) and certainly not high enough to threaten the legitimacy of the system. A related concern is that compulsory voting will lead to higher levels of invalid or ‘informal’ voting. Though it is true that systems with compulsory voting do have higher levels of invalid voting than voluntary regimes, this increase is lower than the gain in participation (Hirczy, 2000: 46). Yet, Clive [And,] Bean (1986: 61) has argued that informal voting in Australia (which hovers at around 2.7 per cent) has more to do with the preferential system of voting than with the compulsion.38

## Increases Knowledge

### 1AR Civic Engagement

#### The results are not simply knowledge of political issues – civic engagement increases.

Milazzo 08 [(Caitlin, Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham) “Forced to Vote: The Impact of Compulsory Voting Laws on Political Discussion” Paper Presented at MPSA Annual National Conference April 3, 2008] AT

Much of the research on compulsory voting thus far has not given this institution positive reviews. In particular, the large number of spoiled ballots has been a concern for both scholars and policy-makers. If compulsory voting did not actually encourage increased participation (i.e. it only causes an increase in spoiled ballots), we would not expect it to encourage frequent discussion of political matters. High numbers of spoiled ballots would indicate that individuals were not responding the incentives to participate created by compulsory voting. However, the results above provide strong evidence to the contrary. Compulsory voting is associated with increased political discussion, if only in a certain portion on the population. Therefore, it appears that at least some individuals are discussing politics frequently when they are forced to go to the polls. This is not to say however that mandatory voting is the “Holy Grail” of political participation. The overall increase in the probability of engaging in frequent political dis- cussion is a) relatively small and b) limited to one portion of the population. However, arguably even a small increase for individuals who are not interested in politics is important, as this group is consistently less likely to be informed about politics. If compulsory voting encourages non-interested individuals to go the polls and increases their incentives to gather information, then compulsory voting is increasing the civic engagement of these individuals in a signiﬁcant manner. Thus, not only will such individuals be more likely to vote in countries with compulsory voting, but they will also be more informed in their political choices.

#### We have real-world evidence that CV increases engagement using surveys of voters, whereas they all start with the assumption that CV increases uninformed voters without empirical support – we undermine that assumption. Prefer empirics over laboratory assumptions since people aren’t perfectly rational so it makes no sense to use theoretical models.

### Extra Card

#### *Informed voting INCREASED in CV systems – my study controlled for external variables and is comparative.*

*Shineman 3 [Victoria Anne Shineman (Visiting Scholar Center for the Study of Democratic Politics Princeton University). “Compulsory Voting as Compulsory Balloting: How Mandatory Balloting Laws Increase Informed Voting Without Increasing Uninformed Voting.” Mimeo, Princeton University, 2010] AJ*

*The predictions of the CB Model were tested through a computerized laboratory experiment. The experiment enabled full control of external variables, and provided a direct test of the model’s predictions. The experimental results found strong support for the substantive predictions of the model: CB did increase informed turnout in some cases, but did not increase uninformed turnout. Although the cut point predictions of the model were not always realized, the comparative static predictions were supported, a result commonly found in voting studies (see Morton and Williams 2010). The experimental results also found that CB further increased informed turnout in cases where behavioral changes were not predicted: in regions where informed turnout was never predicted, and where it was always predicted.*

### Milazzo Methodology

#### This is empirical evidence based on a survey

Milazzo 08 [(Caitlin, Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham) “Forced to Vote: The Impact of Compulsory Voting Laws on Political Discussion” Paper Presented at MPSA Annual National Conference April 3, 2008] AT

The fundamental assumption of this paper is that individual behavior is inﬂuenced by the environment; attitudes and decisions are shaped by political, social, and economic context in which people live (Huckfeldt 1986; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). Anderson (2007) states, People do not live in a vacuum. They form attitudes and make choices invariable environments, which come in the form of formal institutional rulesthat govern people’s behavior or in the form of diﬀerential economic, social,and political conditions that shape people’s interpretations and actions. Institutional features, such as compulsory voting laws, alter an individual’s political en- vironment by shaping the incentives driving behavior. However, in attempting to explain behavior, it is also important to consider individual level diﬀerences that might alter an individual’s incentive to discuss politics. Thus, there are two levels of analysis embedded within this analysis: the macro (country) level and the micro (individual) level. Since the data is multilevel or hierarchical in nature, traditional statistical models are not appropriate. Hox (2002) discusses the two traditional approaches to multilevel data and the problems associated with each. In the ﬁrst, individual level data is aggregated. However, in doing so, information and variation is lost. In the second approach, data is disaggregated. This overemphasizes the eﬀect of the disaggregated variables by treating each observation as independent. There appears to signiﬁcantly more information than is actually available, and therefore, statistical tests are more likely to lead to Type I errors. Multilevel models avoid these problems by taking into account the fact there are mul- tiple levels of data. These models improve our ability to estimate eﬀects within units, test hypotheses that involve multiple levels, and separate out the variance explained at each level of analysis (Raudenbush and Byrk 2002). Given the nature of questions addressed in this paper, it is clear that a multilevel is the best way to proceed. Thus, a multilevel 10 logistical regression model is used to estimate the eﬀects of macro level characteristics (the presence of compulsory voting) on micro level behavior (political discussion). In order to maximize the generalizability of the results, it is important to include data on a diverse set of countries as possible. The data for this analysis comes from three waves of the World Values Survey (WVS) that took place between 1989 and 2004. While the WVS contains data on a number of countries, the current analysis will be restricted to countries that are considered democracies. 2 This restriction is based on the assumption that the levels of political discussion will vary between countries that hold free elections and those that do not. When elections are not free, citizens may not have the same incentives to discuss politics. On the contrary, there may be consequences for engaging in free speech that discourage people from talking freely about politics. Taking this restriction into account, the data set includes over ﬁfty-seven thousand observations from thirty-seven countries. 3 The dependent variable is political discussion. It is based on the WVS question asking respondents how frequently they discussion politics with their friends. Respondents are given three possible answers: ”never”, ”occasionally”, or ”frequently”. In this analysis, the emphasis will be placed on the latter category. Political discussion holds its greatest value when it comes from a large number of sources, particularly when these sources hold divergent opinions. When individuals communicate with individuals whose politi- cal opinions/preferences are diﬀerent from their own, communication is more inﬂuential (McPhee 1963). In other words, political discussion provides greater inﬂuential power when it comes from a diverse range of sources. Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) point out citizens have tendency to seek out opinions that are consistent with their own, but as 2 Countries that receive a score of 8 or higher on the Polity IV index are included. 3 For a complete list of the countries see Appendix A. 11 the frequency of discussion increases, there is a greater likelihood they will receive in- formation from a wider range of sources and there will be disagreement between those sources. “Such disagreements are likely to carry high informational content, and hence to have a very high potential for inﬂuence” (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995, 288). Thus, the dependent variable is coded to take into account the fact it is frequent discussion that has the greatest utility. Respondents who reported that they discuss politics “frequently” are coded as “1”. All others are coded as “0”. Independent Variables: Macro Level Compulsory Voting Compulsory voting is a categorical variable that captures whether a country has com- pulsory voting laws and the degree to which those laws are enforced. In addition to variation in the types of penalties associated with abstention, there is also considerable variation in the degree to which the penalties are imposed. Countries where compul- sory voting laws are strictly enforced (Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Uruguay) are coded as “2”. Countries with weakly enforced compulsory voting laws (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Greece, and Mexico) are coded as “1”. The remaining countries in the data set are coded as “0” because they do not have compulsory voting. 4 I diﬀerentiate between the two diﬀerent categories of CV laws because the eﬀect of compulsory voting should be more substantial in countries where the laws are strictly enforced as opposed to those where the laws are only sporadically enforced; in countries where the laws are strictly enforced the costs associated with abstention are higher. 4 Coding is based on the classiﬁcation of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Campaign It is important to control for the eﬀects that a campaign may have on the frequency of political discussion. If there was a campaign six months prior or six months after the survey, the country is coded “1”. Otherwise, it is coded as “0”. The presence of a campaign should increase the likelihood that a person will discuss politics frequently.

## Inequality

#### A study of 91 countries over 40 years shows that CV decreases inequality.

Chong and Olivera 2 [Alberto Chong and Mauricio Olivera. “DOES COMPULSORY VOTING HELP EQUALIZE INCOMES?” Economics and Politics, Volume 20, Number 3. November 2008. Blackwell Publishing] AJ

This paper explores the link between compulsory voting and income distribution using a cross-section of countries around the world. Our empirical cross-country analysis for 91 countries during the period 1960– 2000 shows that when compulsory voting can be strongly enforced the distribution of income improves as measured by the Gini coefficient and the bottom income quintiles of the population. Our findings are robust to changes and additions to our benchmark specification. Because poorer countries are the ones with relatively more unequal distribution of income it might make sense to promote such voting schemes in de- veloping regions, such as Latin America. This, under the assumption that bureaucratic costs related with design and implementation are not excessive.

#### CV corrects for the socioeconomic bias in voter turnout – the poorer and younger will cast their votes under CV, but not voluntary voting.

Chong and Olivera 08 [Alberto Chong and Mauricio Olivera. “DOES COMPULSORY VOTING HELP EQUALIZE INCOMES?” Economics and Politics, Volume 20, Number 3. November 2008. Blackwell Publishing] AJ

As explained above, the case for compulsory voting is not based so much on the belief that voter participation should be increased per se, as on the idea that an increased voter turnout will result in a better representation of the desires of the society. The individuals that may benefit the most by voting, somewhat paradoxically, tend not to vote. This may be in part because re- lated transaction costs tend to be extremely high for this group because the individuals do not adequately assess the positive externalities of the voting outcomes. The lack of information or misinformation may be a source of problems too. In fact, there is ample evidence that points toward the fact that the sample of individuals who vote voluntarily is not representative of the entire population of eligible voters. When a compulsory-voting rule brings in those voters who would not vote voluntarily, this changes the demographic composition of the effective electorate. Extensive data on income, age, education, race, and so on, suggest that these characteristics differ between voters and the remaining eligible population (Crain and Leonard, 1993). In fact, it has been argued that the set of eligible non-voters tends to be poorer, less educated, younger, and disproportionately higher in minority groups than the set of voluntary voters. Particularly in developing countries, the chances are that non-voters are net recipients of government services. Compulsory rules may thus increase the share of high-demanders for public services among the active electorate because the characteristics of voluntary non-voters suggest that they are the net gainers of government expenditure, which would shift the position of the median voter. The idea that there is a voter bias is not new. If the non-voting population corresponds to the lower class, compulsory voting would generate a stronger support for fiscal redistribution programs as class-bias evidence on turnout showing that the median voter’s income is above the mean has been widely reported. Compulsory-voting laws would increase turnout, and, in addition, would compel lower-income people to vote. This segment of the population is believed to prefer redistribution policies. In fact, political participation is positively related to socioeconomic characteristics. Furthermore, early re- searchers found a positive relationship between voting and socioeconomic status (Gosnell, 1927). Unequal political participation is then not randomly distributed, generating a systematic bias toward the rich citizens in terms of representation and influence in political decisions. Several studies with country- and region-specific data support this fact. The class-bias turnout was 37% between the least and most educated people in the 1991 Switzer- land referendum (Linder, 1994). For six Central American countries this bias was 12% (Seligson et al., 1995). This same result holds for seven European countries where a difference of 10 percentage points between the lowest and highest of five education levels is typical (Powell, 1986). Likewise, some partial evidence also sustains the connection between turnout and re- presentation. As differentials in turnout based in socioeconomic character- istics diminish, support for left parties increases (Nagel, 1998; Pacek and Radcliff, 1995). It has been shown that a higher turnout benefits leftist parties, while a lower turnout appears to favor the parties of the right (McAllister, 1986). Furthermore, income is consistently, positively corre- lated with the probability of voting, while education has proven to be positively and significantly related to voter turnout in virtually every study of voter participation (Muller, 1988).4 Also, it has been argued that compulsory-voting countries and non-compulsory-voting countries have the same mean voter turnout, but differ in the prevalence of countries with democratic institutions. The compulsory-voting group has a greater demo- cratic presence than the voluntary-voting group. A sample of countries with greater prevalence of democratic institutions exhibits [which exhibit] greater sensitivity to voter preferences than a sample of basically autocratic countries. That is, insofar as government consumption consists of public goods and redis- tributive transfers, democracies have a greater sensitivity to the general needs of the populace than autocratic regimes where greater shares of in- creasing gross domestic product may be transferred to the private wealth of the ruling elite (Yeret, 1995).

## General A2 Frameworkey Turns

[Answers coercion, alienation, fines, uninformed voters]

#### 1. No link to any turns – Hodgkiss proves people want to vote but were literally told they were not – this is the legacy of racism in America – this will answer all of your turns since people want to vote willingly but they are being excluded

#### 2. And you don’t have to vote – ballot secrecy means the duty to vote is unenforceable – this mitigates all your offense since the only duty is to drive to a polling place. That means I outweigh – systematic exclusion from decisionmaking certainly beats their turns

#### 3. Their turns assume the right not to vote – but Hodgkiss proves the right to vote is being denied – that’s more important since it’s the fundamental political expression and the right not to vote is just derived from it

## A2 Status Quo

#### Here’s the framing issue – the Hodgkiss evidence indicates the status quo excludes minorities from the right to vote – it’s not voluntary voting versus compulsory voting but the lack of a right to vote versus compulsory voting. Even if CV does some harm there are couple reasons I outweigh----

#### Intentionality – compulsory voting isn’t intentionally racist but actual exclusion is – it’s proactively excluding minorities which leads to racist enforcement of laws

#### Voice – even if CV leads to some bad policies, compulsory voting gives them the ability to express themselves in the first place so policies will eventually reflect their interests

#### Impact and standard evidence – the opportunity to participate is key [explain standard]

## Ideological First

#### 1. Ideologies come first – they insulate the system of racism from efforts to resist it – the overarching structure of racism is more important than individual reforms.

Reid-Brinkley 08 (Shanara Rose Reid-Brinkley, Assistant Professor of African American Studies and Communications as well as the Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh, “The Harsh Realities Of “Acting Black”: How African-American Policy Debaters Negotiate Representation Through Racial Performance And Style,” 2008]

To begin an investigation of these questions of race, representation and performance, I utilize ideological criticism as a rhetorical method. This project is interested in the ideological discourses and representations of race, class, gender, and sexuality within the public conversation about race and education. The dominant narratives, bred within institutional structures, must be interrogated for processes of normalization implicated in the success and achievement of black students in American society. In other words, an ideological analysis provides us with an opportunity to critically analyze the networks of power through which ideologies flow and gain discursive and representative dominance. The Marxist conception of ideology, reformulated and popularized by Louis Althusser, revolves around the assumption that social bodies are trapped within a “false consciousness” that blinds them to the truth. Althusser argues that “ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.” 66 Such a conception of ideology was necessary to explain why the working class did not rise up against the ruling class. Such ideologies were theorized as part of the superstructure resulting in the limited ability of subjects to exercise agency. For Althusser, dominant ideologies allowed the social structure to reproduce itself without ensuing conflict. Ideology functioned to naturalize the dominant structure encouraging individuals to participate by engaging in practices and behaviors designed to maintain that system. More importantly, ideologies were thought to construct an imaginary reality by which social beings became dependent on the structure as it functions, in order to make sense of their very lives. In essence, ideology was considered to be deterministic, binding individuals to the imaginary reality. However, current scholarship has been expressly critical of such a conceptualization of ideology, particularly, within the field of cultural studies, as it made the critical turn away from the study of dominant ideology and toward the cultural and everyday practices by which subjects engage ideological domination. Noted theorists, including Michel Foucault, Raymond Williams, and Stuart Hall have offered significant critiques of such a view of the relations of power in social system. One criticism of this version of ideology is that it assumes there is a truth, somewhere out there, that we are unable to ascertain because of the false consciousness produced through ideological discourses. 67 Second, as Foucault argues, “ideology stands in a secondary position relative to something which functions as its infrastructure, as its material, economic determinant, etc.” 68 In other words, ideology is defined as a result of economic structures. Thus, the economic structures are pre-existent and thus, uninfluenced by ideology, but simply productive of it. And, third, if the individual or the subject is not critical to the development of such ideological structures, but are instead determined by them, then social subjects become agent-less. They become simply social beings produced by the superstructure. Despite significant criticism of the concept of ideology, it remains significantly useful in the study of social domination. We can agree that there is not some true expression of reality out there that we are somehow blinded from seeing. We can agree that ideology is both produced by and produces economic and social structures. And, we can agree that social actors and their actions are not determined by ideology as much as social actors are strongly influenced toward accepting those ideologies as within their best interest, an internalization of ideological discourse as inscribed through various apparatuses of power. Yet, as media and communications scholar Nicolas Garnham cautions, the focus on resistance in cultural studies can prevent us from studying the manner in which dominance is maintained, both through structure and discourse. 69 He notes that it is the responsibility of intellectuals to map out structural and social dominance. Social actors participate in the production and maintenance of culture, both dominant and subordinate. In any given situation, both dominance and resistance are likely to be active in varying degrees. Thus, this project is not simply interested in the study of the production and maintenance of dominant ideologies; simultaneously, we must look to the manner in which social actors engage in resistance efforts within and through such dominant ideologies. Contemporary racism is reproduced and maintained through discursive constructions that are circulated through ideologies. Ideologies help to make stereotypical representations intelligible to an audience. As long as racism remains a social phenomenon in our society, racial ideologies will likely remain a critical tool by which racial difference is signified. All racial ideologies do not function the same way; they are often complicated by intersections of class, gender, sexuality and context. And, as ideologies often function to dominate, they also create circumstances for resistance. This project seeks to engage both dominance and resistance; how racial ideologies reproduce social dominance, and how those affected by that dominance attempt to resist it. The rhetoric surrounding race and education offers one space from which to analyze the social reproduction of racial dominance. Looking to specific contexts through which we analyze the significance of racial ideologies allows us as scholars to map out the forces of power active through racial difference. Specifically, a rhetorical focus can map the public discursive maneuvers that (re)produce and resist these social ideologies. The rhetoric surrounding race, culture, and performance within educational discourse is of critical importance to the future course of educational opportunity in American society. We must understand the strategies of signification that are most persuasive and powerful to the general public audience. What representations of racial others are most intelligible to the public and how might racial others respond to that intelligibility? As our previous discussion of the “acting white” thesis and the rise of cultural explanations of racial difference indicate, contemporary ideological representations of race have changed and in some ways remained the same. We must interrogate the use of ideological representations of race, gender, class, and sexuality as rhetorical strategy in public deliberations. And, it is important to read the social actors involved and watching as embodied.

#### 2. Magnitude – ideological racism pervades society as a whole and affects inequality in all realms – it excludes minorities from all aspects of participation

#### 3. Long term – ideological racism allows oppression to continue indefinitely since it gets justified – even if some reforms can occur, no real progress can happen without challenging white supremacy first

#### 4. The most important way to resist oppression is at the level of knowledge production – power operates through thought processes that necessitate violence against the disempowered, not through concrete institutions

Biyanwila 8—University of Western Australia (Janaka, Re-empowering labour : Knowledge, ontology and counter-hegemony, http://www.tasa.org.au/uploads/2011/05/Biyanwila-Janaka-Session-59-PDF.pdf)

An essential component of union power and issues of empowerment is the production of knowledge. The disempowerment of labour under the neo-liberal intellectual hegemony highlights the need for new forms of counter-hegemonic knowledge. The dominant unions, both in the global South as well as the North, maintain a mono culture of knowledge that situate unions primarily within the realm of production, systems of industrial relations and formal labour markets. In subordinating the realm of social reproduction, and ‘informal’ labour markets, this approach to knowledge evade the lived reality of those, the majority, enduring multiple forms of violence, from hunger to social exclusion in their every day lives. The re-empowerment of unions relates to elaborating union approaches to knowledge or epistemic frameworks that encourage a deeper understanding of union practices as well as communication with other movements. This paper suggests a return to the realm of ontology, the domain of being, in terms of prioritising and transforming the insecurity and violence in everyday life, particularly in the global South. An emphasis on ontology suggests reinforcing social and democratic approaches to knowledge, in order for unions to engage as a counter movement revitalising their identities as civil society actors. ¶ Introduction ¶ Central to debates around union renewal and empowerment is the development of counterhegemonic knowledge capable of organising and mobilising workers (Moody 1997; Lambert, 2002; Waterman, 2005; Clawson, 2003; Hyman, 2004; Webster et al., 2008). Most dominant unions, or the consolidated segments of the labour movement, are compromised within hegemonic knowledge, creating consent to positivist instrumental approaches to knowledge. This mono-culture of knowledge (Sousa, 2003), despite a discourse of diversity and organising ‘new’ workers, represents unions as economic actors, restricted to the workplace, within systems of industrial relations based on a formal economy of exchange. Meanwhile, the less consolidated segments of the labour movement, such as new unions and worker organisations, rely on counter-hegemonic knowledge, or ecologies of knowledge, elaborating their collective identities as a social movement within civil society. The realm of civil society involving organisations, networks and movements, is a space of hegemonic and counterhegemonic struggles, interrelated to the state. Unions as actors within civil society foreground a social and moral economy which is central to strategic theoretical perspectives of ‘community unionism’ and ‘social movement unionism’ (Moody, 1997; Lambert, 2002; Waterman, 2005; Clawson, 2003; Webster et al., 2008). The representation of unions as actors within civil society, emphasise the movement dimension of unions as well as new approaches to knowledge. Nevertheless, these perspectives often fail to factor in the experience of violence in the everyday lives of workers, particularly in the global South. The “South” refers to a status of subordination, in the core-periphery hierarchies of uneven capitalist development, where the historical experience of colonialism, racism, anti-colonial struggles, as well as disillusionment with post-colonial state forms influence the Southern trade union identities (Lambert, 2002).¶ An often ignored significant structural effect of neo-liberal globalisation, particularly in the South, is the spread of violence and insecurity. Under neo-liberal ideology, the spread of “flexible labour markets” and the privatisation public goods, depends on authoritarian state forms that prioritise ‘national security’ over ‘human security’. The generative mechanism of this violence and insecurity are structures of power that reproduce conditions of exploitation, oppression and subjugation (Das, 1990; Galtung, 1996, 2004; Moser, 2001). Various manifestations of violence that permeate multiple scales and temporalities are generated by structural coupling of capitalism, patriarchy, racism and imperialism (Das, 1990; Moser, 2001; Panitch, 2002; Ali and Ercelan, 2004). The adoption of new coercive domestic and international measures by the US in the post 9-11 context, under the ‘war against terrorism’, reflects the restructuring of the coercive apparatuses of all states to coordinate and maintain the US global hegemony (Panitch, 2002). These authoritarian state strategies often depend on ‘uncivil’ actors in civil society for reproducing structures of violence. Of course, this structural violence is debilitating and undermines individual and collective agency. Nevertheless, it is also at the root of social protest and mobilisation (Panitch, 2002). The multiplicity of struggles from Communists Maoists in tribal areas of India to the Zapatistas in indigenous areas of Mexico, illustrate collective struggles forced into violent modes of resistance. ¶ Violence as an expression of power relations involves structural and cultural dimensions. Structural violence (of hunger, poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy) and cultural violence (patriotic, patriarchal, etc) are embedded in power hierarchies based on class, gender, ethnicity, region, caste, age, (dis)ability, and sexuality. These structures of violence are stratified and differentiated with visible and invisible effects. While direct violence, physical and/or verbal, is visible, they emerge from the more invisible cultural and structural violence (Galtung, 2004). Indeed the resistance to structural violence of state and capital by counter forces also appropriates cultural meanings to legitimize their use of violence as the mode of struggle (Ibid.). According to Galtung (2004), transforming violence through human agency requires a counter discourse of peace and non-violence which must be “built in the culture and in the structure, not only in the ‘human mind’”.

# CONTENTION

## A2 Solvency Deficits

### A2 50 Countries Turn (Varadarajan)

#### Bad methodology – the card aggregates turnout from 1945, has no causal warrant, and doesn’t be intra-country comparisons that examine turnout before and after CV. That means you prefer my evidence

#### Doesn’t account for alternate causes – countries that don’t have CV didn’t need it in the first place – other factor are responsible. Prefer in-country studies – they uniquely account for differences between countries.

### A2 Blank Ballots Means No Solvency

#### The rise in total invalid ballots is tiny compared to the increase in turnout.

Hill 06 [Lisa Hill. “Low Voter Turnout in the United States: Is Compulsory Voting a Viable Solution?” Journal of Theoretical Politics 2006 18: 207. Sage Publications] AJ

Martin Wattenberg (1998a: 20), who has briefly considered the potential for compulsory voting to address America’s turnout problem, concluded that ‘it is debatable’ whether it is really desirable to ‘force’ turnout rates into the 90 per cent and above range. His main concern is that ‘people with limited political knowledge’ would tend to vote in a fashion which Australians call ‘donkey voting’, that is, thoughtlessly numbering their ballot from 1 in descending order.36 Notwithstanding the error in assuming that ‘donkey voting’ is ‘a perversity peculiar to compulsory voting’,37 in fact, the level of the donkey vote is not high in Australia (estimated at between 1 and 3 per cent) (Goudie, 2000) and certainly not high enough to threaten the legitimacy of the system. A related concern is that compulsory voting will lead to higher levels of invalid or ‘informal’ voting. Though it is true that systems with compulsory voting do have higher levels of invalid voting than voluntary regimes, this increase is lower than the gain in participation (Hirczy, 2000: 46). Yet, Clive [And,] Bean (1986: 61) has argued that informal voting in Australia (which hovers at around 2.7 per cent) has more to do with the preferential system of voting than with the compulsion.38

#### Only this argument has empirics – their argument is just a speculation but doesn’t have a warrant

### A2 CV Doesn’t Solve Underlying Problems

#### Yes it does: Extend Cherry 09 – As a result of CV electoral reforms such as holiday voting, easier transportation, mail-in voting, and compulsory registration are much more likely to happen

#### And we solve ideological oppression – cross apply Alejandro.

### A2 Ev is About Felons/Felons Alt Cause

#### Doesn’t matter – non-voting is bad whether it’s because of a collective action problem or felon laws. This is all still offense for me.

#### Cherry 2 answers this – non-voting spills over to other reforms to make voting easier, empirically proven by CV in other countries – that means we solve this

#### This isn’t a big deal – only 9 states have felon disenfranchisement, but 31 have photo ID and 50 have some form of racist policies. This is only a tiny alt cause.

### A2 Australia Low Turnout

## A2 Coercion

### A2 General Coercion

#### All AC impacts turn the NC since contention 1 proves that abstention is rarely CHOSEN – voters who WANT to vote face several barriers that the case solves, which means they can express autonomy better.

#### Extend Hodgkiss 01 and Knafo 13 – US voting are deliberately racist and exclusionary

#### Extend Hill 1 – Non voters care TWICE as much as voters, yet they face emotional barriers and a collective action problem that impairs actual mobilization. What they REALLY want is to make a difference, which only the case does.

### A2 Minorities will hate CV

#### Contention 1 proves minorities are extremely dissatisfied with the squo, so my harms outweigh

#### Empirics: Extensive AC evidence proves minorities are really dissatisfied

#### Scope: Every alienated voter feels left out, but only a small section of minorities will actually not want to vote

## A2 Alienation

#### Turn – The case solves alienation since both citizens and politicians will acknowledge than alienated voters actually matter. Status quo alienation is a much larger issue than a $20 fine that most people won’t pay

#### *It’s Deliberate: Discrimination is explicit in the status quo, which is a slap in the face to every demographic except middle-class white people. People are rejected from the system*

#### *Politicians are incentivized to exclude minorities in the squo, but in the aff world there’s better communication and respect since now politicians want their vote.*

## A2 Fines

#### 1. No impact – fees are small and and valid exemptions exist

Jackman 01 [Simon Jackman. Assistant Professor and Victoria Schuck Faculty Scholar, Department of Political Science, Stanford University. “Compulsory Voting.” To appear in The International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences] AJ

Compliance with CV is most commonly induced with a system of small to moderate fines (e.g., Australia and Belgium), although a substantial number of countries with CV do not rely on fines. Other penalties include ineligibility for elected office for a prescribed period (e.g., Argentina), ineligibility for certain types of government employment (e.g., Venezuela), and disenfranchisement (e.g., Thailand). In other countries CV operates as a norm, with social embarrassment an important sanction for non-compliance (e.g., Italy). Sometimes CV appears as a constitutional provision or in statute, but with no mention of penalties for non- compliance (e.g., Bolivia, Chile, Liechtenstein, Egypt). Many countries also have large classes of exemptions. For instance, Australia’s federal CV statute exempts non-voters with ‘‘valid and sufficient’’ reasons for not turning out; Australia’s courts have rigorously denied non-voters’ claims of indifference between the candidates or alienation from politics as valid and sufficient reasons (AEC 1999). Age exemptions are also common: for instance, Brazil makes voting optional for citizens betweenthe ages of 16 and 18, citizens over the age of 70, and for illiterates.

#### I outweigh – even if fines matter, if citizens don’t vote policy is skewed against them – empirically, this has also made them poorer. Stronger link to poverty – fines are small whereas I affect much larger policy changes that outweigh in terms of dollars and cents

#### 2. No impact to fines – this aff is racism, not poverty – these are two different mechanisms of oppression, and this argument isn’t impacted to mine

#### 3. I outweigh poverty – I solve policies like mass incarceration or the de-funding of public school – these spill over into minorities’ finances but also destroy their life chances – the internal link is stronger

## A2 Violence Against Voters

#### This is ridiculous. Electoral violence is incredibly rare in the US anymore – I challenge them to read one card from this century.

#### Second, that’s not how exclusion works anymore – extend Knafo 13 – outright violence and obvious racism have been replaced by a colorblind racism that is much more insidious – through things like photo ID or registration laws, racism is able to mask itself as neutral. Extend Harvard Law Review 7 – these dilute the power of the individual, creating a collective action problem – it’s not outright violence anymore so this doesn’t link.

## A2 Ruse of Solvency

#### We control uniqueness – the system is stagnating now and can’t solve anything – even if CV masks the problem it still gives people a voice which is a net gain for their rights. This argument is just solvency defense.

#### Turn – Blank ballots solve better – if citizens are dissatisfied with their ability to change the system, they’ll write protest ballots which indicates they’re dissatisfied; that’s better than not turning out since it’s clear it’s not a question of laziness – it sends a stronger message

#### Turn – This assumes the problem is masked – but when the people who actually experience oppression have a voice, they can use that voice to resist policies of oppression – unless I actually solve all of oppression people still feel racism and they’ll vote to resist it – there’s zero ruse of solvency since you can change the system

## A2 Uninformed Voters

#### This is about electoral outcomes, which don’t apply to the case. My argument is about increasing access to democracy, not about outcomes – people can be free to choose what they want to choose.

## A2 Invalid/Donkey Votes

#### The rise in total invalid ballots is tiny compared to the increase in turnout.

Hill 06 [Lisa Hill. “Low Voter Turnout in the United States: Is Compulsory Voting a Viable Solution?” Journal of Theoretical Politics 2006 18: 207. Sage Publications] AJ

Martin Wattenberg (1998a: 20), who has briefly considered the potential for compulsory voting to address America’s turnout problem, concluded that ‘it is debatable’ whether it is really desirable to ‘force’ turnout rates into the 90 per cent and above range. His main concern is that ‘people with limited political knowledge’ would tend to vote in a fashion which Australians call ‘donkey voting’, that is, thoughtlessly numbering their ballot from 1 in descending order.36 Notwithstanding the error in assuming that ‘donkey voting’ is ‘a perversity peculiar to compulsory voting’,37 in fact, the level of the donkey vote is not high in Australia (estimated at between 1 and 3 per cent) (Goudie, 2000) and certainly not high enough to threaten the legitimacy of the system. A related concern is that compulsory voting will lead to higher levels of invalid or ‘informal’ voting. Though it is true that systems with compulsory voting do have higher levels of invalid voting than voluntary regimes, this increase is lower than the gain in participation (Hirczy, 2000: 46). Yet, Clive [And,] Bean (1986: 61) has argued that informal voting in Australia (which hovers at around 2.7 per cent) has more to do with the preferential system of voting than with the compulsion.38

## A2 CPs

### General A2 CP

#### Counterplans do not solve the aff – the solvency is very specific – in the status quo, voters are excluded from voting which creates a collective action problem. Only forcing them to vote can overcome this barrier to inclusion

### A2 Ease of Access CPs

#### Huge solvency deficit – it’s not just about ease of access – lack of political interest is highest in disadvantaged communities which the CP doesn’t solve.

Berinsky 05 [Adam J. Berinsky. “The Perverse Consequences of Electoral Reform in the United States.” American Politics Research 2005; 33; 471. SAGE Publications] AJ

Electoral reforms, nevertheless, have had a significant, if unintended, effect. Most politicians and scholars have focused reform efforts on the tangible barriers to voting. These reforms are designed to lower or erase the barriers to voting, making it easier forall citizens to vote, regardless of their personal circumstances. However, the direct costs of registration and getting to the ballot box are only part of the picture. The more significant costs are the cognitive costs of becoming engaged with and informed about the political world. Political interest and engagement, after all, determine to a large extent who votes and who does not. Because levels of political engagement currently follow, rather than cross, demographic divisions in the electorate, reforms designed to make voting “easier” magnify the existing socioeconomic biases in the composition of the electorate. These reforms ensure that those citizens who are most engaged with the political world—those with politically relevant resources—continue to participate, whereas those individuals without such resources fall by the wayside.2

### A2 Registration CP

#### You don’t solve the mechanism of the aff – in addition to registration issues, there are actions by individual officials and photo ID and other disenfranchisement laws that registration doesn’t solve – you only solve a tiny amount of racism

#### The reason people don’t register is because they don’t vote, not the other way around – you’d only register if you intend to vote. CP doesn’t solve the root cause which is individual feelings of disempowerment, not difficulty of registration – the Hodgkiss evidence in the aff proves people who were registered and who were trying to vote were turned away at the polls

## A2 Disenfranchisement Good

#### Disenfrachisement is a continuation of racist policies, reproducing the logic of the enslavement of black people

Weatherspoon 7 [(Floyd, expert in African-American males and the law, published in law journals and newspapers, associate dean for Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs, member of the National Bar Association and the American Bar Association, external Administrative Judge for the EEOC) “The Mass Incarceration of African-American Males: A Return to Institutionalized Slavery,Oppression, and Disenfranchisement of Constitutional Rights” 13 Texas Wesleyan Law Review 599 (2007)] AT

In a class discussion with law students in my African-American Males and the Law Seminar, I asked them if they could think of an institutional system where mass numbers of individuals are involuntarily placed in servitude for extended periods or life. In addition, they lost the right to vote, to freely travel, to obtain an education, to gain meaningful employment, were more harshly punished than whites who committed the same crimes, and housed in deplorable conditions. Without hesitation, the law students responded that I was describing the institution of slavery in America or the period after Reconstruction. In reality, I was describing the present status of African-American males in America who are imprisoned in mass numbers. The present day plight of African-American males parallels the experiences of Africans who were enslaved in America and the experiences of African-Americans after Reconstruction. Similar to the mass number of Africans enslaved in America during the colonial period and prior to the Civil War, mass numbers of African-American males have temporarily or permanently lost the right to vote, to freely travel without harassment from governmental officials, to obtain a quality public education, to obtain meaningful employment, and are often punished more severely than whites who commit the same crimes. The theme of this conference explores the quest for freedom and justice by reflecting on the seminal anti-slavery case, Somerset v. Stewart. In Somerset, a black male slave sought freedom through the English court system. James Somerset was enslaved in Virginia. He subsequently traveled to England with his master, Charles Stewart. There, Somerset escaped and sought the assistance of the English court system for freedom. Somerset's lawyers made a compelling and convincing argument to Chief Justice Lord Mansfield that English law did not support the slave owner's claim that he could, at will, remove his slave from England and sell him to another owner in another country. With much trepidation, Mansfield granted Somerset's freedom based on the principle that there was no positive English law supporting the slave owners' claim. Mansfield held that he could not say this case is allowed or approved by the law of England; and therefore the black must be discharged. How ironic and sad that more than 200 years after the Somerset decision, African-American men in America continue to seek freedom and justice through an American justice system unsympathetic to the plight of African-American males. Similar to James Somerset, African-American males in the United States have faced a long and treacherous journey for justice and equality. From Dred Scott, to Plessy, to Scottsboro Boys, and Brown, the journey continues to evolve. Moreover, at every step of the American justice system, African-American males face racial disparity. This Article expands on the plight of James Somerset by exploring how the American justice system disenfranchises African-American males of their constitutional rights of liberty and equal justice, thus placing them in a system of de facto slavery. This Article will also reveal how the American justice system has not only had a devastating impact on the social and economic status of African-American males, but also on their constitutional rights of freedom and justice. Specifically, this Article explores how the mass incarceration of African-American males is a system of involuntary servitude for life, similar to the institution of slavery. This Article documents the mass incarceration of African-American males in federal, state, and local prisons and jails throughout the United States. Evidence is presented that illustrates a direct correlation between the incarceration of African-American males and the loss of their rights to vote in state elections throughout this country. The legal institution of slavery in the United States ended in 1865 with the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, the badges of slavery and bondage have lingered on into the twenty-first century as African-American males' constitutional rights are marginalized and abridged. Moreover, the Fifteenth Amendment was passed to ensure that the newly freed slaves had the right to vote. Yet, African-American males are systematically denied the opportunity to vote. Who would have thought that more than 100 years later, the descendents of newly freed slaves would be denied the right to vote under various state disenfranchisement laws? These laws have been upheld in most states, and achieve what slaves owners attempted to do with the Black Codes--prevent African-Americans from exercising their constitutional right to vote.

## A2 Alt Causes of Racism

### A2 Biological Categorization

#### Cross-apply Knafo 13: The cause of POLITICAL EXCLUSION, which is the specific issue the aff deals with, is political incentives to motivate the base and exclude voters that might pick the other candidate. That means I directly solve better for aff harms

#### State political structures are what have actually enabled and prevented racial violence – biopower is no the deciding factor.

Dickinson 04 [Edward Ross Dickinson, history at Victoria University of Wellington, Australia, March 2004 (Central European History 37.1]

In an important programmatic statement of 1996 Geoff Eley celebrated the fact that Foucault’s ideas have “fundamentally directed attention away from institutionally centered conceptions of government and the state . . . and toward a dispersed and decentered notion of power and its ‘microphysics.’”48 The “broader, deeper, and less visible ideological consensus” on “technocratic reason and the ethical unboundedness of science” was the focus of his interest.49 But the “power-producing effects in Foucault’s ‘microphysical’ sense” (Eley) of the construction of social bureaucracies and social knowledge, of “an entire institutional apparatus and system of practice” ( Jean Quataert), simply do[es] not explain Nazi policy.50 The destructive dynamic of Nazism was a product not so much of a particular modern set of ideas as of a particular modern political structure, one that could realize the disastrous potential of those ideas. What was critical was not the expansion of the instruments and disciplines of biopolitics, which occurred everywhere in Europe. Instead, it was the principles that guided how those instruments and disciplines were organized and used, and the external constraints on them. In National Socialism, biopolitics was shaped by a totalitarian conception of social management focused on the power and ubiquity of the völkisch state. In democratic societies, biopolitics has historically been constrained by a rights-based strategy of social management. This is a point to which I will return shortly. For now, the point is that what was decisive was actually politics at the level of the state. A comparative framework can help us to clarify this point. Other states passed compulsory sterilization laws in the 1930s — indeed, individual states in the United States had already begun doing so in 1907. Yet they did not proceed to the next steps adopted by National Socialism — mass sterilization, mass “eugenic” abortion and murder of the “defective.” Individual figures in, for example, the U.S. did make such suggestions. But neither the political structures of democratic states nor their legal and political principles permitted such policies actually being enacted. Nor did the scale of forcible sterilization in other countries match that of the Nazi program. I do not mean to suggest that such programs were not horrible; but in a democratic political context they did not develop the dynamic of constant radicalization and escalation that characterized Nazi policies.

### A2 Capitalism

#### A2 Voting Exploits Working Class

#### This makes literally no sense – voting is a form of empowerment as it enables citizens to engage in the process of self-actualization. That’s Gould 1 in the framework, [which they already conceded]

## A2 Legitimizes State

### A2 Aff Legitimizes the state

#### Non-unique: Neg also defends the status quo, so there’s no way of fighting the state in their world either. That means you look to other offense

#### The aff makes social and political changes, which address the so-called “root problems” of racism. That means instead of minorities being a useless underclass, they can address the illegitimacy of the state in the first place. [Explain]

### A2 State Bad

#### Cross apply Gould 2 and 3 – societal attitudes of what the “normal citizen” is are the root cause of state racism since everyone but the white Protestant is excluded. That means I solve the root cause of state racism. Prefer my evidence on specificity.

#### [Extra]

#### IMPACT TURN - Even if the state has enabled racism in the past, it still mitigates civil society’s fantasy of racial violence. The state is the only thing standing between us and doomsday.

Myers 03 [Tony, former lecturer at the University of Stirling. He is the author of Upgrade Your English Essay (Arnold, 2002) and numerous articles on postmodernism, psychoanalysis and politics. Slavoj Zizek, pg 107-108]

Of course, as fantasies cannot ultimately coexist peacefully, particularly when they are ethnic fantasies, this ethic can only ever be an intermediate solution. For the present, Zizek has a more practical solution to the problem of racism, one which draws on his own experience in Slovenia. Surprisingly for a revolutionary, Zizek argues that we should support the state in opposition to civil society. By 'state' Zizek here means to refer to the institutions of government, whereas 'civil society' designates, in its wildest sense, the people of a nation or non-governmental groups. While Zizek might aspire to a nation based purely on the consensual will of civil society, he contends that, in the light of the currently existing racist fantasies of much of civil society, this is just not possible. If he finds this in Slovenia, where he argues that civil society is basically right-wing, Zizek also sees it, for example, in the United States: In America, after the Oklahoma bombing, they suddenly discovered that there are hundreds of thousands of jerks. Civil society is not this nice, social movement, but a network of moral majority conservatives and nationalist pressure groups, against abortion, for religious education in schools. A real pressure from below. (Lovink 1995) For Zizek is the state that should act as a buffer between the fantasies of different groups, mitigating the worst effects of thoses fantasies. If civil society were allowed to rule unrestrained, much of the world would succumb to racist violence. It is only the forces of the state which keep it in check. In the long term, Zizek argues that in order to avoid a clash of fantasies we have to learn to "traverse the fantasy" (what lacan terms "traversing the fantôme). It means that we have to acknowledge that fantasy merely functions to screen the abyss or inconsistency in the Other. In "traversing" or "going through" the fantasy "all we have to do is experience how there is nothing 'behind' it, and how fantasy masks precisely this 'nothing'". (The Sublime Object of Ideology) The subject of racism, be it a Jew, a Muslim, a Latino, an African-American, gay or lesbian, Chinese, is a fantasy figure, someone who embodies the void of the Other.

#### Alt cause – social interactions that gave rise to the state also enabled its racism. States don’t have to be like this, as multicultural states like China prove.

Dean 06 [Jodi Dean. “Is the State Racist by Nature?” March 16, 2006. I Cite]

I don't think so. Overall, I think Old reads the state as such as fascist--rooted in an racial identity that seeks to establish its (impossible) unity through the violent annihilation of difference. This isn't convincing to me because there are, in fact, multicultural states and constitutions that seek promote or preserve different ethnicities. And, I don't read all claims made in terms of the inhabitants of a state (of its citizenry or people) as necessarily racialized or racializing, though they can be. Yet, I have a number of more specific problems with Old's view. First, I don't think there is such a beast as the modern state. As I understand it, there have been different kinds of states. The fact that there are different states recognized within the UN, say, or part of the international arena, does not mean that the states are states in the same way; it does not mean that, the efforts of hegemons to the contrary, all states are based in nations; nor does it mean that all nations are totalities or even wanna-be totalities. This suggests, then, that there is not one form or nature of the state that even could be considered racist. Second, and consequently, it seems important here to consider differences among state forms and histories. China, for example, didn't take its structure from religious-race wars. Anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle impacted the state forms that arose in their wake. Third, the ability to wage total war and annihilate other races doesn't seem to me to characterize the structure or goals of most states. If so, then we would find the vast majority to be failure as states. Now, maybe they are failures, but surely for other reasons. Contemporary international relations theorists Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes (in their chapter to the book Empire's New Clothes) can help this discussion. Rejecting the all too limited Westphalian model of states, they point out that the sovereignty narrative is state-centric: Many social processes--such as the internationalization of capital or modernity--and relations--such as those of gender, class, race, or colonialism--transcend state boundaries in complex and significant ways. Indeed, reflection on the past three hundred or so years--since Westphalia--indicates that the dominant political form has in any case been the imperial state and empire rather than the sovereign state. Laffey and Weldes also take up the Eurocentricism of Westphalian sovereignty, rejecting the idea that the territorial state arose in Europe and was imposed on the rest of the world. Why? Because this model neglects the persistent and integral relations between Europe and the non-European world and their joint role in generating the characteristic social forms of modernity, including the state itself. As Fernando Coronil observes, for example: "Since the European conquest of the Americans, the West and its peripheries have been mutually constituted through processes of imperial transculturation and capital accumulation that continue, in different forms, in the present." They also observe the limitation of a state centered approach to analyzing state violence (a point relevant to Old's claim regarding total war) European states have used foreign military and security manpower. Recruiting local soldiers and police forces from within colonized territories was integral to imperial relations between Europe and non-Europe throughout the period marked by the so-called Westphalian sovereign state, as the British empire in India attests...the sovereignty narrative obscures the international constitution of state power, a routine practice in the history of imperial relations.

## A2 New Voters are Manipulated

#### No impact – It doesn’t matter if new voters are easily swayed, they still need the right to vote.

#### We outweigh – as people retain the right to vote, they will become less inexperienced – this is a very short term impact.

## A2 Creates a Narrative of “Lazy Black Voter”

#### Aff solvency takes this out – the whole thesis of the case is that minorities can and will vote more

#### Non-unique: The narrative already exists in the squo, so only aff has a hope of solving.

#### Turn – the status quo perpetuates that narrative since black voters are excluded from political participation which causes others to think they’re lazy. Compulsory voting solves by encouraging political participation.

## A2 Fosters Resentment of Minorities

#### The only people who will be resentful are politicians who want to keep excluding minorities to win elections – the aff would restrict their influence anyways so resentment wouldn’t have an impact

#### This is the logic I criticize – you are literally saying minorities shouldn’t have a voice because white people won’t like it. We outweigh – the right to vote is more important.

## A2 Diverge from own preferences [Selb and Lachat]

#### The aff is about access to voting, not about people’s preferences. If people choose not to become informed, that doesn’t impact to my standard. My argument is about increasing access to democracy, not about outcomes – people can be free to choose what they want to choose.

#### We outweigh – more people vote for their own preferences than anything else – they only use a theoretical model under the assumption of uninformed voters. This is weak evidence at best.

## A2 CV kills Civic Participation

#### No impact – the aff is about the right to inclusion in the political process, not about how people choose to engage in it. It is equally legitimate for people to not to engage in the same way every else does.

#### We control uniqueness – the current system excludes minorities completely which means zero civic participation – only a risk the aff increases it. Remember the framework is only about racism, not access to politics in general.

### A2 Lundell

#### Your own evidence concedes this isn’t offense. Quote – “the positive and negative effects of compulsory voting cancel each other out. There are certainly those who get inspired and take interest in political and societal activities”

## A2 Ideological Range [Jensen and Spoon]

#### Turn – that means minority parties get represented more, increasing their power in government. More representative government is key to participation.

#### No link

#### it’s not about policies to benefit minorities, but ensuring they have access to voting. Making it harder to pass policies doesn’t have an impact.

#### This only links to multi-party parliamentary governments, not 2-party legislatures like the US system – this talks about coalition governments which don’t exist in the US.

#### No reason fewer policies is bad – at worst it’s neutral since many policies harm minority citizens.

# A2 Specific People’s Dumps

## A2 Trav Dump

This has 13 args: Rovensky, selb and lachat, lundell, Jensen and spoon, applegate, malkopolo, varadarajan, Graham, chong, battacharyay, Gerzensee, hammer, and saunders

#### As an overview----

#### 1. None of these arguments link to the aff – it’s about access to political expression, not about policy outcomes or compositions of government that favor minorities. The framework says that is key to ensuring multiculturalism – the onus is on him to explain why his arguments link

#### 2. Extend Alejandro – CV solves ideological racism since it’s key to valuing people as equals – coercion uniquely expresses people’s participation as vitally important to the system that it’s worth fighting for – failing to coerce allows us to express their voice as not crucial for the system. This outweighs.

#### A) Ideologies come first – they insulate the system of racism from efforts to resist it – the overarching structure of racism is more important than individual reforms.

Reid-Brinkley 08 (Shanara Rose Reid-Brinkley, Assistant Professor of African American Studies and Communications as well as the Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh, “The Harsh Realities Of “Acting Black”: How African-American Policy Debaters Negotiate Representation Through Racial Performance And Style,” 2008]

To begin an investigation of these questions of race, representation and performance, I utilize ideological criticism as a rhetorical method. This project is interested in the ideological discourses and representations of race, class, gender, and sexuality within the public conversation about race and education. The dominant narratives, bred within institutional structures, must be interrogated for processes of normalization implicated in the success and achievement of black students in American society. In other words, an ideological analysis provides us with an opportunity to critically analyze the networks of power through which ideologies flow and gain discursive and representative dominance. The Marxist conception of ideology, reformulated and popularized by Louis Althusser, revolves around the assumption that social bodies are trapped within a “false consciousness” that blinds them to the truth. Althusser argues that “ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.” 66 Such a conception of ideology was necessary to explain why the working class did not rise up against the ruling class. Such ideologies were theorized as part of the superstructure resulting in the limited ability of subjects to exercise agency. For Althusser, dominant ideologies allowed the social structure to reproduce itself without ensuing conflict. Ideology functioned to naturalize the dominant structure encouraging individuals to participate by engaging in practices and behaviors designed to maintain that system. More importantly, ideologies were thought to construct an imaginary reality by which social beings became dependent on the structure as it functions, in order to make sense of their very lives. In essence, ideology was considered to be deterministic, binding individuals to the imaginary reality. However, current scholarship has been expressly critical of such a conceptualization of ideology, particularly, within the field of cultural studies, as it made the critical turn away from the study of dominant ideology and toward the cultural and everyday practices by which subjects engage ideological domination. Noted theorists, including Michel Foucault, Raymond Williams, and Stuart Hall have offered significant critiques of such a view of the relations of power in social system. One criticism of this version of ideology is that it assumes there is a truth, somewhere out there, that we are unable to ascertain because of the false consciousness produced through ideological discourses. 67

#### B) Magnitude – ideological racism pervades society as a whole and affects inequality in all realms – it excludes minorities from all aspects of participation

#### C) Long term – ideological racism allows oppression to continue indefinitely since it gets justified – even if some reforms can occur, no real progress can happen without challenging white supremacy first

#### 3. CV increases political knowledge – empirics prove

Milazzo 08 [(Caitlin, Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham) “Forced to Vote: The Impact of Compulsory Voting Laws on Political Discussion” Paper Presented at MPSA Annual National Conference April 3, 2008] AT

Much of the research on compulsory voting thus far has not given this institution positive reviews. In particular, the large number of spoiled ballots has been a concern for both scholars and policy-makers. If compulsory voting did not actually encourage increased participation (i.e. it only causes an increase in spoiled ballots), we would not expect it to encourage frequent discussion of political matters. High numbers of spoiled ballots would indicate that individuals were not responding the incentives to participate created by compulsory voting. However, the results above provide strong evidence to the contrary. Compulsory voting is associated with increased political discussion, if only in a certain portion on the population. Therefore, it appears that at least some individuals are discussing politics frequently when they are forced to go to the polls. This is not to say however that mandatory voting is the “Holy Grail” of political participation. The overall increase in the probability of engaging in frequent political dis- cussion is a) relatively small and b) limited to one portion of the population. However, arguably even a small increase for individuals who are not interested in politics is important, as this group is consistently less likely to be informed about politics. If compulsory voting encourages non-interested individuals to go the polls and increases their incentives to gather information, then compulsory voting is increasing the civic engagement of these individuals in a signiﬁcant manner. Thus, not only will such individuals be more likely to vote in countries with compulsory voting, but they will also be more informed in their political choices.

#### Impacts ---- A) Turns Selb and Lachat, Jensen and Spoon, Battacharyay, Gerzensky, and Saunders – we have empirical evidence that CV increases engagement, whereas they all start with the assumption that CV increases uninformed voters without empirical support – we undermine that assumption. Prefer empirics over laboratory assumptions since people aren’t perfectly rational so it makes no sense to use theoretical models.

#### B) CV is key to reducing marginalization by increasing civic engagement – that turns Lundell which only accounts for a few forms of civic engagement without counting the important types of participation my evidence talks about.

#### 4. Empirics prove CV increases turnout – extend Engelen – cross-country comparisons prove countries with CV are statistically more likely to have high turnout – this answers Varadarajan since it uses an empirical model whereas Varadarajan is just looking at the data and uses no analysis; also answers graham since it analyzes countries on balance instead of just Australia so it’s more holistic. Also, within-country comparisons prove after CV is implemented, turnout increases – this answers the turnout turns since they don’t analyze the direct effects of CV laws whereas I do.

#### 5. A study of 91 countries over 40 years shows that CV decreases inequality.

Chong and Olivera 2 [Alberto Chong and Mauricio Olivera. “DOES COMPULSORY VOTING HELP EQUALIZE INCOMES?” Economics and Politics, Volume 20, Number 3. November 2008. Blackwell Publishing] AJ

This paper explores the link between compulsory voting and income distribution using a cross-section of countries around the world. Our empirical cross-country analysis for 91 countries during the period 1960– 2000 shows that when compulsory voting can be strongly enforced the distribution of income improves as measured by the Gini coefficient and the bottom income quintiles of the population. Our findings are robust to changes and additions to our benchmark specification. Because poorer countries are the ones with relatively more unequal distribution of income it might make sense to promote such voting schemes in de- veloping regions, such as Latin America. This, under the assumption that bureaucratic costs related with design and implementation are not excessive.

#### This is the only empirical evidence analyzing the direct effects of CV on inequality – none of the turns use these direct empirics, at best they analyze one step of the link chain without the rest; that’s best since it mean we don’t have to piece together often contradictory data sets to reach a conclusions.

### Line by line

#### Off Rovensky –

#### We control uniqueness – the system is stagnating now and can’t solve anything – even if CV masks the problem it still gives people a voice which is a net gain for their rights. This argument is just solvency defense.

#### Turn – Blank ballots solve better – if citizens are dissatisfied with their ability to change the system, they’ll write protest ballots which makes clear it’s not a question of laziness

#### Turn – This assumes the problem is masked – but when the people who actually experience oppression have a voice, they can use that voice to resist policies of oppression – no ruse of solvency since you can change the system

#### Off Selb and Lachat – This is about how people vote against their preferences, but they still vote so it doesn’t link. How people express their voice isn’t relevant to the aff.

#### Off Lundell

#### No link – this card references non-political expression, but the framework is very specific to political expressin – this argument relegates minorities to the non-political arena.

#### We control uniqueness – the current system excludes minorities completely which means zero civic participation – only a risk the aff increases it.

#### Your own evidence concedes this isn’t offense. Quote – “the positive and negative effects of compulsory voting cancel each other out. There are certainly those who get inspired and take interest in political and societal activities”

#### This very specific to the UK and how the Labor party is evil. This literally doesn’t apply to the US at all.

# Framework

## A2 Neg Framework Interactions

### A2 Democracy Solves Racism

#### This is PRECISELY what I’m saying – the democratic process solves racism only if minorities have a voice in the first place – the entirety of the aff proves they don’t and that CV is necessary to solve it – democracy only solves racism when you affirm

#### The US proves democracy doesn’t solve racism – the aff says there has been a history of discrimination and oppression and democracy hasn’t solved it.

### A2 Autonomy Is Prereq

## Epistemology

### A2 Theory Not Racist Anymore

#### Racist thought is intertwined with our knowledge even today.

Hunter 2 [(Margaret, Department of Sociology, Loyola Marymount University) “Rethinking epistemology, methodology, and racism: or, is White sociology really dead” Race & Society 5 (2002) 119–138] AT

How does racism affect sociological research and knowledge production? Many have answered this question by explaining that science allows us to neutralize any outside inﬂuences on the research process, keeping it objective and free from the contaminating inﬂuences of race and other social constructions. I contend that racism and power are not outside of the research process at all, and that in fact, they affect nearly every aspect of how researchers conduct their research from the choice of research questions to the interpretation of their data (Andersen, 1993). Drawing on the literatures of the insider/outsider debate in sociology (Hare, 1973; Merton, 1972; Wilson, 1974), and feminist methodology and epistemology studies, I will outline how racial knowledge is infused in the knowledge production process from start to ﬁnish, and how the act of critical reﬂexivity, coupled with an examination of and ultimate change in power relations, can help researchers see their hidden assumptions about race and racism more clearly. The modern concept of race developed out of the Western European colonial project beginning in the ﬁfteenth century (Smedley, 1993; Takaki, 1993). They used the ideology of race, which included a belief in the inherent inequality between human groups, to justify their plunder of other people and lands. Race remains an ideology of the taxonomy of bodies built on structural inequality. The ideology of race is ﬂexible, however, and has shifted over time. For example, the long-time focus on biological differences between the races has shifted somewhat, at least in the U.S., to an ideology that focuses on cultural differences as the basis for inequality. Race began as, and remains today, a “folk classiﬁcation” that describes human differences as inherently unequal (Smedley, 1993, p. 25). Although many scholars now argue that race is not “real” in the biological sense, race is still very much a socio-cultural reality. Individuals and groups receive differing amounts of resources according to their ascriptive racial categories. Race is a social construction that refers to different types of human bodies for the purpose of creating and maintaining a matrix of material and ideological domination of one group by another (Omi & Winant, 1994). I borrow Bonilla-Silva’s (2001) deﬁnition of racism to describe the systemic, materialist nature of this process. “... races in racialized societies receive substantially different rewards. This material reality is at the core of the phenomenon labeled as racism” (Bonilla-Silva, 2001, p. 22). He goes on to argue that Whites in the United States have developed a racial praxis that allows them to maintain their systemic advantages and to obscure the fact that the system is unfair (Bonilla-Silva, 2001). In this way, racism is not just an ideology, but a material reality, and a structural system that sorts resources unequally according to race.

### XT – A2 Objectivity Real

#### It’s not about objectivity – power shapes our thought processes, meaning that our default way of viewing the world will be biased from the start unless we question those assumptions

Hunter 2 [(Margaret, Department of Sociology, Loyola Marymount University) “Rethinking epistemology, methodology, and racism: or, is White sociology really dead” Race & Society 5 (2002) 119–138] AT

This paper is not another treatise on how to reinstate objectivity into the social sciences, nor is it an argument for postmodern cultural relativism. Instead, I argue that a shift in racial power relations, coupled with the practice of critical reﬂexivity in the research process, is fundamental to the project of addressing racist knowledge production. Through the ongoing act of critical reﬂexivity, researchers can begin to see what they are not seeing in their “default epistemologies.” Debates over the assimilation patterns of Asian and Latino immigrants provide one example where critical reﬂexivity is useful. A researcher who critically reﬂects on the contemporary assimilation literature will be able to see how the current immigrant experience is understood through the Black/White racial paradigm: sociologists interpret assimilation patterns as mimicking either White ethnics (total assimilation) or African Americans (blocked assimilation). I return to this example in more detail after a fuller discussion of racial epistemologies and objectivity. Although critical reﬂexivity is a crucial tool in examining epistemologies, attention to unequal power relations in U.S. society at large and how they affect our knowledge production processes is vital. It is not sufﬁcient to reﬂect on or think about different ways of understanding racism. It is imperative to uncover the way that U.S. power relations validate some ways of knowing and denigrate others (Cazenave & Maddern, 1999).Gaventa (1980) suggests that power not only coerces people to do things against their own interests, power has the ability to affect our very understandings of the world and perceptions of our society. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is an excellent example of the power of dominant epistemologies to shape our knowledge and elicit submission to elites (Hoare & Smith, 1971). For example, some forms of racial knowledge are used to perpetuate state-sponsored racism through social and economic policies. The knowledge production process will ultimately only change when signiﬁcant shifts in racial power change. I envision the process of critical reﬂexivity as one part of that process. Although debates over the role of science and objectivity have been present within the discipline of sociology since its inception, several African American sociologists brought the issue to the fore in the early 1970s. In 1973, sociologist Joyce Ladner and other social scientists declared the “death of White sociology” in her edited volume of the same name. Ladner and others were critical of the canonization of sociological research done in the name of objectivity and value-neutrality that conﬁrmed and perpetuated racist assumptions about African Americans. “Mainstream sociology, in this regard, reﬂects the ideology of the larger society, which has always excluded Black lifestyles, values, behavior, attitudes, and so forth from the body of data that is used to deﬁne, describe, conceptualize, and theorize about the structure and functions of American society” (Ladner, 1973, p. xxiii). Ladner and others argued that sociology and other social sciences are not value-free or scientiﬁcally objective and never can be. Consequently, they tried to lay the groundwork for what would be a new Black sociology: created from the lived experiences and perspectives of Black people,1 using theories and analytic categories organic to the Black experience. Although a new Black sociology never developed in an institutionalized way, the dialogue initiated by these scholars was an important one. In fact, this debate carries on today. The theme of the 2002 Association of Black Sociologists meeting was “Black Sociology vs. Sociology by Blacks: An Examination of Theoretical and Methodological Paradigms.

### Philosophy = Historically Contingent

#### Philosophy is never objective – all philosophical theories privilege some mode of being and perpetuate some kinds of structural inequality.

Kehoe [(Killian, Policy Analyst at Institute of International and European Affairs) “The Whole Picture - Gramscian Epistemology through the Praxis Prism” Cork Online Law Review, 2003 http://www.mercuryfrost.net/colr/editions/2003/2003ix.pdf] AT

Gramsci found that common sense draws from three sources; shared wisdom, language and popular science and religion. To challenge these is to challenge one’s own world view and achieve a better, rigorous view. However Gramsci recognized that philosophy cannot be separated from the history of philosophy, nor can culture from the history of culture. In the most immediate and relevant sense, one cannot be a philosopher, by which I mean have a critical and coherent conception of the world, without having a consciousness of its historicity, of the phase of development which it represents and of the fact that it contradicts other conceptions or elements of other conceptions. 27 There is a relationship between history and philosophy whereby the thought of the time is tied to that epoch and mirrors the time, leading Gramsci to conclude that philosophy is identical to history, philosophy is history. Yet Gramsci asserts that philosophy, as traditionally recognized, does not necessarily guide action directly, that there are often other considerations which have an influence on activity, the focus of Gramsci’s attention. There are deeper influences beyond philosophical norms on the individual’s real conception of the world and so there is often a dichotomy between thought and action due to the fact that one does not satisfy or provide fully for the latter. Gramsci sought to provide such a theory to explain all action. He recognized action as an effort to change something, to bring into existence some new state of affairs, and that for this reason all action is essentially political. Therefore for Gramsci, philosophy is a living, acting, organic thing, directly related to history and politics. As an Italian academic has commented, under this equation, philosophy becomes a scheme for interpreting the historically given reality and an operative scheme of hypotheses for acting on this reality itself Philosophy’s content comes from action and from the social structure which it seeks to construct. 28 The Philosophy of Philosophy When one sees philosophy as a reaction to a time, a need, and a question or problem philosophy ceases to be a search for absolute knowledge and instead becomes a contingent categorical analysis of a mutable social system. Philosophy, correctly understood, rejects all absolutes and thus becomes a historicism. 29 This suggestion has shared features with the Hegelian claim that philosophy recasts itself after a shape of life has grown old.30 Gramsci held that philosophy progresses with and because 31 the history of mankind does so and like Croce before him Gramsci conceives of all philosophy as applied to a need. Nevertheless there is a recognition that in order to satisfy what Gramsci saw as the new need, there must be a philosophical revolution much like the actual revolution spoken about by socialists of the day. Through rigorous critique and removal of all unknowns Gramsci suggested a new advance from previous thought. All hitherto existing philosophies have been manifestations of the intimate contradictions by which society is lacerated. But each philosophical system taken by itself has not been the conscious expression of this. 32 The most preferable philosophy under this conception is that which shares the organic nature of its role and at the same time effects change. Gramsci hoped to suggest a philosophy that could lead, as well as be lead.

### Epistemology 🡪 Social Change

#### Anti-racist epistemology is key to social change

Hunter 2 [(Margaret, Department of Sociology, Loyola Marymount University) “Rethinking epistemology, methodology, and racism: or, is White sociology really dead” Race & Society 5 (2002) 119–138] AT

My brief, critical investigation of the assumptions and blind spots in the current debate on discrimination and immigration provides only one example of the scholarly beneﬁt to engaging in critical reﬂexivity. All researchers should allow themselves to question academic positivism and acknowledge how their epistemologies, identities, ideologies, discourses, and power affect the knowledge they create about the world (Blauner & Wellman, 1973). This is particularly important for sociologists because we provide so much of the data and interpretation that shape public opinion and government policy on many social issues, although admittedly we never inﬂuence the public as much as we would like to. In order to eradicate racist knowledge production, we must deal with both the ideological and material aspects of racism (Bonilla-Silva, 2001; Omi & Winant, 1994; Smedley, 1993). Because racism is a praxis, it is a totalizing system that requires a radical change in power relations before any progress toward an anti-racist society can be achieved. Although this problem must be addressed at many levels (i.e., economy, education, discourse, etc.) social science researchers have an important role to play. We can continue to (or begin to) resist racist knowledge production and to critically examine our own research methods as supporting or challenging the existing system of inequality. Epistemological diversity in the academy is desirable, and imperative, because it broadens the kind of research being done, and therefore the kind of knowledge being produced. However, this is impossible without a change in racial power relations in our society as a whole. There is neither one way to investigate racism, nor is there one truth about the reality of racism. As researchers move away from dominant positivist ways of understanding racism, they will be able to make room for more diverse research projects that contribute to this ongoing conversation that was ﬁrst broadly publicized by Ladner and her colleagues in The Death of White Sociology. Positivism not only creates a false sense of truth and objectivity, but researchers have greatly harmed many communities, especially communities of color by “researching” them and then publishing the results of their value-free, objective accounts of pathology and degradation (Smith, 1999). We need look no further than the infamous “Moynihan Report”2 for evidence of this behavior. Plural perspectives that are equally regarded as legitimate scholarship are desperately needed in the dialogue on racial and ethnic discrimination. Larger structural changes in race relations are necessary in order for the racial epistemologies of people of color to be more highly valued.

### 1st – No Objectivity

#### **There is** no such thing as objectivity

Kehoe [(Killian, Policy Analyst at Institute of International and European Affairs) “The Whole Picture - Gramscian Epistemology through the Praxis Prism” Cork Online Law Review, 2003 http://www.mercuryfrost.net/colr/editions/2003/2003ix.pdf] AT

In a further convincing attack on objectivism, Gramsci unwittingly revealed a clear parallel with the unfoundationality aspect of postmodern thought by asking piercing questions of objective knowledge claims. Does it seem that there can exist an extrahistorical and extra-human objectivity? Who can put himself in this kind of standpoint in the cosmos itself? And what will such a standpoint mean? It can indeed be maintained that here it is a matter of a hangover of the concept of God, precisely in its mystic conception of an unknown God. 41 In Gramscian terms, to venture beyond our reality is to fall into a mysticism which his philosophy of praxis seeks to avoid. This line of philosophical argument echoes Marxist works unseen by Gramsci which urged all forms of objectivists to give up your abstractions and you will also give up your question. 42 For Gramsci objectivity exists but it is the logic of man’s instantiation in the world, the logic of man’s activity on the basis of needs, the logic of praxis. Thus the conditions of praxis are also the conditions of the objectivity of the possible knowledge, since only through praxis is the world presented to us. 43

## A2 Objections

### A2 Intuitions Cause Racism

#### This is stupid. The aff doesn’t “use” intuitions. The only claim I am making is that racism is bad. If you don’t contest this fact we can move on.

### A2 Skep

#### This argument literally says we shouldn’t do the aff because racism isn’t bad – new link to a K

#### “Uniform theories,” which say that all actions are equally preferable, can be ignored in decision-making without any harm, since these theories become functionally useless under intertheoretic value comparisons.

Jacob Ross [USC Associate Philosophy Professor. “Rejecting Ethical Deflationism.” Ethics , vol. 116, no. 4, pp. 742-768, 2006. www-bcf.usc.edu/~jacobmro/ppr/deflation-ross.pdf] AJ

Suppose I think that a uniform theory is probably true, but I’m not absolutely certain, because I think there is a small chance that some nondeflationary theory may be true. We may suppose that I have a degree of credence of .99 in a uniform theory, TU, and a degree of credence of .01 in some nondeflationary theory, TL. Now suppose I’m trying to decide whether to send a trolley to the right, which would result in ten deaths, or to the left, which would result in five deaths. Theory T , let us suppose, implies that I should send the trolley to the left, while TU, being uniform, implies that either option would be equally good. I could therefore reason as follows. Given one possibility (that TL is true) it would be better to send the trolley to the left, and given the alternative possibility (that TU is true) both options would be equally good. Thus, the option of sending the trolley to the left dominates the option of sending it to the right, and so the former option has a higher expected value. Therefore, I should send the trolley to the left. And this is the same conclusion I would arrive at if I deliberated on the basis of TL alone. Whenever I have credence in two theories, one uniform and one nonuniform, the conclusion I would come to on the basis of the latter theory alone will be the same as the conclusion I would come to by taking into account both theories and reasoning probabilistically. Therefore, no harm is done by excluding the uniform theory from consideration and accepting the nonuniform theory.

### A2 Racism Arbitrary

#### You are just wrong – the status quo is what’s arbitrary, not racism bad – obviously we should try to resist systems of domination because it is a bad thing.

#### It’s important to focus on racism – yes there are other types of oppression but it’s what the US has a 400 year history of doing – making it the most important

#### Sen takes it out – these arguments assume that we start from the position of building society but we don’t – we begin with racist institutions and the question shouldn’t be how to make the perfectly neutral institutions, but rather how those institutions can combat their own racism.

# 1AR K

## 1AR Racism K

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### PHILO LINKS

### Kant

#### Kantian rationality is a tool used by Western thinkers to invent fundamental differences between Europe and the rest of humanity to justify the inferiority of non-white peoples.

Eze 97 Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze [African philosophy: an anthology. “Modern Western Philosophy and African Colonialism.”1997]

When Western philosophy speaks of "reason." It is not just speaking of "science" and "knowledge" and "method," and "critique," or even "thought." In and through these codes it is more fundamentally the question of the "anthropos," of the human, that is at stake, for questions of knowledge and identity, logos and anthropos, always hang together. It is within this background of anthropos as logikos the interlacing of human understanding and the understanding of the human, that Europeans originally introduced the notion of a difference in kind between themselves and Africans as a way of justifying unspeakable exploitation and denigration of Africans.

#### Extend Scheurich and Young 97 – axiology is intertwined with the social history in which that philosophy was formed – you can’t escape the way your ideas get implemented – these ideas are inherently biased against blacks and justifies their oppression.

#### Kantianism is tainted by racist assumptions. To Kant only Europeans count as fully human, all others must be forced to conform.

Eze [(Emmanuel Chukwudi, Prof. Philosophy DePaul University) Post Colonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. “The Color of Reason.” Pg. 130-31]

It should be obvious that what is at stake in our critique of Kant is, as Lucius Outlaw pointedly stales, the "struggle over the meaning of man,"140 or the project of defining what it means to be(come) human. In 1765 Kant wrote: “If there is any science man really needs, ii is the one 1 teach, of how to fulfill properly that position in creation which is assigned to man, and from which he is able to learn what one must be m order to be a man.” It is clear that what [to] Kant settled upon as the "essence" of humanity, that which one ought to become in order to deserve human dignity, sounds very much like Kant himself: "white," European, and male.'4\* More broadly speaking, Kant's philosophical anthropology reveals itself as the guardian of Europe's self-image of itself as [was] superior and the rest of the world as barbaric. Behind Kant's anthropology is what Tsenay Serequeberhan characterizes as "the singular and grounding metaphysical belief that European humanity is properly speaking isomorphic with the humanity of the human as such. This universalist conjunction of metaphysics and anthropology is made possible by a philosophy which understands itself as the lieu of logos so that philosophical anthropology becomes the logocentric articulation of an ahistorical, universal, and unchanging essence of "man." The so-called primitives surely ought to be wary of such Kantian universalist-humanoid abstraction, which colonizes humanity by grounding the particularity of the European self as center even as it denies the humanity of others. And lest it be forgotten, nothing that I have said here is particularly new. Friedrich Gentz, who studied with Kant at Konigsberg In between 1783 and 1786, pointed out that, if the goal of Kant's anthropological theories were realized, it would "compact the whole species into one and the same form," a dangerous situation which would destroy diversity and the "free movement of the spirit" for anyone who disagreed with Kant's compact would be treated as a rebel against fundamental principles of human nature.

### Constitution

#### Documents written 300 years ago in a time of slavery are no model for action – just as non-white males were not part of the “We the People” of the Constitution, the Supreme Court and Constitution does not represent the black citizen – that’s the Wacquant evidence – basing our ethics on these institutions only serves to justify racism.

### Colorblindness

#### Colorblindness is a new link to the K. Western philosophy’s recent move toward colorblindness simply reifies existing racism and oppression. We need to recognize the racism that actually exists in order to address it.

Charles Mills [The Racial Contract. Cornell University Press 1997.]

Contemporary debates between nonwhites and whites about the centrality or peripherality of race can thus be seen as attempts respectively to point out, and deny, the existence of the Racial Contract that underpins the social contract. The frustrating problem nonwhites have always had, and continue to have, with mainstream political theory is not with abstraction *itself* (after all, the "Racial Contract" is itself an abstraction) but with an idealizing abstraction that abstracts away from the crucial realities of the racial polity. The shift to the hypothetical, ideal contract encourages and facilitates this abstraction, since the eminently nonideal features of the real world are not part of the apparatus. There is then, in a sense, no conceptual point-of-entry to start talking about the fundamental way in which (as all nonwhites know) race structures one's life and affects one's life chances. The black law professor Patricia Williams complains about an ostensible neutrality that is really "racism in drag," a system of "racism as status quo" which is "deep, angry, eradicated from view" but continues to make people "avoid the phantom as they did the substance," "defer[ring] to the unseen shape of things." [77](http://www.questia.com/read/103614477" \t "_top)The black philosophy professor Bill Lawson comments on the deficiencies of the conceptual apparatus of traditional liberalism, which has no room for the peculiar postEmancipation status of blacks, simultaneously citizens and noncitizens. [78](http://www.questia.com/read/103614477" \t "_top)The black philosopher of law Anita Allen remarks on the irony of standard American philosophy of law texts, which describe a universe in which "all humans are paradigm rights holders" and see no need to point out that the actual U.S. record is somewhat different. The retreat of mainstream normative moral and political theory into an "ideal" theory that ignores race merely rescripts the Racial Contract as the invisible writing between the lines. So John Rawls, an American working in the late twentieth century, writes a book on justice widely credited with reviving postwar political philosophy in which not a single reference to American slavery and its legacy can be found, and Robert Nozick creates a theory of justice in holdings predicated on legitimate acquisition and transfer without more than two or three sentences acknowledging the utter divergence of U.S. history from this ideal. 80 The silence of mainstream moral and political philosophy on issues of race is a sign of the continuing power of the Contract over its signatories, an illusory color blindness that actually entrenches white privilege. A genuine transcendence of its terms would require, as a preliminary, the acknowledgment of its past and present existence and the social, political, economic, psychological, and moral implications it has had both for its contractors and its victims. By treating the present as a somehow neutral baseline, with its given configuration of wealth, property, social standing, and psychological willingness to sacrifice, the idealized social contract renders permanent the legacy of the Racial Contract. The ever-deepening abyss between the First World and the Third World, where millions -- largely nonwhite -- die of starvation each year and many more hundreds of millions -- also largely nonwhite -live in wretched poverty, is seen as unfortunate (calling, certainly, for the occasional charitable contribution) but unrelated to the history of transcontinental and intracontinental racial exploitation.

### Polls

#### The neg’s idea that the majority will always constitutes what ought to be done is a racist construct that has historically justified oppression – this is a perversion of democracy that ultimately undermines true democratic principles, making it terminal defense against their framework

Wong 13 [(Cori, Philosophical Consultant, Blogger, Lecturer) “Democracy and the Moral Majority: Why Third Graders Know Better” Coriwong.com, June 15] AT

We can obviously point to cases where listening to the majority would be a good thing, yet at some level, we also know that going along with the will of the masses and aligning our actions with majority interests can be highly problematic. In fact, in extreme cases, it can be down right dangerous. This is why we caution against participating in “group think” and “mob mentalities.” Think of Nazi Germany. Think of witch hunts. Think of the majority that, at one point in our history, favored African slavery, or the White majority that created and fought for Jim Crow laws, or the people who believed that homosexuality is a disease, or the men who didn’t think that women are rational enough to vote, or hold political office, or deserve equal pay. Actually, think of any time in history when a revolution was necessary for the realization of greater justice (and think of current political situations for that matter). In those instances, to preserve our own dignity and cling to any shred of self-respect, we should hope that we would not have been part of the majority. Rather, we would hope to be “on the right side of history.” So why don’t we question our faith in democratic rule and the notion of a moral majority? (Uh…I’m using ‘moral majority’ to talk about the power of the majority to influence legislation on moral issues, which is not to be conflated with the right-wing Christian group. Although…well, sure.) As a few others throughout history have been keen to point out before, the fundamental characteristic of democracy that hinges on majority rule also leaves it susceptible to tyranny, namely, the “tyranny of the majority.” Apparently, at about the same time that he and his buds were writing up the Constitution of the United States, John Adams noted that majority rule could, in fact, put vulnerable groups at a great disadvantage. So, the likelihood that the majority can actually be in the wrong was not missed by the very people who established American democracy! They didn’t overlook this possibility only to have it unexpectedly rear its unfortunate and ugly head somewhere down the road when we “lost sight” of the wonders of democracy. Opportunities for injustice, inequality, and oppression are built right into the heart of democracy, brushing shoulders with life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Sometimes exercising these inalienable rights come so close to injustice itself that it’s hard to tell them apart. And the forefathers of our democracy apparently knew this. So, I’ll ask it again, since when has the majority ever been a reliable source of determining what is valuable, right, and good?

### Evolution

#### Evolutionary naturalism is dangerous – it justifies violence and oppression.

Del Housaye [(Kent, Adjunct Professor at Grand Canyon University) “Why Naturalism is Destructive” http://kentdelhousaye.com/2012/09/20/why-naturalism-is-destructive/] AT

A second consequence of naturalism is that it eliminates any moral culpability. That is, without a God who is the source of moral authority, there are no morals except those we invent for ourselves. Therefore, is there is no moral law, then there is no transgression of that law. Sin evaporates in a Godless universe. Without any universal moral boundaries, there is no right and wrong; there is only good and bad. Meaning, we have no legitimate authority to make any moral judgments on others because nothing is intrinsically righteous or sinful. In a world without a moral authority, nobody is wrong. They may be misguided or uninformed or imbalanced, but we have no ultimate moral law by which to evaluate their actions. So, we must simultaneously praise and criticize their actions even if they are wretched. Because naturalism eliminates moral culpability, Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, and Kony are neither right nor wrong to slaughter, torture, maim, and enslave others. Their actions might be reprehensible to people, but they would not be sinful. In other words, they did nothing wrong because there is no wrong. A third consequence of naturalism is that it rejects all purpose and meaning. Scientists with naturalistic beliefs argue that in all the sciences the only question we ought to be asking is “what”. In the sciences, there is no “why”. In other words, naturalism is unconcerned with purpose and meaning. In fact, naturalism denies that there is any purpose or meaning to anything. Things are the way they are because of natural selection, and for no other reason than for the sake of evolutionary progression. In naturalism there is no meaning or purpose for anything or anyone. And, in a world that teaches its youth that they have no purpose in life and that there is no meaning to anything, is it any surprise that we are so depressed and violent? After all, if I am repeatedly reminded that I exist for no reason and have no purpose or significance in this life, then why should I care about others? Why shouldn’t I care only about myself and harm others who stand in my way? The world is horrified when angry people walk into workplaces, schools, and movie theaters to murder masses of people and wonder why. Doesn’t it seem obvious that when you’re told repeatedly of your meaninglessness, insignificance and purposelessness in this world that you will grow depressed and even violent? Naturalistic beliefs lead to a dark and lonely place in which the only good in life is in what you can secure for yourself. And, if we are unable to get what we want out of this life, then it’s no surprise that we would want to blame and harm others who stand in our way. This leads right into the fourth consequence of naturalism, which is that it denies human dignity and value. A worldview that treats human beings as merely advanced primates denies the uniqueness of the human race and hence denies it any special worth or place in the world. Naturalism teaches that human beings are just another species of animals that have evolved over time and that there is nothing that separates them from other animals. That is, they have nothing intrinsically within them that makes them any different. On the other hand, Christian theism teaches that human beings were made to be special and were given the image of God to distinguish them from all other creatures. The book of Genesis in the Bible tells us that God blessed humans by sharing his image with them and installing them in a place above all the animals. So, clearly naturalism and theism are at odds regarding human distinction. Because naturalism denies a Creator, it also denies any divine image in humanity. This means that people are not intrinsically different or special than other things and should be treated no differently. Therefore, it isn’t hard to see how people would have no reservations about harming their fellow human beings any more than they would have about harming dogs, or frogs or flowers. The truth is that angry and depressed people who feel worthless are quick to see others as worthless too. When people do not recognize the worth and dignity of themselves or of others, then there isn’t much that prevents them from harming either. The fifth consequence of naturalism is that it condemns the weak, the sick, and the vulnerable. Naturalism is centrally founded on the concept of the survival of the fittest. It is squarely dependent upon the belief that only the strong survive. The weak are left behind to die and disappear. It is no different with the human race who are part of this evolutionary chain. As the human race evolves, the weak, the sick and the vulnerable among us will inevitably and necessarily be wiped out. Now, most naturalists would never be so bold as to suggest that we ought to expedite that process but they all know that it is necessary for the progress of evolution to continue. And, because it is necessary, their beliefs require them to advocate against anything and anyone who holds up progress. Therefore, the people in our world who are sick, infirmed, and unwanted are the weakest in our race and should be allowed to die or even be killed. So, we can see how this kind of belief would impact ones views of critical social issues like abortion and euthanasia. So, how does naturalism view the weak among us like mentally handicapped children, aging senior adults, and people with so-called incurable diseases? These folks are viewed as obstacles to the progress of human evolution who should be either allowed to die or even potentially removed from our race. Obviously, this kind of thinking leads to such oppressive evils as eugenics and genocide, and those who have pushed for these evils have one thing in common…that’s right, they have all embraced the Darwinian party line known as naturalism. For all of these reasons, we ought to be horrified by the godless worldview of naturalism and should care enough about this to be motivated to talk to our kids and students about it. The truth is that naturalism is not harmless. Rather, it is quite harmful and destructive not only to religious beliefs about God and the world but also to the general welfare of the entire human race.

### Social Contract

#### Social contract theories exist to justify exclusionary political power structures.

James M. Thomas [“Re-upping the Contract with Sociology: Charles Mills's Racial Contract Revisited a Decade Later” Sociology Compass. Volume 1, Issue 1, pages 255–264, September 2007]

Conceptualizing white supremacy as a political system, the second tenet of Mills's racial contract, allows for us to reject the overarching agentic quality found within the original works of social contract theory (see Hobbes 1651; Locke 1690; Rawls 1971; Rousseau 1762), and instead see the racial contract as a the foundational structure of our society. Classical contract theory assumes that man (read: white men) chose to reject the state of original nature and form a society founded on consent to authority for the greater good. Mankind, existing in a chaotic state of nature that they had little or no control over, actively chose to join together as a means of existing in a state of peace that would lead to a manipulation of nature around them as a means of prosperity. As Mills (1997) demonstrates, however, if such a covenant existed, then that covenant existed as an exclusionary tool. Perhaps white men came together to form a certain society, but the original contract was racialized in that people of color were prohibited from even being seen as possessing the ability to tacitly consent to such a contract because to be of color was to be unhuman. Last, the epistemological move by Charles Mills to situate the original social contract within a power vacuum by establishing it as a contract among whites, as a racial contract, provides us with grounds for even having a critical race discourse in the first place. We cannot talk about race and racism if they do not exist – and believe me, as of late critical race scholars have had to work harder than ever to prove the existence of such structural barriers (see Bonilla-Silva 2001, 2003, 2004; Lewis 2004). Even more though, positioning global racial hegemony as existing through a pact creates a dialogic character of white supremacist agency and white supremacist structure. To paraphrase Mills's argument, a racial pact is in place. This racial pact has led to a creation and maintenance of institutions that have historically denied access to people of color. Thus, if we are to have any mechanisms of liberating ourselves, we must be able to see the dialogism between those within the pact, and the structures that they have created and maintained through their pact with each other. This move by Charles Mills's racial contract is not to suggest that whites are the enemy of racial harmony. Rather, it is a move that states that racial harmony cannot exist until whites too, along with people of color, can acknowledge the hegemonic system within which they operate. Before continuing, I want the reader to note that I have stayed away from referring to Mills's racial contract as a theory. There are those who would argue that Mills's racial contract is just that – a theoretical device, albeit a useful one, but nevertheless a theory on race and racism. Mills argues, however, as do I, that the racial contract is real (Mills 1997). The abstraction of classical social contract theory to explain abstract notions of freedom, equality, and justice in no way changes the historical truths of imperialism, colonialism, conquest, and other human atrocities committed against people of color around the world in the name of global white supremacy. To refer to so many real and lived experiences as ‘theory’, many of which still exist today, is an injustice not only to those who have suffered at the hands of these historical truths, but also an injustice to those of us who fight for the liberation from these acts of tyranny. As mentioned before, the racial contract is not a theory, but is instead a global historical occurrence. That is not to say that one day, many great white men had a meeting and made a pact with each other to rule over people of color. If we bought into this notion, we would only reify the conjectural history of the social contract that Mills and others (see Pateman 1988) have sought to deconstruct. Rather, over the course of some 500 years, whites in position of power have sought to maintain and expand their power through the exploitation of the Global South (Bonilla-Silva 2000; see also Roediger 2002). There exists a common historical ideological root: the globalization/domination/colonization/[and] imperialism of ‘Western’ culture, which has created what Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2000, 194) has referred to as a ‘macroracial discourse’ (see also Aguirre and Bonilla-Silva 2001). The racial contract, then, has come to be an experience. How it has been experienced most definitely varies across space and place (Bonilla-Silva 2000), but there are experiences to be shared. The new racist discourse, whether it be color-blind, abstract liberalism (Bonilla-Silva 2003), or the articulation through subtle ideologies of cultural deficiencies (Allen and Angie 2000; see also Herrnstein and Murray 1994; Murray 1984), is still a reality for most if not all people of color.

### State of Nature

#### By defining the “civil” society of Europe in opposition to the uncivilized state of nature among Indigenous populations, social contract theory justifies the exclusion of non-white peoples from the state – this creates colonialism, genocide, and total war

Henderson 98 [(James, Senior Administrator and Research Director of the Native Law Centre at the University of Saskatchewan) “The Context of the State of Nature,” University of British Columbia Press, 1998]

Hobbes did not assert the universality of the state of nature. He did not believe that the state of nature "ever generally" existed "over all the world."" Instead, he asserted that there were "many places" where the state of nature did exist: "the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before.”23 Hobbes used savages in America to illustrate the universal negative standards of primal chaos and the natural state of war." The savage state envisioned by Hobbes provided more than the force creating and sustaining law and political society, however; it also created a spectacular repository of negative values attributed to Indigenous peoples. Hobbes asserted that the state of nature and civil society are opposed to one another. The state of nature has a right of nature (“ius naturale"): "the liberty each man has to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature, that is to say, his own life; and consequently, of doing any thing which in his own judgment and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereto." By the right of nature, "every man has a right to every thing, even to one another’s body. "26 This reinforced the wretched and dangerous condition of the state of nature. Hobbes emphasized the tendency toward the state of nature in European society by noting the existing civil wars. He thought that these wars testiﬁed to the fact that European sovereigns remained in a state of nature toward each other as well as toward their subjects. He also believed that, with the separation between political and ecclesiastical authority in European society, the whole of Europe was not far from falling into the state of nature or the image of civil war, much in the same way as the ancient republics had been transformed into "anarchies." After Hobbes made this distinction between the state of nature and civil society, the state of nature became the starting point in Eurocentric discussions of government and politics. The state of nature was the condi- tionality or the assumption or the given upon which the idea of the modern state or civil society was constructed. Those who attempted to construct a rational theory of the state began from Indigenous peoples in a state of nature being the antithesis of civilized society. These political philosophers ranged from Spinoza to Locke, from Pufendorf to Rousseau to Kant. These philosophers created the natural-law theory of the modern state. Hegel eliminated the state of nature as the original condition of humans but merged the theory in the relations among states. By the early eighteenth century, the usual explanation of the origin of the state, or “civil society," began by postulating an original state of nature in which primitive humans lived on their own and were subject to neither government nor law.” As the ﬁrst systematic theorist of the philosophy of Liberalism and Hobbes's greatest immediate English successor, John Locke took up where Hobbes left off. In 1690, Locke published Two Treatises of Government.” Like Hobbes, he started with the state of nature. However, he opposed Hobbes's view that the state of nature was "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short" and maintained instead that the state of nature was a happy and tolerant one. He argued that humans in the state of nature are free and equal yet insecure and dangerous in their freedom. Like Hobbes, Locke had no proof of his theory. Indeed, there is no proof that the state of nature was ever more than an intellectual idea, since no historical or social information about it has ever existed.” Of course, there was nothing to disprove the idea either, and Locke simply stated that "It is not at all to be wonder’d that History gives us but a very little account of Men, that lived together in the State of Nature. "31 Following Hobbes, he argued that government and political power emerged out of the state of nature. “In the beginning," Locke wrote, "all the World was America/32 That America is “still a Pattern of the ﬁrst Ages of Asia and Europe”33 and the relationship between the Indigenous peoples and the Europeans in America is "perfectly in a State of Nature."34 Thus, Locke, despite his differences with Hobbes on the state of nature itself, used the idea to justify European settlement in America” and to give Europeans the right to wage war “against the Indians, to seek Reparation upon any injury received from them."

### Colorblind

#### Colorblindness is a refusal to acknowledge racism – this perpetuates structural violence

Walsh 4 [(Kenneth, Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal) “COLOR-BLIND RACISM IN GRUTTER AND GRATZ” Boston College Third World Law Journal, Volume 24 No 2, 2004. Review of RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES. By Eduardo Bonilla-Silva. Lanham, Boulder, New York, and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 2003. Pp. 213.] AT

In his book, Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva alerts readers to the danger that a color-blind ideology will soon pervade discussions of race in the United States.157 The mechanisms of color-blind racism allow whites to advance positions that assure the perpetuation of white privilege.158 Under this color-blind guise, the arguments opposing affirmative action sound reasonable and moral.159 Yet individuals employ the frames, style, and story lines of color-blind racism to mask the fact that blacks still hold a second-class status in America.160 Thus, color-blind racism facilitates the perpetuation of racial inequality by obscuring the fact that there is even a problem to fix.161

### Coherentism

#### Coherentism is an attempt to defend the traditional positivist epistemology

Scheurich and Young 97 [(James Joseph Scheurich, Professor in the Department of Educational Administration and Human Resource Development at Texas A&M University; Michelle D. Young, Associate Professor, Department of Educational Administration. Executive Director, University Council for Educational Administration) “Coloring Epistemologies: Are Our Research Epistemologies Racially Biased?” Educational Researcher, Vol. 26, No. 4. (May, 1997), pp. 4-16.] AT

We define "positivism" as the traditional application of the scien- tific method within the social sciences. We are aware, nonetheless, of the debates about whether this is the appropriate label or not and agree that, strictly speaking, it is not (Phillips, 1987), but language, as usual, is at least partially uncontrollable, and, thus, it seems that the meaning we give it is the one that has passed into common academic parlance. With "postpositivisms," we concur with Guba and Lincoln (1994) that they represent "efforts of the past few decades to respond in a limited way (that is, while remaining within essentially the same set of basic beliefs) to the most problematic criticisms of positivism" (p. 109). By "neo-realisms," we mean that range of realisms, including scientific realism (e.g., Bhaskar, 1986, 1989) and coherentis[m]t realism (e.g., Evers & Lakomski, 1991), that has sought, similarly to postposi- tivism, to address the strong criticisms of the scientific method that have emerged over the past few decades, while maintaining the basic validity of the scientific method. By "interpretivisms" and "construc- tivisms," we agree with Schwandt (1994) that they are "a loosely cou- pled family of methodological and philosophical persuasions . . . that share the goal of understanding the complex world of lived experience from the point of view of those who live it" (p. 118). within the "critical tradition," we include critical theory, feminism, and lesbian/ gay perspectives, all of which start from the experiences of a social group that has been excluded, marginalized, or oppressed over lengthy historical periods; which typically include a critique of social inequities related to those experiences; and which work toward, di- rectly or indirectly, some sort of emancipatory social change for those groups. By postmodernisms/poststructuralisms, we include the work of the French theorists like Foucault, Irigaray, and Derrida that sub- jects the fundamental, civilizational assumptions of modernism itself to critique. But we also include in this categorv the work of manv others, iike that of Patti Lather (1991) or ~udith Butler (19931, who have extensively appropriated this philosophy to their own interests.

#### This positive model of truth is not absolute, it’s a historically contingent model framed by epistemological racism – this is not only a myopic way of knowing, but it also commits profound violence against the marginalized

Scheurich and Young 97 [(James Joseph Scheurich, Professor in the Department of Educational Administration and Human Resource Development at Texas A&M University; Michelle D. Young, Associate Professor, Department of Educational Administration. Executive Director, University Council for Educational Administration) “Coloring Epistemologies: Are Our Research Epistemologies Racially Biased?” Educational Researcher, Vol. 26, No. 4. (May, 1997), pp. 4-16.] AT

The civilizational level is the level of broad civilizational assumptions, assumptions that, though they construct the nature of our world and our experience of it, are not typically conscious to most members of a civilization (Foucault, 1979, 1988). These assumptions are deeply embedded in how those members think and in what they name "the world" or "the Real" through various categories or concepts (Said, 1979; Stanfield, 1985, 1994). But these assumptions are different for different civilizations, such as the Hopi civilization (Loftin, 1991) or the Zuni civilization (Roscoe, 1991), and, thus, each civilization constructs the world differently for its inhabitants: "Not all people [i.e., civilizations, in this case] 'know' in the same way" (Stanfield, 1985, p. 396). In addition, large, complex civilizations often include a dominant culture and one or more subordinate cultures. In this context, subordinate cultures, races, and other groups often have different civilizational assumptions: "Just as the material realities of the powerful and the dominated produce separate [social, historical experiences] .. .each [racial or social group] may also have distinctive epistemologies or theories of knowl- edge" (Collins, 1991, p. 204). One consequence is that "[d]ominant racial group members and subordinate racial group members do not think and interpret realities in the same way because of their divergent structural positions, histories, and cultures" (Stanfield, 1985, p. 400).10 For instance, "What is considered theory in the dominant academic community is not necessarily what counts as theory for women-of-color" (Anzaldua, 1990, p. xxv; see, also, J. A. Banks, 1993, pp. 7-8; 1995, p. 16; Cose, 1993; Collins, 1991). The name for the Euro-American culture's construction of "the world" or "the Real," as was noted above, is modernism. Modernism is an epistemological, ontological, and axiological network or grid that "makes" the world as the dominant western culture knows and sees it (Foucault, 1972,1973,1979,1988; Frankenberg, 1993; Goldberg, 1993; Stanfield, 1985; West, 1993). Though this grid has evolved and changed to some degree, it has, nonetheless, maintained a kind of coherence and consistency, particularly in terms of some of its primary assumptions (that is, its civilizational level assumptions). One of these primary assumptions, the one we are addressing here, is civilizational racism. Beginning with the modernist period, European colonial and territorial expansion was typically undertaken under the rationale of the supremacy of White civilization, along with other rationales, such as those about economics and religion. For instance, Hacker (1992) asserts that "For at least half a dozen centuries . . . 'white' has implied a higher civilization based on superior inheritance" (p. 7) (see, also, Takaki, 1993). To the English attending the Globe Theatre to see Shakespeare's The Tempest, "Caliban [the character who epitomizes the native people of the 'new' world] represented what Europeans had been when they were lower [italics added] on the scale of development" (Takaki, 1993, p. 32), while Prospero (the character who depicts the English conqueror) declares that he came to the new world "to be the lord on't" (Shakespeare, quoted in Takaki, 1993, p. 35; see, also, Feagin & Vera, 1995; Frankenberg, 1993; Goldberg, 1993; Harris, 1993; Stanfield, 1985; Webster, 1992; West, 1993, pp. 3-32). Widely circulated racial hierarchies and exclusions such as these became, then, a central feature in the emergence of western modernism and modernist thought, and, consequently, White racism or White supremacy became interlaced or interwoven into the founding fabric of modernist western civilization (for an extended discussion of this point, see Goldberg, 1993; see, also, Stanfield, 19851." These racial rationales were, of course, central, along with other rationales, to the founding of the U.S. Taking land from and killing Native Americans was justified by the Whites' definition of property as well as the supposed supremacy of White civilization-like that depicted in Thomas More's Utopia (Takaki, 1993, p. 35; see, also, Feagin & Vera, 1995; Hacker, 1992; Harris, 1993). Similar rationales were used in taking the Southwest from the Mexicans, whom Stephen F. Austin, one of the prominent political leaders of the "Texas revolution," disparagingly called "a mongrel Spanish-Indian and negro race" (De Leon, 1983, p. 12; see, also, Takaki, 1993). The enslavement of African Americans and the "subsequent decades of Jim Crow laws, peonage, tenancy, lynchings and second-class citizenship" (West, 1993, p. 256) were also justified in the same racially exclusionary terms (Feagin & Vera, 1995; Hacker, 1992; Harris, 1993; Takaki, 1993), though, of course, these justifications were not the only justifications driving slavery or the appropriation of Native American and Mexican American land. While this is an extremely brief summary of a complex argument about White racial supremacy and the fact that it was interlaced within the founding assumptions of western civilization, our point can be made in a simpler way. The White race, what Stanfield (1985) has called "a privileged subset of the population" (p. 389), has un- questionably dominated western civilization during all of the modernist period (hundreds of years). When any group within a large, complex civilization-significantly dominates other groups for hundreds of years, the ways of the dominant group (its epistemologies, its ontologies, its axiologies) not only become the dominant ways of that civilization, but also these ways become so deeply embedded that they typically are seen as "natural" or appropriate norms rather than as historically evolved social constructions (Stanfield, 1985). To a large degree, the dominant group, whatever its composition, makes its own "community the center of the universe and the conceptual frame that constrains all thought" (Gordon et al., 1990, p. 15). Thus, the dominant group creates or constructs "the world or "the Real" and does so in its own image, in terms of its ways and its social-historical experiences (J. A. Banks, 1993; Collins, 1991; Minh-ha, 1989; Morrison, 1992; Stanfield, 1985, 1994; West, 1993; see, especially, Said, 1979, for an entire volume that discusses how the West gave "reality" to its construct of "the Orient"). In this view, ontologies, epistemologies, and axiologies are not outside history or sociology; they are deeply interwoven within the social histories of particular civilizations and within particular groups within those civilizations. As Gordon et al. (1990) assert, "Knowledge, technology, and the production of knowledge are cultural products . . . . Knowledge production operates within communicentric [ontological and epistemological] frames of reference, which dominate and enable it" (p. 14). Similarly, Stanfield (1994) has said The experiences that construct paradigms in sciences and humanities are derivatives of cultural baggage imported into intellectual enterprises by privileged residents of historically specific societies and world systems. This is important to point out, because it is common for scholars to lapse into internal analyses while discussing para- digms and thus to ignore the rather common sense fact that sciences and humanities are products of specific cultural and historical contexts that shape the character of intellectual work. (pp. 181-182) Or, as James Banks (1993) more simply states, "all knowledge reflects the values and interests of its creators" (p. 4). Consider who the major, influential philosophers, writers, politicians, corporate leaders, social scientists, educational leaders (e.g., Kant, Flaubert, Churchill, Henry Ford, Weber, Dewey) have been over the course of western modernism. They have virtually all been White. And it is they who have constructed the world we live in-named it, discussed it, explained it. It is they who have developed the ontological and axiological categories or concepts like individuality, truth, education, free enterprise, good con- duct, social welfare, etc. that we use to think (that thinks US?) and that we use to socialize and educate children. This racially exclusive group has also developed the epistemologies, the legitimated ways of knowing (e.g., positivism, neo-realisms, post-positivisms, interpretivisms, constructivisms, the critical tradition, and postmodern- isms/poststructuralisms) that we use. And it is these epistemologies and their allied ontologies and axiologies, taken together as a lived web or fabric of social construc- tions, that make or construct "the world" or "the Real" (and that relegate other socially constructed "worlds," like that of African Americans or the Cherokee, to the "margins" of our social life and to the margins in terms of legitimated research epistemologies). These influential people and their "world-making" or "reality-making" activities or practices, however, are not separate from the social history within which they live: "all knowledge is relative to the context in which it is generated" (Gordon et al., 1990, p. 15). And, thus, "when academics and public opinion leaders construct knowledge[,] . ..they are influenced by the ideas, assump- tions, and norms of the cultures and subsocieties in which they are socialized" (J. A. Banks, 1995, p. 16). Just as Julius Caesar was "constructed by the social history of his particular group, saw and understood the worldin terms of the social constructions of his people in their time and place, the influential authors of modernism have been constructed by their position, place, and time. Just as Caesar did not see the world from the point of view of other cultures that Rome dominated, these influential western modernists did not see the world from within the epistemologies and ontologies of other races and cultures inside or outside of western modernism. "How we create, define, and validate social knowledge [and, thus, reality] is determined largely through our cultural context" (Stanfield, 1985, p. 388).12 Our argument, however, is not that these influential White individuals were involved in a racial conspiracy or moral bad faith, but that these individuals can only name and know from within the social context available to them, from within the social history in which they live. While we seem to have little trouble understanding that those far away in time existed in terms of their social contexts-i.e., Julius Caesar-we seem to resist under- standing this about ourselves. We, as our predecessors did, live, understand, work, think, and act within a particular social history, within a particular social construction. We do not live, in some universal sense, above culture or history; we live inside a culture, inside a civilizational social~construction; we live in the terms and wavs of a particular social history.13 This, then, is our central argument about epistemological racism. Epistemologies, along with their related ontologies and epistemologies, arise out the social history of a particular social group. Different social groups, races, cultures, societies, or civilizations evolve different epis- temologies, each of which reflects the social history of that group, race, culture, society, or civilization; that is, no epistemology is context-free. Yet, all of the epistemologies currently legitimated in education arise exclusively out of the social history of the dominant White race. They do not arise out of the social history of African Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Americans, or other racial/cultural groups-social histories that are much different than that of the dominant race (a difference due at least partially to the historical experience of racism itself [see, for example, Collins, 19911). Cornell West (1993) validates this judgment when he says "social practices . . . [and research is a social practice] are best understood and explained . . . by situating them within . . . cultural tradi- tions" (p. 267). It is, then, in this sense that scholars of color contend that the dominant research epistemologies are racially biased.14 By epistemological racism, then, we do not mean that the researchers using, say, positivism or postmodernism are overtly or covertly racist as individuals. Nor do we mean that epistemological racism is a conscious insti- tutional or societal conspiracy in favor of Whites (B. M. Gordon, 1993, p. 267). Epistemological racism means that our current range of research epistemologies - positivism to postmodernisms/ poststructuralisms - arise out of the social history and culture of the dominant race, that these epistemologies logically reflect and reinforce that social history and that racial group (while excluding the epistemologies of other races/cultures), and that this has negative results for people of color in general and scholars of color in particular. In other words, our "logics of inquiry" (Stanfield, 1993a) are the social products and practices of the social, historical experiences of Whites, and, therefore, these products and practices carry forward the social history of that group and exclude the epistemologies of -other social groups. But, again, the critical problem-for all of us, both Whites and people of color-is that the resulting epistemological racism, besides unnecessarily restricting or excluding the range of possible epistemologies, creates profoundly negative consequences for those of other racial cultures with different epistemologies, ontologies, and axiologies. By epistemological racism, then, we do not mean that the researchers using, say, positivism or postmodernism are overtly or covertly racist as individuals. Nor do we mean that epistemological racism is a conscious insti- tutional or societal conspiracy in favor of Whites (B. M. Gordon, 1993, p. 267). 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But, again, the critical problem-for all of us, both Whites and people of color-is that the resulting epistemological racism, besides unnecessarily restricting or excluding the range of possible 8 EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER epistemologies, creates profoundly negative consequences for those of other racial cultures with different e~istemolo- gies, ontologies, and axiologies. First, epistemologies and research that arise out of other social histories, such as African American social history or Cherokee social history, are not typically considered legitimate within the mainstream research community (see Anzaldua, 1990; Collins, 1991; B. M. Gordon, 1990, 1993; Minh-ha, 1989; Sarris, 1993; Stanfield, 1993a, 1993b, 1994; among many others). As Reyes and Halcon (1988) suggest, "the traditional Euro-centric perspective used to evaluate their [scholars of color] scholarship disadvantages nontraditional [race-based] research because predominantly White male academics lack the appropriate cultural perspectives from which to judge its real merit" (p. 307). Similarly, Collins (1991) contends that "[w]hile Black women can produce knowledge claims that contest those advanced by the white male community, this community does not grant that Black women scholars have competing knowledge claims based in another [equally warranted] knowledge validation process" (p. 204; see, also, Stanfield, 1994, p. 176). Or, as Sarris (1993) asks, "Can Apache stories, songs, and so forth be read (or heard) and thus understood in terms of Euroamerican-specific expectations of language and narrative [i.e., Euro-American epistemologies]" (p 427)? Second, there has been a large chorus of scholars of color (including Anderson, 1993; Anzaldua, 1990; Collins, 1991; Paredes, 1977; Sarris, 1993; Stanfield, 1994; among others) who have contended that dominant group epistemologies and methodologies-the epistemologies and methods themselves and not just "bad" applications of these epistemologies and methodologies-tend to distort the lives of other racial groups. For example, Gordon et al. (1990) have asserted that Examination of the social and educational research knowledge bases relative to Afro-Americans indicated that these sciences have traditionally attempted to under- stand the life experiences of Afro-Americans from a nar- row cultrocentric perspective and against equally narrow cultrocentric standards [i.e., epistemological racism]. (p. 15) Consequently, as Stanfield (1985) has said, mainstream "[slocial science knowledge production about racial minorities still dwells on the pathological and on the sensational" (p. 411). A result of this is that these negative distortions pass into the dominant culture as "truth," thus becoming the basis of individual, group, and institutional attitudes, decisions, practices, and policies (i.e, institu- tional and societal racism). Another result is that these distortions are often enculturated into those who are the victims of the distortions (hooks, 1990; Rebolledo, 1990), especially children, who have less ability to resist (McCarthy, 1993; Stevenson & Ellsworth, 1993; Weinberg, 1993), necessitating "painful struggle[sl of accepting and rejecting internalized negative and disenabling self-conceptions" (West, 1993, p. 270; see, also, J. A. Banks, 1993). A further result is that, frequently, "minority scholar's time is consumed in efforts to refute or neutralize fallacious findings, questionable theories, and inappropri- ate interpretations" (Gordon et al., 1990, p. 16) of mainstream research and scholarlv commentarv. Third, the dominant research epistemologies-from positivism to postmodernisms-implicitly favor[s] White people because they accord most easily with their social history (J. A. Banks, 1993: B. M. Gordon, 1993; Stanfield, 1985). Thus, even though it may be unintended, the "clothes" that an epistemology could be said to be fit better and are more comfortable to White researchers because White researchers themselves are a product of the social history of Whites, just as the dominant epistemologies are a product of White social history. That is, the range of epistemologies that have arisen from the social history of Whites "fit" Whites because they themselves, the nature of the university and of legitimated scholarship and knowledge, and the specifications of different research methodologies are all cultural products of White social history. While scholars of color have had to wear these "White" clothes (be bi-cultural) so that they could succeed in research communities, however sociologically, his- torically, or culturally ill-fitting those clothes might be, White scholars have virtually never had to think about wearing the epistemological clothes of people of color or even to consider the idea of such "strange" apparel. The negative consequence for scholars of color, however, is that they must learn and become accomplished in epistemologies that arises out of a social history that has been profoundly hostile to their race and that ignores or excludes alternative race-based epistemologies because mainstream research communities have assumed that their epistemologies are not derived from any particular group's social history, i.e., are free of any specific history or culture. That scholars of color have successfully become episte- mologically bi-cultural to survive as scholars is a testament to them-their strength, their courage, their perseverance, and their love of scholarship-rather than a testament to the race/culture-free nature of mainstream research epistemologies

#### The alternative is to be open to alternative ways of knowing – this is key to inclusiveness and combating racism

Scheurich and Young 97 [(James Joseph Scheurich, Professor in the Department of Educational Administration and Human Resource Development at Texas A&M University; Michelle D. Young, Associate Professor, Department of Educational Administration. Executive Director, University Council for Educational Administration) “Coloring Epistemologies: Are Our Research Epistemologies Racially Biased?” Educational Researcher, Vol. 26, No. 4. (May, 1997), pp. 4-16.] AT

Second, those of us who teach methods courses must begin to study, teach, and, thus, legitimate the research epistemologies that arise out of the social histories of people of color. Often "students get the message either directly or indirectly that ethnic-related research is not something that they should engage in as part of their training or for their dissertation research" (Padilla, 1994, p. 24). As professors, we need to support an informed understanding and skillful use of these race-based epistemologies by interested students of color. (But we ought not to try to force them in this direction as most students of color typically know that race-oriented scholarship is more risky than mainstream-oriented scholarship.) As scholars, we need to add race-oriented journals to our own reading lists, and we need to increase our valuation of those journals during tenure and promotion proceedings. As dissertation chairs, we must support doctoral studies drawn from these new race-based epistemologies. As journal editors, editorial board mem- bers, and journal reviewers we must study and support the publication both of discussions of these epistemologies and of studies based on them, like that of Ladson-Billings (1995). Even better, we need to solicit this kind of work, including doing special editions of our journals. As editors and reviewers for publishing companies, we must insist on the inclusion of race-based perspectives in methods textbooks. We know that efforts of these sorts are possible. We have taught research methods courses in which we cover other race/culture-based epistemologies (African American, Hispanic American, Native American, Asian American, among other racial designations), along with positivism to poststructuralisms. We have class members help find new materials, and the students of color are continuously edu- cating us through their class discussions of the materials and through their written work. In addition, other pro- fessors at our university have become interested in this approach, and there is now serious discussion of a college- wide course of this sort. Furthermore, we know of pro- fessors at other universities who have been doing the same. In addition, as the new editor and managing editor

### TOPIC LINKS

### Brennan Link

#### This is precisely the exclusionary logic the AC criticizes – extend Wacquant – the idea that some people are unfit to vote because they are too stupid or too uninformed perpetuates the idea that there are civically disabled deviants in our society who must be politically sterilized – if we can say some people have a moral obligation not to vote, what stops us from enforcing that obligation? It is this logic that the despicable policies of the past were founded on.

### Uninformed Voters Link

#### Discounting the votes of some is bad – we should assume everyone’s votes count, otherwise we arbitrarily exclude those we consider “unworthy.”

Halperin 2000 [(Jason, united states attorney's office for the southern district of new york) LexisNexis Summary of “A Winner At The Polls: A Proposal For Mandatory Voter Registration” 3 New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 69] AT

The second principal policy argument that might be used to attack the bill is more disturbing. It is likely that some may oppose a mandatory voter registration law because it would make it much easier for "uninformed" voters to vote. "Look what happened in Minnesota in 1998 when the registration rules were more voter-friendly - Jesse Ventura was elected governor," some people may warn. This argument is disturbing because it reeks of rank elitism and reveals a total disregard for the bedrock values of democracy. Consider the words of one who would oppose increasing voter participation: Somehow the delusion has taken hold that a commitment to self-rule means coaxing apathetic numbskulls into voting <elip> [.] By now, we have so degraded the franchise that the vote of an illiterate, unemployed, unstable high school drop-out couch potato is deemed no less valuable than that of the president of Columbia [University]. n318 The arrogance of those who would tell us who is "informed" enough to vote is mind-boggling. Where in the Fifteenth Amendment grant of the right to vote is the parenthetical that says "but this right to vote only applies to those who would cast an informed vote"? Now that the United States no longer has poll taxes and literacy tests, should states adopt current-events tests to weed out those voters who are not informed enough? The notion is simply outrageous.

#### This is precisely the type of logic I criticize – extend Wacquant – ideas that certain people are uninformed or unable to vote constructs them as civically useless – they are seen as an anti-citizen that must be politically sterilized and marginalized.

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### ALT AND IMPACT

### Impact

#### Extend the Elden evidence from the 1AC – racism justifies biological categorization of bodies by race – this logic justifies genocidal extermination against those deemed inferior

#### Colonialism and neo-colonialism render the colonized invisible so to exploit their populations – this allows for dehumanization and degradation of the colonized.

Hayes 96 [Floyd W. Hayes III Fanon: a critical reader Ed. Lewis Ricardo Gordon, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting. “Fanon, Oppression and Resentment: The Black Experience In the United States.” 1996.]

Fanon points out that in the colonial situation the primary thrust of the Master in relation to the Slave is not for the sake of recognition but for work. The colonized are dehumanized, their humanity effaced, not simply for the sake of the colonizer's ego satisfaction but for the purpose of the colonized's exploitation (Pn 179 / BS 220). What colonialism seeks to hide from view, to render invisible about itself, is the grounding fact of its possibility: that colonialism is predicated only on force and fraud. Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau all exemplify their states of nature in terms of non-European states of being. The fact that force and fraud are the only virtues necessary in the Hobbesian state of nature (the state of "warre') reveals rather that a readier representation of the contractualists' "natural state" is not "the savage peoples of the Americas" and the like (Hobbes: ch. 13) but the colonial condition imposed by Europeans (geographically or racially) upon those deemed non-European. Colonialism is operationalized at both the material and the representational levels. Materially colonialism seeks to strengthen[s] domination for the sake of human and economic exploitation. Representationally, it seeks to sustain[s] the identity of the ideological or discursive image it has created of the colonized and of the depreciated image the colonized have of themselves. Colonialism thus undertakes at the latter level to extend and maintain a veiling, to affect a strategic invisibility on the pan of the colonized: to maintain invisibility socially and politically so as to minimize the costs of economic reproduction[.] and labor enforcement. Through normalization, colonialism is able to hide[s] from view its constitutive forms of domination[.] and exploitation. By making the relations and practices of dominance seem standard, normal, and given, colonialism creates as "acceptable" its central social expressions of degradation and dehumanization, rendering unseen the fact that it makes people what they are not. Colonialism is quite literally untruth, an untruth which to sustain itself must be hidden from view. Fanon speaks of this as "the lie of the colonial situation" (Sr 115 / ADC 128), a lie that infects the colonized who to survive find that they are "hardly ever truthful before the colonizer" (114 /127). Thus, like modernity more generally, colonialism is a condition of extreme ambivalence, imposing a structure, an order of things, it inevitably is incapable of sustaining. Drawn to an order, a scheme of classification, it at once cannot sustain because it is both mis- and unrepresentative of a people the very being of whom it negates, the colonial condition faces (off) its impending disorder with differentiation and division, separation and subordination, manipulation and mystification - in short, with fraud and force (sec ch. 4 of Black Skin; see also Bauman). It is in this sense that Fanon sees himself as engaged analytically, critically, in a form of unveiling.

### Alt

#### Extend Scheurich and Young 97 – this now functions as alternative for the kritik – racism is deeply embedded in the academia since the dominant frame of knowing has been constructed by the White perspective – the role of the judge as a facilitator of an academic discussion is to question and challenge the racist lessons embedded in all our ideas – vote affirmative to resist racism.

#### And here is more evidence – the modern global order of Euro-American domination is justified by the Western philosophical tradition – from our privileged standpoint we have a choice: we can either sustain and replicate this evil or fight it. Vote affirmative to choose resistance.

Serequeberhan [Tsenay, Prof. Philosophy. Morgan State University. Post Colonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. “The Critique of Eurocentrism.” Pg. 154-57]

From all of the above, then, Kant's historicopolitical texts - and, as I have argued elsewhere, the historical thinking of Hegel and Marx 77 and, by extension, the European philosophic tradition as a whole - is grosso modo grounded, minus its "dark horses," on a Eurocentric "pre-text”of the humanity/historicity of human existence as a whole, But why is it necessary to de-structively engage this "pre-text” or Idee? Why is this critical-negative project an indispensable aspect of the contemporary discourse of African philosophy? To begin with, as Kwame Anthony Appiah has correctly noted, we contemporary African philosophers/ and Westernized Africans in general, share by our training and educational formation, in the intellectual heritage of Europe. Consequently, we "see" ourselves and our contemporary situation, at least partially, through the lenses conferral to us in the transmissions of this heritage. Thus, to explore this shared heritage in regards to how it sees and conceptualizes our lived humanity is a necessary precondition to critically appropriating it. For as Frantz Fanon reminds us - lest we forget! - our sharing in this heritage it rather problematic, since it is transmitted to us through a dour stepmother who "restrains her fundamentally perverse offspring from … giving free rein to its evil instincts" - a harsh "colonial mother11 who "protects her child from itself"7\* Today, that part of our heritage which is African - or its residual -is no longer (at least in principle) considered "evil." In order to begin appropriating to ourselves that from which we were thus far protected, it is first necessary to clear the metaphysical grounding of all the evil that was said of us and done to us. It is not enough to say with Kwasi Wiredu that: “Indeed an African needs a certain level headedness to deal with some of these hinkers at all. Neither 1 Hume, nor Marx, displayed much respect for the black man, so whatever partiality the African philosopher may develop for these thinkers must rest mostly on considerations of the truth of their philosophical thought.” Indeed, to give proper consideration and appreciation to the "philosophical thought" expressed by these and other thinkers in the European tradition presupposes the critical destructive labor of seeing how "the truth" is skewed and skewered by the partiality it justifies[.] and in which it is enmeshed. The necessity for this undertaking, furthermore, is grounded in the fact that today Eurocentrism is the general consciousness of our age. It is not something that merely affects Europeans. As Marx noted in the German ideology, the dominant ideas of the ruling strata in a society are always, at any particular point in time, the dominating ideas of an age or historical period. Today in our global society the dominant ideas are the ideas through which Europe dominates the world. As Jose Rabasa has appropriately noted: “I must emphasize again that by Eurocentrism I do not simply mean a Tradition that places Europe as a universal cultural ideal embodied in what is called The West, but rather a pervasive |metaphysical | condition of thought\* It is universal because it affects both Europeans and non-Europeans, despite the specific questions and situations each may address.” To critically engage in a destructive reading of the texts of the Occidental tradition as regards their views on non-European cultures is thus to critically appropriate that part of our own heritage which was violently "bestowed" on us by Europe. Not to do so would be to continue to inhabit a defunct intellectual horizon, whose material [is] embodi[ed]ments that is, overt imperialism and [in] colonialism[.] - have already been destroyed by the formerly colonized peoples of the world. Today, in our post colonial present, we face a more covert hegemony which functions and implements global Euro-American domination through the Westernized segments of formerly colonized peoples. For better or for worse, we who belong to the Westernized segments of formerly colonized societies occupy positions of relative power which can be utilized either to replicate Europe or to try and unleash the concrete and suppressed possibilities of our respective histories.10 For example, as 1 Lyotard has correctly observed: "The spread of struggles for independence since the Second World War and the recognition of new national names seem to imply a consolidation of local legitimacies” But this "spread of struggles for independence" only "seem[s] to imply" the "consolidation of local legitimacies;" it is only a semblance, an appearance that hides the actuality that "[n]ew 'independent’ governments either fall in line with the market of world capitalism or adopt a Stalinist-style political apparatus.” In a similar vein, Castoriadis tells us that the West asserts "not that it … [has]. . . discovered the trick of producing more cheaply and more quickly more commodities, but that it. . . [has| . . . discovered the way life appropriate to all human society." In making such a grandiose metaphysical assertion, the "unease”1 that "Western ideologues" might have fell is "allayed by the haste with which the 'developing' nations" or, more accurately\* the Westernized elites of these nations greedily "adopt the Western 'model’ of society." What both Lyotard and Castoriadis are pointing to is the fact that the hegemonic replication of Europe, in our shared postcolonial present, is carried on by and incarnated in the human residue that is^ the Westernized elites left behind by the retreating colonial empires of Europe. In other words, the "fact that, in some particular domain, and to some particular end [i.e., the scientific/technological control of nature],"" the West has achieved considerable success is taken, by the Westernized elites and their metropolitan mentors, as a sign of Europe's absolute metaphysical superiority to the rest of humanity). It is, grosso modo, this domineering theme that constitutes the Eurocentric consciousness of our postcolonial globe and, as we have seen in our reading of Kant, finds its speculative foundation in the Western tradition of philosophy[.]. More than through physical force, Euro-America today rules through its hegemony of ideas, "through its ‘models’ of growth and development, through the statist and other structures which … are today adopted everywhere.” other structures which … are today adopted everywhere.” This is why Fanon concludes Le dames de la terre with a simultaneous call[s] to [we must] leave "old" Europe behind and engage in the concrete inventing and creat[e]ing of our own lived historicity[.]. But to heed, or even hear, Fanon’s call [This] requires that we first recognize and de-structure the speculative metaphysical underpinnings of the Eurocentric constraints that have held us and still hold us – in bondage. This, in my view, is one of the most important and basic tasks of the contemporary discourse of African philosophy; its critical-negative project –the critique of Eurocentrism.

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## Discussion K

### Theory

#### New 1AR k – Theory is a link

#### 1. You shift the debate from “In a democracy, should voting be compulsory?” to “what interpretation can give the neg the most ground?”---that destroys confrontation of real racism --- not engaging the democratic process because it’s easier to pull out generic theory blocks reduces debate to a race to find shortcuts when it has the potential to be a tool for democratic liberation that the framers wanted us to examine. Things like framework sustain the privilege that rich, white males already have while rigging the activity even more against minority participants.

Reid-Brinkley 08 (Shanara Rose Reid-Brinkley, Assistant Professor of African American Studies and Communications as well as the Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE,” 2008. http://www.comm.pitt.edu/faculty/documents/reid-brinkley\_shanara\_r\_200805\_phd.pdf)

Despite the UDL’s success at increasing the participation levels of racial/ethnic minorities and women in high school policy debate, the program has not resulted in a significant increase in the participation levels in national level college policy debate. 3 Even with the financial resources made available to UDL students to increase their successful participation in high school and the specific interest of college debate teams in recruiting minority students, UDL participants are largely choosing not to participate in college policy debate. 4 Jon Brushke, debate scholar and debate director, notes that “If even a very small percentage of those UDL students went on to college debate there should be an obvious and profound change in participation by ethnic groups, and that has not happened.” 5 He notes further, that “Whatever other benefits these leagues have offered their participants; they have not managed to change ethnic participation levels in college debate.” 6 Stepp notes further that the activity remains primarily dominated by white males, from middle to upper class backgrounds. Even those UDL students who have chosen to debate in college still remain statistically under-represented at the most successful levels of national competition. 7 Stepp and Gardner note that although female and minority participation is increasing, there does not seem “to be a proportional increase in their winning,” including both team awards and speaker awards. 8 As the UDL movement gained attention from those in the debate community interested in diversifying the activity, Dr. Ede Warner at the University of Louisville became significantly involved in the development of debate curriculum, the training of UDL summer institute faculty members, and the instruction of UDL students. 9 In a 2001 essay, Warner along with Brushke argue: With UDL support, students from under-served high schools can go to tournaments and compete against students from wealthy school systems. Debate thus addresses at all levels the problems that the under-served confront when approaching institutions so often governed by the graduates of rich, private schools: Skills of discourse are equalized, economic disadvantages become less of a barrier when confronting rhetors, and the economically under-served gain a conduit to positions of institutional power…More basically, when students from UDL schools debate against elite high schools and win, the students learn that victory is possible and that economic disadvantages can be overcome. 10 Warner and Brushcke demonstrate their commitment to the UDL’s ability to be efficacious in encouraging and producing educational success and achievement amongst “under-served” communities. For these authors, the UDL movement creates a sense of hope that educational opportunities can significantly impact the social consequences of race, ethnicity, gender and class. In other words, “Offering debate at under-served schools addresses…inequalities.” 11 Warner and Brushke go on to note that “debate-as-outreach” can be particularly powerful as the debate community learns to become increasingly more accepting of stylistic differences that are likely to result from the diversifying of that activity. They argue that debate “audiences must appreciate these new forms.” 12 However, as Warner observed the national development of the UDL and its impact on the nationally competitive high school circuit and the college debate community, he experienced a growing discontent. By 2005 Warner’s position on the UDL had drastically changed: Students are hoodwinked and bamboozled into believing that they can receive access to all of the benefits of interscholastic debate, in the same way that I have convinced students that the game could change to allow for more diversity. They are told that debate is a "way out" and can improve their lives. They are told that if they learn the norms and procedures of traditional debate they can achieve just like everyone else. What they are not told: that debate tools alone won't overcome their disadvantages, especially within the debate community, that the best they can generally hope for is becoming the best in that UDL and perhaps getting recruited by the local UDL partner, and ultimately living their slife as a regional debater or a non-competitive national debater. They will not share in the resource expenditures of the larger debate structure, they will not be on the pre-bid track and they will not receive the rewards reserved for a select few in national debate. Why? Not because of anything they do, but because the game is rigged against them, who they are, and what the community asks them to become to achieve ‘success.’

#### Policy proves this is a real possibility – being open to other forms of argument is key

Smith 13 [(Elijah, CEDA and NDT champion) “A Conversation in Ruins: Race and Black Participation in Lincoln Douglas Debate” Victory Briefs Daily, 9/4/13] AT

At every tournament you attend this year look around the cafeteria and take note of which students are not sitting amongst you and your peers. Despite being some of the best and the brightest in the nation, many students are alienated from and choose to not participate in an activity I like to think of as homeplace. In addition to the heavy financial burden associated with national competition, the exclusionary atmosphere of a debate tournament discourages black students from participating. Widespread awareness of the same lack of participation in policy debate has led to a growing movement towards alternative styles and methods of engaging the gatekeepers of the policy community, (Reid-Brinkley 08) while little work has been done to address or even acknowledge the same concern in Lincoln Douglas debate. Unfortunately students of color are not only forced to cope with a reality of structural violence outside of debate, but within an activity they may have joined to escape it in the first place. We are facing more than a simple trend towards marginalization occurring in Lincoln Douglas, but a culture of exclusion that locks minority participants out of the ranks of competition. It will be uncomfortable, it will be hard, and it will require continued effort but the necessary step in fixing this problem, like all problems, is the community as a whole admitting that such a problem with many “socially acceptable” choices exists in the first place. Like all systems of social control, the reality of racism in debate is constituted by the singular choices that institutions, coaches, and students make on a weekly basis. I have watched countless rounds where competitors attempt to win by rushing to abstractions to distance the conversation from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day. One of the students I coached, who has since graduated after leaving debate, had an adult judge write out a ballot that concluded by “hypothetically” defending my student being lynched at the tournament. Another debate concluded with a young man defending that we can kill animals humanely, “just like we did that guy Troy Davis”. Community norms would have competitors do intellectual gymnastics or make up rules to accuse black debaters of breaking to escape hard conversations but as someone who understands that experience, the only constructive strategy is to acknowledge the reality of the oppressed, engage the discussion from the perspective of authors who are black and brown, and then find strategies to deal with the issues at hand. It hurts to see competitive seasons come and go and have high school students and judges spew the same hateful things you expect to hear at a Klan rally. A student should not, when presenting an advocacy that aligns them with the oppressed, have to justify why oppression is bad. Debate is not just a game, but a learning environment with liberatory potential. Even if the form debate gives to a conversation is not the same you would use to discuss race in general conversation with Bayard Rustin or Fannie Lou Hamer, that is not a reason we have to strip that conversation of its connection to a reality that black students cannot escape. Current coaches and competitors alike dismiss concerns of racism and exclusion, won’t teach other students anything about identity in debate other than how to shut down competitors who engage in alternative styles and discourses, and refuse to engage in those discussions even outside of a tournament setting. A conversation on privilege and identity was held at a debate institute I worked at this summer and just as any theorist of privilege would predict it was the heterosexual, white, male staff members that either failed to make an appearance or stay for the entire discussion. No matter how talented they are, we have to remember that the students we work with are still just high school aged children. If those who are responsible for participants and the creation of accessible norms won't risk a better future for our community, it becomes harder to explain to students who look up to them why risking such an endeavor is necessary.

#### Three impacts

#### A) It has a stronger chance of actually affecting other rounds since it is empirically proven – prefer it over their unwarranted analytic blips – this takes out all their generic argumetns

#### B) This card is dual functional – all your “oppression doesn’t matter” arguments are now links to this K – arguing for that excludes minority participants from the activity

#### C) Internal link to your education arguments – people who can’t participate in the activity because of your practices don’t get fairness or education. Participation is the greatest benefit – how we debate the topic isn’t nearly as important as debating it since we get some education either way. We shouldn’t benefit ourselves at others’ expense

#### 2) Extend the Scheuring and Young – yes, it applies to theory as well – these framework arguments aren’t neutral – they’re ploys to exclude the important discussion and perpetuate the status quo oppression

#### 3) Your framework arguments are not neutral – we can’t wish away these atrocities by refusing to discuss but we can examine them

William Shannahan [“Twilight of the Topical Idols: Kritik-ing in the Age of Imperialism”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 25 pg. 66-77)

Most importantly perhaps, debate’s invigorated reflexivity finally acknowledged that the process of interpretation was neither neutral nor innocent. For far too long however, debate ha[s]d proceeded as if affirmatives’ relationship to the topic was [is] unproblematic and did not require examination. This is not to say that our very erudite community failed to recognize how interpretation was “subjective,” but rather they failed to accept the very notion that subjectivity itself was tied to politics, ideology, and philosophical bent. Not surprisingly, debate’s insularity [has] fairly effectively prevented five decades of sustained criticism against the canons of Western philosophy and politics from entering into debate rounds and debate thinking, as if most of, for example, Continental philosophy had nothing to offer us. Even the most casual glance across a variety of disciplines demonstrated the irrefutable relevance of so-called post-structuralism and postmodernism to debate practice. For an activity that prides itself on its erudition, these theoretical oversights were conspicuous and disabling. How could such a sophisticated argumentative community fail to consider and evaluate the relevance of such far-reaching and important changes in academic scholarship?

#### He Continues:

Affirmative debaters’ relationship to the topic constituted them in particular, often undesirable ways. The topic was not simply some bounded space or a container from which to draw topical plans. Instead, the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications. That body in Washington, D.C. can no longer be isolated from brutal acts employed to make policy. Importantly, the second generation again allowed examination of the ethical relationship inherent in affirming, or refusing to debate, the interpellated, often virulent violence involved in such affirmation.

### Questioning Oppression Link

#### I shouldn’t have to justify why oppression is bad – questioning and justifying oppression is an exclusionary practice that makes debate a hostile space for those who endure oppression daily

Smith 13 [(Elijah, CEDA and NDT champion) “A Conversation in Ruins: Race and Black Participation in Lincoln Douglas Debate” Victory Briefs Daily, 9/4/13] AT

At every tournament you attend this year look around the cafeteria and take note of which students are not sitting amongst you and your peers. Despite being some of the best and the brightest in the nation, many students are alienated from and choose to not participate in an activity I like to think of as homeplace. In addition to the heavy financial burden associated with national competition, the exclusionary atmosphere of a debate tournament discourages black students from participating. Widespread awareness of the same lack of participation in policy debate has led to a growing movement towards alternative styles and methods of engaging the gatekeepers of the policy community, (Reid-Brinkley 08) while little work has been done to address or even acknowledge the same concern in Lincoln Douglas debate. Unfortunately students of color are not only forced to cope with a reality of structural violence outside of debate, but within an activity they may have joined to escape it in the first place. We are facing more than a simple trend towards marginalization occurring in Lincoln Douglas, but a culture of exclusion that locks minority participants out of the ranks of competition. It will be uncomfortable, it will be hard, and it will require continued effort but the necessary step in fixing this problem, like all problems, is the community as a whole admitting that such a problem with many “socially acceptable” choices exists in the first place. Like all systems of social control, the reality of racism in debate is constituted by the singular choices that institutions, coaches, and students make on a weekly basis. I have watched countless rounds where competitors attempt to win by rushing to abstractions to distance the conversation from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day. One of the students I coached, who has since graduated after leaving debate, had an adult judge write out a ballot that concluded by “hypothetically” defending my student being lynched at the tournament. Another debate concluded with a young man defending that we can kill animals humanely, “just like we did that guy Troy Davis”. Community norms would have competitors do intellectual gymnastics or make up rules to accuse black debaters of breaking to escape hard conversations but as someone who understands that experience, the only constructive strategy is to acknowledge the reality of the oppressed, engage the discussion from the perspective of authors who are black and brown, and then find strategies to deal with the issues at hand. It hurts to see competitive seasons come and go and have high school students and judges spew the same hateful things you expect to hear at a Klan rally. A student should not, when presenting an advocacy that aligns them with the oppressed, have to justify why oppression is bad. Debate is not just a game, but a learning environment with liberatory potential. Even if the form debate gives to a conversation is not the same you would use to discuss race in general conversation with Bayard Rustin or Fannie Lou Hamer, that is not a reason we have to strip that conversation of its connection to a reality that black students cannot escape. Current coaches and competitors alike dismiss concerns of racism and exclusion, won’t teach other students anything about identity in debate other than how to shut down competitors who engage in alternative styles and discourses, and refuse to engage in those discussions even outside of a tournament setting. A conversation on privilege and identity was held at a debate institute I worked at this summer and just as any theorist of privilege would predict it was the heterosexual, white, male staff members that either failed to make an appearance or stay for the entire discussion. No matter how talented they are, we have to remember that the students we work with are still just high school aged children. If those who are responsible for participants and the creation of accessible norms won't risk a better future for our community, it becomes harder to explain to students who look up to them why risking such an endeavor is necessary.

### Impact/Alt

#### The negative’s discourse reifies the ideological underpinning of racism that perpetuates white supremacy in debate – vote aff to interrogate these dominant ideologies

Reid-Brinkley 08 (Shanara Rose Reid-Brinkley, Assistant Professor of African American Studies and Communications as well as the Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh, “The Harsh Realities Of “Acting Black”: How African-American Policy Debaters Negotiate Representation Through Racial Performance And Style,” 2008]

To begin an investigation of these questions of race, representation and performance, I utilize ideological criticism as a rhetorical method. This project is interested in the ideological discourses and representations of race, class, gender, and sexuality within the public conversation about race and education. The dominant narratives, bred within institutional structures, must be interrogated for processes of normalization implicated in the success and achievement of black students in American society. In other words, an ideological analysis provides us with an opportunity to critically analyze the networks of power through which ideologies flow and gain discursive and representative dominance. The Marxist conception of ideology, reformulated and popularized by Louis Althusser, revolves around the assumption that social bodies are trapped within a “false consciousness” that blinds them to the truth. Althusser argues that “ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.” 66 Such a conception of ideology was necessary to explain why the working class did not rise up against the ruling class. Such ideologies were theorized as part of the superstructure resulting in the limited ability of subjects to exercise agency. For Althusser, dominant ideologies allowed the social structure to reproduce itself without ensuing conflict. Ideology functioned to naturalize the dominant structure encouraging individuals to participate by engaging in practices and behaviors designed to maintain that system. More importantly, ideologies were thought to construct an imaginary reality by which social beings became dependent on the structure as it functions, in order to make sense of their very lives. In essence, ideology was considered to be deterministic, binding individuals to the imaginary reality. However, current scholarship has been expressly critical of such a conceptualization of ideology, particularly, within the field of cultural studies, as it made the critical turn away from the study of dominant ideology and toward the cultural and everyday practices by which subjects engage ideological domination. Noted theorists, including Michel Foucault, Raymond Williams, and Stuart Hall have offered significant critiques of such a view of the relations of power in social system. One criticism of this version of ideology is that it assumes there is a truth, somewhere out there, that we are unable to ascertain because of the false consciousness produced through ideological discourses. 67 Second, as Foucault argues, “ideology stands in a secondary position relative to something which functions as its infrastructure, as its material, economic determinant, etc.” 68 In other words, ideology is defined as a result of economic structures. Thus, the economic structures are pre-existent and thus, uninfluenced by ideology, but simply productive of it. And, third, if the individual or the subject is not critical to the development of such ideological structures, but are instead determined by them, then social subjects become agent-less. They become simply social beings produced by the superstructure. Despite significant criticism of the concept of ideology, it remains significantly useful in the study of social domination. We can agree that there is not some true expression of reality out there that we are somehow blinded from seeing. We can agree that ideology is both produced by and produces economic and social structures. And, we can agree that social actors and their actions are not determined by ideology as much as social actors are strongly influenced toward accepting those ideologies as within their best interest, an internalization of ideological discourse as inscribed through various apparatuses of power. Yet, as media and communications scholar Nicolas Garnham cautions, the focus on resistance in cultural studies can prevent us from studying the manner in which dominance is maintained, both through structure and discourse. 69 He notes that it is the responsibility of intellectuals to map out structural and social dominance. Social actors participate in the production and maintenance of culture, both dominant and subordinate. In any given situation, both dominance and resistance are likely to be active in varying degrees. Thus, this project is not simply interested in the study of the production and maintenance of dominant ideologies; simultaneously, we must look to the manner in which social actors engage in resistance efforts within and through such dominant ideologies. Contemporary racism is reproduced and maintained through discursive constructions that are circulated through ideologies. Ideologies help to make stereotypical representations intelligible to an audience. As long as racism remains a social phenomenon in our society, racial ideologies will likely remain a critical tool by which racial difference is signified. All racial ideologies do not function the same way; they are often complicated by intersections of class, gender, sexuality and context. And, as ideologies often function to dominate, they also create circumstances for resistance. This project seeks to engage both dominance and resistance; how racial ideologies reproduce social dominance, and how those affected by that dominance attempt to resist it. The rhetoric surrounding race and education offers one space from which to analyze the social reproduction of racial dominance. Looking to specific contexts through which we analyze the significance of racial ideologies allows us as scholars to map out the forces of power active through racial difference. Specifically, a rhetorical focus can map the public discursive maneuvers that (re)produce and resist these social ideologies. The rhetoric surrounding race, culture, and performance within educational discourse is of critical importance to the future course of educational opportunity in American society. We must understand the strategies of signification that are most persuasive and powerful to the general public audience. What representations of racial others are most intelligible to the public and how might racial others respond to that intelligibility? As our previous discussion of the “acting white” thesis and the rise of cultural explanations of racial difference indicate, contemporary ideological representations of race have changed and in some ways remained the same. We must interrogate the use of ideological representations of race, gender, class, and sexuality as rhetorical strategy in public deliberations. And, it is important to read the social actors involved and watching as embodied. It is quite clear, that the public discourse surrounding race and education is extensive and far beyond the space allotted for this project. Thus, I have chosen a localized context from which to interrogate the ideological representations of race that may operate in any given American educational context. Academic policy debate is a competitive activity available to high school and college students. The activity dates back to the early 1900’s in American history. 70 It is an extracurricular activity that pits students against one another in a rigorous mental and verbal challenge. To engage in the ideological analysis of race and education discourse, I analyze three case studies within American policy debate and its representation. Chapter Two is an analysis of a non-profit organization for minority, inner city youths, the Urban Debate League, that has received wide media representation. I analyze the representation of UDL participants in local and national newspapers, as well as, an extended primetime story by 60 minutes on the Baltimore Urban Debate League. In this chapter, I argue that successful black students are scapegoated in news media representation and then redeemed by their debate participation. More specifically, I argue that the news media relies on racial stereotypes of black youths to make the UDL participants intelligible to the viewing and reading audience. It is necessary for the audience to view the students as “at risk” in order to later demonstrate their exemplary status. It is the students’ ability to mimic the performative dynamics of success that allows their race, class, and gender status to be redeemed in news media representation. I conclude that such a practice demonstrates the social significance of the stereotype even in positive portrayals of inner city black youths. Chapter Three is an analysis of race and performance in national college policy debate. The rising interest in diversifying policy debate at the high school level through non-profit organizations has fueled attempts to diversify at the college level. This chapter analyzes the University of Louisville Malcolm X debate program as it pushes the debate community to confront its race and class privilege. In this chapter, I ask how do black students respond to the racial ideologies surrounding their debate participation? What are the rhetorical strategies by which they engage a majority white audience in public discussion about race, privilege, and performance? I argue that these students use black sub-cultural styles, including signifyin’, and black popular culture such as gospel and hip hop, to engage in a critical re-negotiation of intellectual knowledge making practices within the debate community. I argue further that the Louisville students engage in rhetorical practices that violate the genre of policy debate speechmaking. To engage in this investigation I review three elimination round debates at the Cross-Examination Debate Association’s National Championship Tournament. I specifically focus on the most successful of the Louisville teams made up of the partnership between Elizabeth Jones and Tonia Green. I argue that the use of subcultural style offers a means for the Louisville students to resist the norms of white privilege that permeates the traditional debate landscape. Chapter Four is an analysis of the debate community’s response to the Louisville Project. In this chapter we are interested in how a majority white community responds to confrontational protest rhetoric in resistance narratives centered around racial representation and performance. I argue that the debate community engages in anti-movement resistance strategies. Instead of an outright rejection of the Louisville Project, the debate community attacks the Project’s violation of the community’s notion of order and decorum. Through these three case studies, I seek to demonstrate the connection between the public representation of blackness and the performative strategies engaged in by Blacks in the attempt to resist the stereotypes associated with such representations. This project takes seriously the use of performative and cultural style as a strategic and rhetorical engagement with contemporary racism in America.

### Extra Evidence

#### Our discussion of the discursive constructions that make racial domination possible is key – these discourses perpetuate the exclusionary nature of the debate community

Reid-Brinkley 08 (Shanara Rose Reid-Brinkley, Assistant Professor of African American Studies and Communications as well as the Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE,” 2008]

The attempts at educational reform are not limited to institutional actors such as the local, state, and federal governments. Non-profit organizations dedicated to alleviating the black/white achievement gap have also proliferated. One such organization, the Urban Debate League, claims that “Urban Debate Leagues have proven to increase literacy scores by 25%, to improve grade-point averages by 8 to 10%, to achieve high school graduation rates of nearly 100%, and to produce college matriculation rates of 71 to 91%.” The UDL program is housed in over fourteen American cities and targets inner city youths of color to increase their access to debate training. Such training of students defined as “at risk” is designed to offset the negative statistics associated with black educational achievement. The program has been fairly successful and has received wide scale media attention. The success of the program has also generated renewed interest amongst college debate programs in increasing direct efforts at recruitment of racial and ethnic minorities. The UDL program creates a substantial pool of racial minorities with debate training coming out of high school, that college debate directors may tap to diversify their own teams. The debate community serves as a microcosm of the broader educational space within which racial ideologies are operating. It is a space in which academic achievement is performed according to the intelligibility of one’s race, gender, class, and sexuality. As policy debate is intellectually rigorous and has historically been closed to those marked by social difference, it offers a unique opportunity to engage the impact of desegregation and diversification of American education. How are black students integrated into a competitive educational community from which they have traditionally been excluded? How are they represented in public and media discourse about their participation, and how do they rhetorically respond to such representations? If racial ideology is perpetuated within discourse through the stereotype, then mapping the intelligibility of the stereotype within public discourse and the attempts to resist such intelligibility is a critical tool in the battle to end racial domination. Education theorist Ludwig Pongratz argues that the testing focus in the standards and accountability movement is “probably the most effective means of realizing disciplinary procedures.” 11 He argues further that the contemporary “reformist drive” sweeping western nations is a tool designed to replicate normative practices, values, beliefs and behaviors consistent with the broader society. In other words, building on the work of Michel Foucault, Pongratz argues that the educational system, including reform efforts, function as a disciplinary “apparatus” that shapes and molds social bodies into normalized social systems. 12 The disciplinary character of modern education systems do not operate through institutional control, but instead through the positioning of social bodies to engage in self-control, an internalization of the discourse of institutional power. Pongratz notes that “in this way, it becomes possible to integrate school pupils into the school’s institutional framework more effectively than ever before.” 13 Acclaimed French Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’ theory of habitus is useful here. For Bourdieu, habitas represents the incorporation of the “social into the corporeal.” 14 Gender theorist Terry Lovell argues “Through habitus, social norms are incorporated in the body of the individual subject.” 15 An institution, like those attached to public education in the U.S. “can only be efficacious if it is objectified in bodies in the form of durable dispositions that recognize and comply with the specific demands of a given institutional area of activity.” 16 In other words, the disciplinary character of the school system only functions in so much as disciplinary parameters can be internalized by the members of a social body. What is missing from the study of education reform and the black/white “achievement gap” is an analysis of the discursive construction of racial “images and stereotypes with which” the public is “confronted.” 17 Public discourse about education reform, particularly that which revolves around the black/ white achievement gap, requires the use of race, class, and gender imagery that is intelligible to the general public. In essence, from experts to politicians to the news media, public representations of black underachievement and reform efforts depend on the versatility of social and cultural stereotypes consistent with the argumentative structures and social ideologies that make rhetorical efforts at reform intelligible. Education reform engages in a discourse of “paradigm shift.” 18 In essence there is a discursive consistency amongst education reform proponents for characterizing reform efforts as a change in perspective from previous values and beliefs about how best to educate America’s youth. Philosophy of education scholar Jeff Stickney argues that scholars interested in the production of education reform discourse should be concerned with “how a change of perception is to be brought about or secured.” 19 In other words, Stickney argues that the discourse supporting educational reform functions to discipline educators into a compliance that belies any attempt to critique and engage the viability of the reform effort to the specific contexts educators find themselves working within. 20 While Stickney is interested in engaging such discourse for the purpose of furthering theoretical scholarship on curriculum development, his study raises the question of how the public discourse surrounding education reform may function to discipline its differently situated stakeholders.

## 

## 2N Link Frontlines

### POLLS

### ---XT

#### Extend Wong – the aff legitimizes injustice, inequality, and oppression – by arguing that anything the majority believes is automatically right, the aff is a tyranny of the majority that justifies historic abuses of majority power such as Jim Crow, slavery, and the abuse of gay and women’s rights. This is also terminal framework defense – the fact that the majority has committed obvious wrongs means that majority opinion does not automatically make a policy just or morally obligatory.

#### And, more evidence – the ideology of majority rules espoused by the aff is a dangerous perversion of democracy – it justifies systematic violence against minority groups

Beahm 98 [(Donald Beahm, Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Doane College, Instructor at University of Nebraska-Lincoln) “Alternative conceptions of and corrections to the tyranny of the majority” Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate College at the University of Nebraska. ProQuest] AT

The fundamental tenet of democracy is that the majority rules. This concept has filtered down through time to us in such a pervasive fashion that it has become the doctrine of democracy. This doctrine of democracy has been adopted by multifarious governments endorsing the utilitarian principle of what is best for the people is what is chosen by the majority. This main tenet of democracy is potentially flawed because it does not adequately account for the very thing that most threatens the existence of democracy. This threat comes from majoritarian oppression. ln a letter written 11 October 1788, Janos Madison warned Thomas Jefferson that: wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of oppression. ln our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is cheifly\* [sic] to he apprehended, not iron acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but iron acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents (Madison i071, ii:208). Madison had expressed concerns about the injustice of majoritarian oppression prior to his letter to Jefferson in Federalist Paper Fifty-one (1981, 323). But Madison was not the first to express recognition of this problem. Long before Madison, Plato (1081, 47), and Aristotle (1818, 122, 134, 281) described similar views on the danger of the majority becoming overbearing. Since Edison's warning a number of other authors have perceived threats from the majority as [is] the most dangerous to a democracy (Tocqueville 1089, 248, 282, 260; Calhoun 1953, 22-26, 38; Iill 1911, 448, 480). Oppression by the majority in all of its various conceptions has come to be known as the ‘Tyranny of the Majority." Although the phrase "Tyranny of the Majority' is often used as though it were a singular theory that is well defined and clearly understood, it is in fact none of the aforementioned. What the tyranny of the majority is, and how to guard against it, has been the subject of a number of nebulous alternative conceptions and corrections. No single theorist has attempted to construct a comprehensive theory of the tyranny of the majority. Those who have writ- ten on the issue have done so in a mostly indirect fashion where other ends (usually political) were being pursued.‘ The result has been a poverty of clarity on the matter (Dahl 1986, 4-88). The limited constitutional government established in the United States at the convention in 1787 was marked by Madison's desire to prevent majoritarian oppression from dominating the new government. Although obvious contradiction to minority protections such as slavery and continuing discrimination against racial minorities demonstrates the failures that all too often have afflicted our system, Madison was earnest in making the concept of the tyranny of the Majority a focus of concern in the fledgling days of the American republic. The phrase 'Madisonian Democracy' has cone to symbolize his contribution in this area (Dahl 1986, 4). In her book, The Tyranny of the Majority, Lani Guinier returns to a majority that rules that does not dominate as a "Madisonian Majority” (1804, 8). Thus, America has a rich, original, and sometimes conflicting heritage to draw upon concerning protection of the few from a domineering majority. Not unimportant is the fact that America had Madison to set the agenda. Regardless of Madison's attempt to establish protections against the tyranny of the majority, examples of it have flourished over the last two hundred and ten years. Two of the most recognised examples of majoritarian tyranny in the history of the United States are the Civil War and discrimination against racial minorities (Roper 1089, 87; Gainier 1904, 103). These two examples provide a provocative paradox for analysis of the issue because they both had to deal with discrimination against a racial minority that resulted in decidedly different outcome. In the case of the Civil War a tyrannizing majority (the North) abolition on the South. While one certainly could suggest that this was a moral exercise in majority will, it Ins nevertheless seen by Southerners at the tine as an act of a tyrannical majority. The result of the outcome of the Civil War was to end one abominable torn of discrimination, slavery, only to have the specter of various other manifestations raised. Discrimination against racial minorities continued virtually unabated for many years, and continues today in the areas of employment, housing, education, and voting (Guinier 1994) which have left American history rife with ugly examples of what the injustice of majoritarian oppression can do.

### ---A2 Democracy is Good

#### This is not democracy, this is oppression – masking your bastardization of democracy as democracy itself only furthers the systematic violation of basic rights

Patrick 6 [(John, author) Understanding Democracy, A Hip Pocket Guide “Majority Rule and Minority Rights” Oxford University Press 2006] AT

The essence of democracy is majority rule, the making of binding decisions by a vote of more than one-half of all persons who participate in an election. However, constitutional democracy in our time requires majority rule with minority rights. Thomas Jefferson, third President of the United States, expressed this concept of democracy in 1801 in his First Inaugural Address. He said, All . . . will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful must be reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal law must protect and to violate would be oppression. In every genuine democracy today, majority rule is both endorsed and limited by the supreme law of the constitution, which protects the rights of individuals. Tyranny by minority over the majority is barred, but so is tyranny of the majority against minorities. This fundamental principle of constitutional democracy, majority rule coupled with the protection of minority rights, is embedded in the constitutions of all genuine democracies today. The 1992 constitution of the Czech Republic, for example, recognizes the concepts of majority rule and minority rights. Article VI says, "Political decisions shall stem from the will of the majority, expressed by means of a free vote. The majority’s decisions must heed the protection of the minorities." The Czech constitution is filled with statements of guaranteed civil liberties, which the constitutional government must not violate and which it is empowered to protect. Majority rule is limited in order to protect minority rights, because if it were unchecked it probably would be used to oppress persons holding unpopular views. Unlimited majority rule in a democracy is potentially just as despotic as the unchecked rule of an autocrat or an elitist minority political party. In every constitutional democracy, there is ongoing tension between the contradictory factors of majority rule and minority rights. Therefore, public officials in the institutions of representative government must make authoritative decisions about two questions. When, and under what conditions, should the rule of the majority be curtailed in order to protect the rights of the minority? And, conversely, when, and under what conditions, must the rights of the minority be restrained in order to prevent the subversion of majority rule? These questions are answered on a case-by-case basis in every constitutional democracy in such a way that neither majority rule nor minority rights suffer permanent or irreparable damage. Both majority rule and minority rights must be safeguarded to sustain justice in a constitutional democracy.

### ---A2 Democracy Defines Right

#### 1. I shouldn’t have to justify why oppression is bad – questioning and justifying oppression is an exclusionary practice that makes debate a hostile space for those who endure oppression daily

Smith 13 [(Elijah, CEDA and NDT champion) “A Conversation in Ruins: Race and Black Participation in Lincoln Douglas Debate” Victory Briefs Daily, 9/4/13] AT

At every tournament you attend this year look around the cafeteria and take note of which students are not sitting amongst you and your peers. Despite being some of the best and the brightest in the nation, many students are alienated from and choose to not participate in an activity I like to think of as homeplace. In addition to the heavy financial burden associated with national competition, the exclusionary atmosphere of a debate tournament discourages black students from participating. Widespread awareness of the same lack of participation in policy debate has led to a growing movement towards alternative styles and methods of engaging the gatekeepers of the policy community, (Reid-Brinkley 08) while little work has been done to address or even acknowledge the same concern in Lincoln Douglas debate. Unfortunately students of color are not only forced to cope with a reality of structural violence outside of debate, but within an activity they may have joined to escape it in the first place. We are facing more than a simple trend towards marginalization occurring in Lincoln Douglas, but a culture of exclusion that locks minority participants out of the ranks of competition. It will be uncomfortable, it will be hard, and it will require continued effort but the necessary step in fixing this problem, like all problems, is the community as a whole admitting that such a problem with many “socially acceptable” choices exists in the first place. Like all systems of social control, the reality of racism in debate is constituted by the singular choices that institutions, coaches, and students make on a weekly basis. I have watched countless rounds where competitors attempt to win by rushing to abstractions to distance the conversation from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day. One of the students I coached, who has since graduated after leaving debate, had an adult judge write out a ballot that concluded by “hypothetically” defending my student being lynched at the tournament. Another debate concluded with a young man defending that we can kill animals humanely, “just like we did that guy Troy Davis”. Community norms would have competitors do intellectual gymnastics or make up rules to accuse black debaters of breaking to escape hard conversations but as someone who understands that experience, the only constructive strategy is to acknowledge the reality of the oppressed, engage the discussion from the perspective of authors who are black and brown, and then find strategies to deal with the issues at hand. It hurts to see competitive seasons come and go and have high school students and judges spew the same hateful things you expect to hear at a Klan rally. A student should not, when presenting an advocacy that aligns them with the oppressed, have to justify why oppression is bad. Debate is not just a game, but a learning environment with liberatory potential. Even if the form debate gives to a conversation is not the same you would use to discuss race in general conversation with Bayard Rustin or Fannie Lou Hamer, that is not a reason we have to strip that conversation of its connection to a reality that black students cannot escape. Current coaches and competitors alike dismiss concerns of racism and exclusion, won’t teach other students anything about identity in debate other than how to shut down competitors who engage in alternative styles and discourses, and refuse to engage in those discussions even outside of a tournament setting. A conversation on privilege and identity was held at a debate institute I worked at this summer and just as any theorist of privilege would predict it was the heterosexual, white, male staff members that either failed to make an appearance or stay for the entire discussion. No matter how talented they are, we have to remember that the students we work with are still just high school aged children. If those who are responsible for participants and the creation of accessible norms won't risk a better future for our community, it becomes harder to explain to students who look up to them why risking such an endeavor is necessary.

#### 2. You clearly don’t understand how kritik debate works – it doesn’t make sense to apply your argument to the kritik because that is exactly what I’m criticizing – the legitimacy of the idea that the majority defines what is right is what I’m calling into question so it’s circular to use that argument to prove it’s own legitimacy.

### CONSTITUTION

#### Social change comes from shifts in popular opinion, not from the application of Constitutional principles – this is evident in the fact that the Constitution has allowed racist policies to this day

Williams 92 [(Juan, political analyst for Fox News Channel, writes for The Washington Post, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, senior news analyst for NPR) “The Survival of Racism Under the Constitution” William and Mary Law Review Volume 34 Issue 1 Article 3] AT

With true foresight, Madison argued with another Virginian, Thomas Jefferson, that the ten amendments in the Bill of Rights were necessary additions to the Constitution because the new republic's ruling majority could misuse the government by making it an instrument of oppression.22 Madison did not argue that a tyrannical elite controlling the government might run over the majority; instead, he argued, displaying a magnificent ability to foresee danger, that an impulsive majority in a frenzy over some problem might abuse the government's control of tax revenue, military power, and laws to run over individual and privacy rights.23 The rights of racial and ethnic minorities in America have their most stalwart defender in those protections. Douglass and, especially, Justice Marshall, used the liberties enunciated in those documents-liberties for all men-in their fight for equal rights. As I noted earlier, however, it remains a source of bitter irony to those men, as well as to me, that despite this language of high ideals, our nation could twist itself into such a hideous contortion as to allow for the tyrannical practices of state-enforced slavery and legal discrimination. This situation begs the question: Why has racial prejudice found a home in a nation born with the promise to pursue such a high-minded ideal as "equality?" In the specific case of black Americans, the rights listed for American citizens in the Declaration of Independence and Constitution simply went ignored. Blacks did not receive full recognition as American citizens until the Civil War Amendments. 24 The society that created the Declaration, the Constitution, and Bill of Rights, was racially separate. Although the Framers were able to comprehend the ideals of justice, equality, and freedom, the America that existed when they drafted the Constitution was a nation already deep in the mire of oppression based on skin color. Benjamin Banneker, the black mathematician, wrote to Jefferson to ask how the language of the Declaration could speak of men being "created equal, '25 when Jefferson, one of its authors, was a slaveholder, and therefore, a member of a fraternity that employed "fraud and violence"26 to keep slaves under "groaning captivity. 2' 7 In our democratic society, the white majority acted without regard to the Bill of Rights in enacting laws that enforced this inequality of treatment and inequality of opportunity.28 Slavery, lynching, and rape were illegal acts when people with white skin were the victims. When it came to blacks, however, the nation's majority was blind to perceptions of criminality.2 9 From the majority's point of view, having to deal with an inferior race was a matter of the white man's burden. The racism of this majority, and its murderous instinct regarding black people and Native Americans, leads to this conclusion: equality is a function of attitude formed by popular opinion, not the nation's laws. Neither the laws nor the founding precepts of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights determines the level of equality that black people, women, members of religious minorities, or any other discreet group experience day to day in America. Equality is a byproduct of the popular opinion of the day; the way that the white majority-and even other blacks and minorities-treats a black person or any other minority is a consequence of stereotypes. The stereotypes produce attitudes that lead to human actions and laws that, history tells us, can justify the most horrendous oppression.3 “

### GENERAL

### A2 Theory Separate

#### They’re just making excuses. The apparent race neutrality of theory only appears that way because their author does not consider people of color to be “persons” in the first place.

Charles Mills [Race and the foundations of knowledge: cultural amnesia in the academy Ed. Joseph A. Young, Jana Evans Braziel “Modernity, Persons and Subpersons” 2006]

The first would seem to be the most vulnerable, since it runs up against the obstacle of what X actually said. Nevertheless, it will be argued that these racist remarks do not rise to the status of a theory, and as such should be taken as overridden by T (construed as egalitarian and nonracial). In the light of my discussion above, however, we immediately appreciate that the obvious reply should be to ask by what non-question-begging, noncircular criterion this determination of inferior epistemic status is made. It cannot be supported by simply invoking T's [the theory’s] apparent race-neutrality as manifested in its vocabulary of "men" or "persons," for, as I have argued, the very question is whether we have independent reason to believe people of color are numbered among those persons. (In other words, humanness is being taken, without argument, as sufficient for personhood—which is precisely what is at issue.) Nor can it be supported by the general claim that racism can never rise to the level of a theory, for this assertion has already been rejected. Nor can it be assumed that the brevity of the racist remarks in question demonstrates that no theory is being elaborated, for in some cases the philosopher may simply be appealing to the common wisdom. If X made pronouncements about nonwhites that are in seeming contradiction to his general pronouncements about "men' or “persons," then we do have to entertain the possibility that he did not mean "men' or ”persons" to include them. The case for exclusionary white personhood becomes more plausible if a[n] developed account is given of why nonwhites are inferior, but even without [it] such an account the possibility needs to be considered, rather than be ruled out a priori. Thus we need to learn to read, and to see, these texts differently. We need to be on the lookout for the aside, the throwaway, the seemingly casual remark, the offhand comment, whose significance lies in that very casualness--the making of a set of assumptions that, when unpacked, reveal a world of difference. In these seemingly marginal remarks are often contained distinctions that go to the center of the theorist's thought and that demonstrate its whiteness.

### A2 Racism Not Important vs Theory

#### This is a brand new link to the kritik. They are engaging in the sanitizing of their philosophy, a process which has been used to obscure the institutional racism that continues affect people of color to this day.

Charles Mills [Race and the foundations of knowledge: cultural amnesia in the academy Ed. Joseph A. Young, Jana Evans Braziel “Modernity, Persons and Subpersons” 2006]

It will be appreciated, then, that this semantic innovation, so simple to describe, would, if adopted, quite radically transform our view of modern Western moral/political philosophy. We would have to start thinking of these theorists, and their theories, quite differently from how they are presented in the standard textbook. This does not rule out, of course, a sanitized reappropriation and retrieval of their theories. But it would have to be explicitly acknowledged that that is what we are doing, that we are not reading them as they intended. So it is not that liberalism and egalitarianism, abstract L and E, were historically meant to extend to everybody. Rather, we would need to talk about racialized liberalism and racialized egalitarianism, RL and RE. Racism would then emerge, as it should, as a normative system in its own right--indeed, as the actual normative system obtaining for most of the modern period. And just as the hierarchical ideologies of the ancient and medieval world were multiply tiered, with different standings (of class) for different sets of human beings, we would be forced to acknowledge that (actual, historical) liberalism also is a two-tiered ideology, with a different status assigned to, and correspondingly differentiated norms prescribed for, whites and nonwhites. The orthodox narrative of modernity would have to be rewritten; the orthodox cartography of the political would have to be redrawn. Apart from being--unlike the present narrative--true to the actual historical record, and so demanding implementation on those grounds alone, this transformation would have the great virtue of uniting the conceptual spaces and periodization times of the white political and the nonwhite political. As emphasized at the start, the mainstream narrative orients us toward certain players, certain dates, in keeping with a macro-picture ot global history in which an egalitarian modernity triumphantly succeeds the hierarchical ancient and medieval epochs. So there is a segregation of events, an apartheid of the historical calendar, a color coding of concepts. Textbooks provide an account of the history of Western political philosophy that moves smoothly from Plato to John Rawls without dealing with race, as if, in the modern period, Western theorists were proclaiming their egalitarian views as applicable to everybody. The views of known racist theorists—Joseph de Gobineau, Houston Stuart Chamberlain, Adolf Hitler--are usually excluded from these accounts, and the racism of Enlightenment theorists is not highlighted or even mentioned. The West is constructed in such a way that racism and white racial domination have been no part of the history of the West, and the normative superiority of whiles to nonwhites, justified by these theorists, has been no part of that history. We have a history of the official political proscenium with a certain cast of actors (Whigs and Tories; liberals and conservatives; socialists, anarchists, and fascists), and these other players (abolitionists, anti-imperialists, Pan-Africanists...) seem to be on a different stage, a stage so oddly related to the familiar one that it hardly seems political al all. Similarly, we are all familiar with 1776 and 1789 as crucial dates tor human liberation: the American and French Revolutions. But how many of us would be able to come up unassisted with the date of the Haitian Revolution or the end of New World slavery? Imagine a standard textbook account John Locke’s Second treatise” will he at pains to situate Locke as a Whig spokesman in an ideological and political conflict with the quasi-feudal views of Sir Robert Filmer's patriarchal Toryism, Locke will he portrayed as the modernist advocate of egalitarian ism as against Intrinsic subordination, or liberal parliamentarianism as against absolutism and the divine right of kings, and his proclamation of the equality of all men in the state of nature will be central to that portrayal. But these same textbooks will say nothing about racial hierarchy, and Locke's role in justifying Native American expropriation and countenancing African slavery. The battle of white men for political egalitarianism is recognized as a political struggle; the battle of people of color for political egalitarianism is not. So these same Western theorists will not be represented--as they (usually) are--as defenders of colonialism and exponents of global white supremacy, a political system in which whites rule despotically over people of color- A mystified account of political philosophy complements a mystified account of recent world history, in which the central role of imperialism and racial domination has been either sanitized or written out of the record altogether

### A2 Modern Theory not Racist

#### This does not answer the link evidence I’m presenting. My argument specifically is that their authors are based on a tradition of philosophy where racism is central to their mode of thinking, and an uncritical assumption that racism has been washed out of philosophy merely disguises those racist assumptions that continue to have an impact on people.

Charles Mills [Prof. Philosophy, Northwestern University. Race and Racism In Modern Philospohy. “Kant’s Untermenschen” pg. 190]

Second, it could well be that these exclusions do in fact affect the thinker’s thought in other ways whose ramifications need to be worked out. In the case of gender, the connection is easier to make, in part because feminists have been boring on these questions longer than critical race theorists. If you have been generalizing about humanity on the basis of one half of it, then there will obviously be vast areas of history and experience that need to be brought in to correct for these omissions. Political theorists such as Susan Moller Okin have argued against a merely "terminological" gender neutrality, which contents itself with a self-conscious alternation of "he" and "she" without considering how the originally sexist theory's basic conceptual apparatus, assumptions, and pronouncements may have been shaped by these gender exclusions. Do crucial concepts such as "autonomy" need to be given a different emphasis, if a case can be made that a tacitly masculine experience has grounded their formation? Is the disdain for "inclination” linked with its identification with the body and the feminine? It could be argued similarly that genuine race neutrality requires careful rethinking of white philosophy's content in the light of racial domination. If nonwhite "savagery" is the negative antipode against which civilized (white) humanity is going to define itself, then obviously the interlocking conceptual relationships are likely to shape how these concepts of "civilization," and what it is to rise above nature, develop. Both in the descriptive realm, where full humanity is conceptualized in Eurocentric and culturally loaded terms, and in the prescriptive realm, the implications could be far-reaching

## 2N Misc Frontlines

### A2 Epistemology is Accusing of Racism

#### Epistemological racism isn’t an accusation of racism.

Scheurich and Young 97 [(James Joseph Scheurich, Professor in the Department of Educational Administration and Human Resource Development at Texas A&M University; Michelle D. Young, Associate Professor, Department of Educational Administration. Executive Director, University Council for Educational Administration) “Coloring Epistemologies: Are Our Research Epistemologies Racially Biased?” Educational Researcher, Vol. 26, No. 4. (May, 1997), pp. 4-16.] AT

Understanding that we need to get beyond issues of individual racism, whether overt or covert, is critical to initiating a consideration of whether our research epistemologies are racially biased. For example, if we, as researchers, were to read an article that argued that our research epistemologies were racially biased and if we disagreed with this argument because we did not consider ourselves, as individuals, to be consciously or intentionally racist, this judgment would indicate that we did not understand epistemological racism. The error here is that racial critiques of research epistemologies have virtually nothing to do with whether an individual researcher is overtly or covertly racist. A researcher could be adamantly anti-racist in thought and deed and still be using a research epistemology that, given our later discussion of episte- mological racism, could be judged to be racially biased. Consequently, researchers considering the issue of epistemological racism need to get beyond the question of whether personally they are racists because this latter judgment is not related to judgments about epistemolog- ical racism

### More Scheurich and Young Ev

#### This racism might be invisible but it is just as harmful – your obligation is to resist it.

Scheurich and Young 97 [(James Joseph Scheurich, Professor in the Department of Educational Administration and Human Resource Development at Texas A&M University; Michelle D. Young, Associate Professor, Department of Educational Administration. Executive Director, University Council for Educational Administration) “Coloring Epistemologies: Are Our Research Epistemologies Racially Biased?” Educational Researcher, Vol. 26, No. 4. (May, 1997), pp. 4-16.] AT

Racism of any sort is heinous, most terribly for its victims but also for its perpetrators." One of the worst racisms, though, for any generation or group is the one that we do not see, that is invisible to our lens-the one we participate in without consciously knowing or intending it. Are we not seeing the biases of our time just like those a hundred years ago did not see the biases of their time? Will those who look back at us in time wonder why we resisted seeing our racism? The unfortunate truth is that we can be strongly anti-racist in our own minds but be promulgating racism in profound ways we do not understand (Pine & Hilliard, i990, p. 595). \*s Case (1993) says in The Rage of a Privileged Class' "people do not have to be racist-or have any malicious intent-in order to make decisions that unfairly harm members of another race" (p. 4). It is our contention here, based on the seminal, ground-breaking work of scholars of color, that we educational researchers are unintentionally involved at the epistemological heart of Our research enterprises, in a racism-epistemological racism-that we generally do not see or understand. Once we see and understand it, though, we cannot continue in our old ways. To do so would be to betray our fundamental commitment as educators and as educational researchers.

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# Theory Frontline

## Theory K Link

### General

#### New 1AR k – Theory is a link

#### 1. You shift the debate from “In a democracy, should voting be compulsory?” to “what interpretation can give the neg the most ground?”---that destroys confrontation of real racism --- not engaging the democratic process because it’s easier to pull out generic theory blocks reduces debate to a race to find shortcuts when it has the potential to be a tool for democratic liberation that the framers wanted us to examine.

Reid-Brinkley 08 (Shanara Rose Reid-Brinkley, Assistant Professor of African American Studies and Communications as well as the Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE,” 2008. http://www.comm.pitt.edu/faculty/documents/reid-brinkley\_shanara\_r\_200805\_phd.pdf)

Despite the UDL’s success at increasing the participation levels of racial/ethnic minorities and women in high school policy debate, the program has not resulted in a significant increase in the participation levels in national level college policy debate. 3 Even with the financial resources made available to UDL students to increase their successful participation in high school and the specific interest of college debate teams in recruiting minority students, UDL participants are largely choosing not to participate in college policy debate. 4 Jon Brushke, debate scholar and debate director, notes that “If even a very small percentage of those UDL students went on to college debate there should be an obvious and profound change in participation by ethnic groups, and that has not happened.” 5 He notes further, that “Whatever other benefits these leagues have offered their participants; they have not managed to change ethnic participation levels in college debate.” 6 Stepp notes further that the activity remains primarily dominated by white males, from middle to upper class backgrounds. Even those UDL students who have chosen to debate in college still remain statistically under-represented at the most successful levels of national competition. 7 Stepp and Gardner note that although female and minority participation is increasing, there does not seem “to be a proportional increase in their winning,” including both team awards and speaker awards. 8 As the UDL movement gained attention from those in the debate community interested in diversifying the activity, Dr. Ede Warner at the University of Louisville became significantly involved in the development of debate curriculum, the training of UDL summer institute faculty members, and the instruction of UDL students. 9 In a 2001 essay, Warner along with Brushke argue: With UDL support, students from under-served high schools can go to tournaments and compete against students from wealthy school systems. Debate thus addresses at all levels the problems that the under-served confront when approaching institutions so often governed by the graduates of rich, private schools: Skills of discourse are equalized, economic disadvantages become less of a barrier when confronting rhetors, and the economically under-served gain a conduit to positions of institutional power…More basically, when students from UDL schools debate against elite high schools and win, the students learn that victory is possible and that economic disadvantages can be overcome. 10 Warner and Brushcke demonstrate their commitment to the UDL’s ability to be efficacious in encouraging and producing educational success and achievement amongst “under-served” communities. For these authors, the UDL movement creates a sense of hope that educational opportunities can significantly impact the social consequences of race, ethnicity, gender and class. In other words, “Offering debate at under-served schools addresses…inequalities.” 11 Warner and Brushke go on to note that “debate-as-outreach” can be particularly powerful as the debate community learns to become increasingly more accepting of stylistic differences that are likely to result from the diversifying of that activity. They argue that debate “audiences must appreciate these new forms.” 12 However, as Warner observed the national development of the UDL and its impact on the nationally competitive high school circuit and the college debate community, he experienced a growing discontent. By 2005 Warner’s position on the UDL had drastically changed: Students are hoodwinked and bamboozled into believing that they can receive access to all of the benefits of interscholastic debate, in the same way that I have convinced students that the game could change to allow for more diversity. They are told that debate is a "way out" and can improve their lives. They are told that if they learn the norms and procedures of traditional debate they can achieve just like everyone else. What they are not told: that debate tools alone won't overcome their disadvantages, especially within the debate community, that the best they can generally hope for is becoming the best in that UDL and perhaps getting recruited by the local UDL partner, and ultimately living their slife as a regional debater or a non-competitive national debater. They will not share in the resource expenditures of the larger debate structure, they will not be on the pre-bid track and they will not receive the rewards reserved for a select few in national debate. Why? Not because of anything they do, but because the game is rigged against them, who they are, and what the community asks them to become to achieve ‘success.’

#### Policy proves this is a real possibility – being open to other forms of argument is key

Smith 13 [(Elijah, CEDA and NDT champion) “A Conversation in Ruins: Race and Black Participation in Lincoln Douglas Debate” Victory Briefs Daily, 9/4/13] AT

At every tournament you attend this year look around the cafeteria and take note of which students are not sitting amongst you and your peers. Despite being some of the best and the brightest in the nation, many students are alienated from and choose to not participate in an activity I like to think of as homeplace. In addition to the heavy financial burden associated with national competition, the exclusionary atmosphere of a debate tournament discourages black students from participating. Widespread awareness of the same lack of participation in policy debate has led to a growing movement towards alternative styles and methods of engaging the gatekeepers of the policy community, (Reid-Brinkley 08) while little work has been done to address or even acknowledge the same concern in Lincoln Douglas debate. Unfortunately students of color are not only forced to cope with a reality of structural violence outside of debate, but within an activity they may have joined to escape it in the first place. We are facing more than a simple trend towards marginalization occurring in Lincoln Douglas, but a culture of exclusion that locks minority participants out of the ranks of competition. It will be uncomfortable, it will be hard, and it will require continued effort but the necessary step in fixing this problem, like all problems, is the community as a whole admitting that such a problem with many “socially acceptable” choices exists in the first place. Like all systems of social control, the reality of racism in debate is constituted by the singular choices that institutions, coaches, and students make on a weekly basis. I have watched countless rounds where competitors attempt to win by rushing to abstractions to distance the conversation from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day. One of the students I coached, who has since graduated after leaving debate, had an adult judge write out a ballot that concluded by “hypothetically” defending my student being lynched at the tournament. Another debate concluded with a young man defending that we can kill animals humanely, “just like we did that guy Troy Davis”. Community norms would have competitors do intellectual gymnastics or make up rules to accuse black debaters of breaking to escape hard conversations but as someone who understands that experience, the only constructive strategy is to acknowledge the reality of the oppressed, engage the discussion from the perspective of authors who are black and brown, and then find strategies to deal with the issues at hand. It hurts to see competitive seasons come and go and have high school students and judges spew the same hateful things you expect to hear at a Klan rally. A student should not, when presenting an advocacy that aligns them with the oppressed, have to justify why oppression is bad. Debate is not just a game, but a learning environment with liberatory potential. Even if the form debate gives to a conversation is not the same you would use to discuss race in general conversation with Bayard Rustin or Fannie Lou Hamer, that is not a reason we have to strip that conversation of its connection to a reality that black students cannot escape. Current coaches and competitors alike dismiss concerns of racism and exclusion, won’t teach other students anything about identity in debate other than how to shut down competitors who engage in alternative styles and discourses, and refuse to engage in those discussions even outside of a tournament setting. A conversation on privilege and identity was held at a debate institute I worked at this summer and just as any theorist of privilege would predict it was the heterosexual, white, male staff members that either failed to make an appearance or stay for the entire discussion. No matter how talented they are, we have to remember that the students we work with are still just high school aged children. If those who are responsible for participants and the creation of accessible norms won't risk a better future for our community, it becomes harder to explain to students who look up to them why risking such an endeavor is necessary.

#### Three impacts

#### A) It has a stronger chance of actually affecting other rounds since it is empirically proven – prefer it over their unwarranted analytic blips – this takes out all their generic argumetns

#### B) This card is dual functional – all your “oppression doesn’t matter” arguments are now links to this K – arguing for that excludes minority participants from the activity

#### C) Internal link to your education arguments – people who can’t participate in the activity because of your practices don’t get fairness or education. Participation is the greatest benefit – how we debate the topic isn’t nearly as important as debating it since we get some education either way. We shouldn’t benefit ourselves at others’ expense

#### 2) Extend the Scheuring and Young – yes, it applies to theory as well – these framework arguments aren’t neutral – they’re ploys to exclude the important discussion and perpetuate the status quo oppression

#### 3) Your framework arguments are not neutral – we can’t wish away these atrocities by refusing to discuss but we can examine them

William Shannahan [“Twilight of the Topical Idols: Kritik-ing in the Age of Imperialism”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 25 pg. 66-77)

Most importantly perhaps, debate’s invigorated reflexivity finally acknowledged that the process of interpretation was neither neutral nor innocent. For far too long however, debate ha[s]d proceeded as if affirmatives’ relationship to the topic was [is] unproblematic and did not require examination. This is not to say that our very erudite community failed to recognize how interpretation was “subjective,” but rather they failed to accept the very notion that subjectivity itself was tied to politics, ideology, and philosophical bent. Not surprisingly, debate’s insularity [has] fairly effectively prevented five decades of sustained criticism against the canons of Western philosophy and politics from entering into debate rounds and debate thinking, as if most of, for example, Continental philosophy had nothing to offer us. Even the most casual glance across a variety of disciplines demonstrated the irrefutable relevance of so-called post-structuralism and postmodernism to debate practice. For an activity that prides itself on its erudition, these theoretical oversights were conspicuous and disabling. How could such a sophisticated argumentative community fail to consider and evaluate the relevance of such far-reaching and important changes in academic scholarship?

#### He Continues:

Affirmative debaters’ relationship to the topic constituted them in particular, often undesirable ways. The topic was not simply some bounded space or a container from which to draw topical plans. Instead, the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications. That body in Washington, D.C. can no longer be isolated from brutal acts employed to make policy. Importantly, the second generation again allowed examination of the ethical relationship inherent in affirming, or refusing to debate, the interpellated, often virulent violence involved in such affirmation.

### Education Link

#### The goal of education should not be the same as a typical generic education theory argument. Anti-oppressive education requires a confrontation of things we view as commonsense.

Kevin K. Kumashiro [professor of Asian Studies at the University of Illinois Chicago and Founder of the Anti-Oppression “’Posts’ Perspectives on Anti-Oppressive Education in Social Studies, English, Mathematics, and Science Classrooms”, Educational Researcher, Volume 30, No. 3, April 2001.]

Anti-oppressive education works against commonsense views of what it means to teach. Teachers must move beyond their preconceived notions of what it means to teach, and students must move beyond their current conceptions of what it means to learn. Anti-oppressive education involves constantly re-examining and troubling the forms of repetition that play out in one’s practices and that hinder attempts to challenge oppressions. It involves desiring and working through crisis rather than avoiding and masking it. It involves contesting the standards that currently deﬁne education in the disciplines. And it involves imagining new possibilities for who we are and can be.

## K o/w Theory

### A2 Fairness

#### 1. Fairness is a marginal impact – making it slightly harder to win for one person is nothing compared to the systematic racism and exclusion the 1AC attempts to challenge – the exclusion you face as a result of one argument is not as great as the exclusion hundreds of students face elsewhere

#### 2. The nature of the activity creates very few winners since someone must win and someone must lose – moreover you will not care about the rounds you lost after you leave this activity – but the potential of this activity to challenge real racism in the real world is much more important

Reid-Brinkley 08 (Shanara Rose Reid-Brinkley, Assistant Professor of African American Studies and Communications as well as the Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE,” 2008. http://www.comm.pitt.edu/faculty/documents/reid-brinkley\_shanara\_r\_200805\_phd.pdf)

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### A2 Education

#### 1. Strongest link to education – who knows more about compulsory voting in Australia is irrelevant compared the anti-oppressive learning cultivated by the 1AC. This is the vision of schools that fund debate – topics change but the broader goal doesn’t

#### 2. Exclusion – theory on this issue has been run for years – no one cares and people would rather engage theory than change – you don’t solve. But policy proves we can make the activity better – it’s key to liberation

#### 3. Mental decolonization – The role of an educator is to create a learning environment to foster mental liberation from oppressive ideologies.

G. J. Dei [Anti-Colonialism and Education 2006]

The anti-colonial classroom must always be a de-colonizing space. This is both a[n] physical and intellectual imperative, affecting both the set up and use of space, as well as the delivery of the instructor's program. The teacher, as well as the students, should address the meanings of knowledge and learning. Within anti-colonial education, the teacher is responsible for presenting knowledge and learning as counters to hegemonic power The first step in doing so lies within the exchange of knowledge, i.e. the learning process. The teacher/facilitator must not be understood (by herself/himself or by the students) as "in charge" of the knowledge. While she/he may be the custodian of certain knowledges, this by no means translates into ownership thereof. Working with bell hooks' (1994) understanding of decolonization as [is] a process wherein we depart from our customary paradigms, and reject the ways in which our reality and experience have been shaped by hegemonic cultural discourse, we can arrive at a critical learning moment The most dangerous of all delusions is to think that your social reality is the only reality worth talking about. To do so is to engage in a colonizing mental exercise, characterized by profound intellectual arrogance. This is the problem with the Eurocentric epistemology that characterizes so much dominant curricula. The subversion thereof is thus an act of mental liberation. To truly embrace and work with a multicentric framework requires axiological, ontological and epistemological de-centering. We must return here to the notion and necessity of humility in the teaching and learning processes.

#### Your methodology spills over to foster uncritical acceptance of hegemonic discourse not just in debate but in life in general - this controls the internal link to your argument – to gain any knowledge in the first place we must be open to question the dominant ideology

## A2 Pre-fiat Justifications Bad

### CI

#### Counterinterp – I can justify the aff framework with pre-fiat or role of the ballot arguments if the framework is racism

#### Net benefit is inclusiveness – I shouldn’t have to justify why racism is bad – forcing me to do so excludes minorities from the activity.

Smith 13 [(Elijah, CEDA and NDT champion) “A Conversation in Ruins: Race and Black Participation in Lincoln Douglas Debate” Victory Briefs Daily, 9/4/13] AT

At every tournament you attend this year look around the cafeteria and take note of which students are not sitting amongst you and your peers. Despite being some of the best and the brightest in the nation, many students are alienated from and choose to not participate in an activity I like to think of as homeplace. In addition to the heavy financial burden associated with national competition, the exclusionary atmosphere of a debate tournament discourages black students from participating. Widespread awareness of the same lack of participation in policy debate has led to a growing movement towards alternative styles and methods of engaging the gatekeepers of the policy community, (Reid-Brinkley 08) while little work has been done to address or even acknowledge the same concern in Lincoln Douglas debate. Unfortunately students of color are not only forced to cope with a reality of structural violence outside of debate, but within an activity they may have joined to escape it in the first place. We are facing more than a simple trend towards marginalization occurring in Lincoln Douglas, but a culture of exclusion that locks minority participants out of the ranks of competition. It will be uncomfortable, it will be hard, and it will require continued effort but the necessary step in fixing this problem, like all problems, is the community as a whole admitting that such a problem with many “socially acceptable” choices exists in the first place. Like all systems of social control, the reality of racism in debate is constituted by the singular choices that institutions, coaches, and students make on a weekly basis. I have watched countless rounds where competitors attempt to win by rushing to abstractions to distance the conversation from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day. One of the students I coached, who has since graduated after leaving debate, had an adult judge write out a ballot that concluded by “hypothetically” defending my student being lynched at the tournament. Another debate concluded with a young man defending that we can kill animals humanely, “just like we did that guy Troy Davis”. Community norms would have competitors do intellectual gymnastics or make up rules to accuse black debaters of breaking to escape hard conversations but as someone who understands that experience, the only constructive strategy is to acknowledge the reality of the oppressed, engage the discussion from the perspective of authors who are black and brown, and then find strategies to deal with the issues at hand. It hurts to see competitive seasons come and go and have high school students and judges spew the same hateful things you expect to hear at a Klan rally. A student should not, when presenting an advocacy that aligns them with the oppressed, have to justify why oppression is bad. Debate is not just a game, but a learning environment with liberatory potential. Even if the form debate gives to a conversation is not the same you would use to discuss race in general conversation with Bayard Rustin or Fannie Lou Hamer, that is not a reason we have to strip that conversation of its connection to a reality that black students cannot escape. Current coaches and competitors alike dismiss concerns of racism and exclusion, won’t teach other students anything about identity in debate other than how to shut down competitors who engage in alternative styles and discourses, and refuse to engage in those discussions even outside of a tournament setting. A conversation on privilege and identity was held at a debate institute I worked at this summer and just as any theorist of privilege would predict it was the heterosexual, white, male staff members that either failed to make an appearance or stay for the entire discussion. No matter how talented they are, we have to remember that the students we work with are still just high school aged children. If those who are responsible for participants and the creation of accessible norms won't risk a better future for our community, it becomes harder to explain to students who look up to them why risking such an endeavor is necessary.

#### Three impacts

#### A) It has a stronger chance of actually affecting other rounds – outweighs the theory argument on strength of link

#### B) This card is dual functional – all your “oppression doesn’t matter” arguments are now links to this K – arguing for that excludes minority participants from the activity

#### C) Internal link to your education arguments – people who CAN’T PARTICIPATE IN THE ACTIVITY BECAUSE OF YOUR PRACTICES DON’T GET FAIRNESS OR EDUCATION. Further this outweighs – participation is the greatest benefit – how we debate the topic isn’t nearly as important as debating it since we get some education either way. We shouldn’t benefit ourselves at others’ expense

## A2 Policymaking Good/K Affs Bad

### 1AR Answers

#### I meet – it’s a justification of the framework, not a reason to vote for me. We still debate about the topic under my interp – that solves all your offense.

#### You violate your own shell – reading theory with drop the debater means the judge votes on theory, not the better debater. That links to all the standards – you aren’t only enacting a policy and you shift the debate away from role-playing.

#### You’re the one who initiated theory – you could have chosen to engage the substance of the aff, which would have solved all the abuse story – but now that you’ve started the theory debate I’m forced to engage on this level too – new 1AR role of the ballot doesn’t violate

#### Extend the Scheuring and Young – yes, this epistemology argument applies to theory as well – these framework arguments aren’t neutral – they’re ploys to exclude the important discussion and perpetuate the status quo oppression. This is a reason to reject theory on face – you can’t weigh this against the criticism since this is what I’m criticizing – just because it’s true doesn’t make it any less problematic

### CI

#### My role of the ballot claim is a disad to theory – your interp prevents the round from focusing on racism – if I win that the judge should focus on racism, it proves those pre-fiat arguments are good, which is a net benefit to the counter interp

#### Extend Scering 93 – all our lessons are implicitly intertwined with racism – if the judge is an educator, they shouldn’t teach oppression – outweighs the aff – acts are more important than omissions since they are stronger lessons – actively promoting racism by ignoring it is worse than failing to promote decision-making. This isn’t micropol – your weighing doesn’t apply

#### Theory on this issue has been run for years – their interp certainly don’t solve racism. But policy proves we can make the activity better by being open to alternative forms of argumentation – it’s key to including minorities in debate

Smith 13 [(Elijah, CEDA and NDT champion) “A Conversation in Ruins: Race and Black Participation in Lincoln Douglas Debate” Victory Briefs Daily, 9/4/13] AT

At every tournament you attend this year look around the cafeteria and take note of which students are not sitting amongst you and your peers. Despite being some of the best and the brightest in the nation, many students are alienated from and choose to not participate in an activity I like to think of as homeplace. In addition to the heavy financial burden associated with national competition, the exclusionary atmosphere of a debate tournament discourages black students from participating. Widespread awareness of the same lack of participation in policy debate has led to a growing movement towards alternative styles and methods of engaging the gatekeepers of the policy community, (Reid-Brinkley 08) while little work has been done to address or even acknowledge the same concern in Lincoln Douglas debate. Unfortunately students of color are not only forced to cope with a reality of structural violence outside of debate, but within an activity they may have joined to escape it in the first place. We are facing more than a simple trend towards marginalization occurring in Lincoln Douglas, but a culture of exclusion that locks minority participants out of the ranks of competition. It will be uncomfortable, it will be hard, and it will require continued effort but the necessary step in fixing this problem, like all problems, is the community as a whole admitting that such a problem with many “socially acceptable” choices exists in the first place. Like all systems of social control, the reality of racism in debate is constituted by the singular choices that institutions, coaches, and students make on a weekly basis. I have watched countless rounds where competitors attempt to win by rushing to abstractions to distance the conversation from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day. One of the students I coached, who has since graduated after leaving debate, had an adult judge write out a ballot that concluded by “hypothetically” defending my student being lynched at the tournament. Another debate concluded with a young man defending that we can kill animals humanely, “just like we did that guy Troy Davis”. Community norms would have competitors do intellectual gymnastics or make up rules to accuse black debaters of breaking to escape hard conversations but as someone who understands that experience, the only constructive strategy is to acknowledge the reality of the oppressed, engage the discussion from the perspective of authors who are black and brown, and then find strategies to deal with the issues at hand. It hurts to see competitive seasons come and go and have high school students and judges spew the same hateful things you expect to hear at a Klan rally. A student should not, when presenting an advocacy that aligns them with the oppressed, have to justify why oppression is bad. Debate is not just a game, but a learning environment with liberatory potential. Even if the form debate gives to a conversation is not the same you would use to discuss race in general conversation with Bayard Rustin or Fannie Lou Hamer, that is not a reason we have to strip that conversation of its connection to a reality that black students cannot escape. Current coaches and competitors alike dismiss concerns of racism and exclusion, won’t teach other students anything about identity in debate other than how to shut down competitors who engage in alternative styles and discourses, and refuse to engage in those discussions even outside of a tournament setting. A conversation on privilege and identity was held at a debate institute I worked at this summer and just as any theorist of privilege would predict it was the heterosexual, white, male staff members that either failed to make an appearance or stay for the entire discussion. No matter how talented they are, we have to remember that the students we work with are still just high school aged children. If those who are responsible for participants and the creation of accessible norms won't risk a better future for our community, it becomes harder to explain to students who look up to them why risking such an endeavor is necessary.

#### Exclusion outweighs fairness

#### A) It has a stronger chance of actually affecting other rounds – empirics outweigh his bad analytics since it tests his claims in the real world. Policy also proves it outweighs -

#### B) Internal link to your education arguments – people who can’t participate in the activity because of their practices don’t get fairness or education. Further this outweighs – participation is the greatest benefit – how we debate the topic isn’t nearly as important as debating it since we get some education either way. We shouldn’t benefit ourselves at others’ expense

#### The role of an educator is to create a learning environment to foster mental liberation from oppressive ideologies.

G. J. Dei [Anti-Colonialism and Education 2006]

The anti-colonial classroom must always be a de-colonizing space. This is both a[n] physical and intellectual imperative, affecting both the set up and use of space, as well as the delivery of the instructor's program. The teacher, as well as the students, should address the meanings of knowledge and learning. Within anti-colonial education, the teacher is responsible for presenting knowledge and learning as counters to hegemonic power The first step in doing so lies within the exchange of knowledge, i.e. the learning process. The teacher/facilitator must not be understood (by herself/himself or by the students) as "in charge" of the knowledge. While she/he may be the custodian of certain knowledges, this by no means translates into ownership thereof. Working with bell hooks' (1994) understanding of decolonization as [is] a process wherein we depart from our customary paradigms, and reject the ways in which our reality and experience have been shaped by hegemonic cultural discourse, we can arrive at a critical learning moment The most dangerous of all delusions is to think that your social reality is the only reality worth talking about. To do so is to engage in a colonizing mental exercise, characterized by profound intellectual arrogance. This is the problem with the Eurocentric epistemology that characterizes so much dominant curricula. The subversion thereof is thus an act of mental liberation. To truly embrace and work with a multicentric framework requires axiological, ontological and epistemological de-centering. We must return here to the notion and necessity of humility in the teaching and learning processes.

#### Your methodology spills over to foster uncritical acceptance of hegemonic discourse not just in debate but in life in general - this controls the internal link to your argument – to gain any knowledge in the first place we must be open to question the dominant ideology

### If you Read 1AR K

#### 1: Reading a bunch of generic arguments about policymaking paradigms being good do not specifically compare with the role of the ballot story presented in the original criticism.  My argument was not generically that education was good, but rather, anti-colonial education was.  Their policymaking arguments do not have any link to how they are specifically deal with colonialism or an explanation of why their form of education is specifically superior.  They had to read those cards specifically in the last speech to actually clash with the case.  Give them zero leeway to make links to the role of the ballot analysis in the next speech because I wont have the opportunity to address them.  As long they still link to colonialism, you should still drop them based on the role of the ballot story.

#### 2: This is a new link to the K. The affirmative must be forced to confront the legacy of colonialism in the western intellectual tradition that they endorse. In addition, their insistence that we uncritically play the role of the government obscures the United States’ role in colonialism and oppression.

William Shannahan [“Twilight of the Topical Idols: Kritik-ing in the Age of Imperialism”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 25 pg. 66-77)

Most importantly perhaps, debate’s invigorated reflexivity finally acknowledged that the process of interpretation was neither neutral nor innocent. For far too long however, debate ha[s]d proceeded as if affirmatives’ relationship to the topic was [is] unproblematic and did not require examination. This is not to say that our very erudite community failed to recognize how interpretation was “subjective,” but rather they failed to accept the very notion that subjectivity itself was tied to politics, ideology, and philosophical bent. Not surprisingly, debate’s insularity [has] fairly effectively prevented five decades of sustained criticism against the canons of Western philosophy and politics from entering into debate rounds and debate thinking, as if most of, for example, Continental philosophy had nothing to offer us. Even the most casual glance across a variety of disciplines demonstrated the irrefutable relevance of so-called post-structuralism and postmodernism to debate practice. For an activity that prides itself on its erudition, these theoretical oversights were conspicuous and disabling. How could such a sophisticated argumentative community fail to consider and evaluate the relevance of such far-reaching and important changes in academic scholarship?

He Continues:

Affirmative debaters’ relationship to the topic constituted them in particular, often undesirable ways. The topic was not simply some bounded space or a container from which to draw topical plans. Instead, the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications. That body in Washington, D.C. can no longer be isolated from brutal acts employed to make policy. Importantly, the second generation again allowed examination of the ethical relationship inherent in affirming, or refusing to debate, the interpellated, often virulent violence involved in such affirmation.

#### 3: The fact that they ran this argument serves as an additional link to the criticism.  The ideology of colonialism demands changing the way people think so that they come to accept colonialism as natural and normal.  Their demand to conform to a state-centered ideology that silences criticism of colonialism is a way in which colonialism continues to thrive as ideology.

Peterson 92 [(Spike, Professor Department of Political Science, Arizona State University, Associate Fellow, Gender Institute, London School of Economics, Gendered States, pgs. 5-6. 1992)]

In contrast, recent literature examines the states’ role in cultural and ideological productions that selectively shape our understanding of power and its effects. Crucial to the state’s ability to rule effectively is “a claim to legitimacy, a means by which political organized subjection is simultaneously accomplished and concealed.” These studies place in the foreground “normalizing practices,” surveillance, “information storage,” and routines and rituals of rules” that makes the state’s coercive power by effectuating rule indirectly and rendering social hierarchies “natural.” Of note here is the state’s role in (re)configuring individual and collective identities, “new” histories, and “imagined communities.” Studies of nationalism particularly reveal these converging practices. This literature examines not only what kinds of choices are made but how numerous options are rendered invisible and/or erased—how alternatives are “forgotten” and legitimations of rule “naturalized” and internalized. From this perspective, states matter “because their organizational configurations, along with their overall patterns of activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation and collective political actions (but not others), and make possible the raising of certain political issues (but not other).” In sum, recent nonfeminist scholarship on the state, especially that of comparativists, is marked my commitments to historical, contextual, processual, interdisciplinary, and interpretative orientations. These commitments also surface repeatedly in feminist scholarship, and are visibly at work in this volume. More specifically, contributors elaborate and reframe themes and insights noted above by examining them through gender-sensitive lenses. By contrast, where neorealist accounts predominate in IR, the state continutes to be “taken for granted,” yielding less adequate theories of how the world we live in was made and how it is (“in reality”) reproduced.

#### 4: Even if you buy a policymaking paradigm, I offer an alternative to endorse. They don’t do enough explanation to explain why the alternative is not a “policy option” to be able to exclude the kritik and win on the case based on the framework.

#### 5: I control the internal link. The effectiveness of policymaking as an education tool depends on the ability to critique the assumptions endorsed by the affirmative.

Bruschke and Warner 1 [Assoc. Prof. Speech Comm @ CSUF – and – Assoc. Prof. Comm. @ Louisville – 2001 (Jon, Ph.D. and Ede, Ph.D., (“‘Gone on Debating:’ Competitive Academic Debate as a Tool of Empowerment,” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate 22, p. 6, SPS]

Second, empowered students must be social critics. Essentially, they must apply the same dialectical stance toward the world they live in and (he public policies they are asked to live by and participate in enacting. Academic debate facilitates the development of students as social critics because of its policy oriented and research intensive nature. Although learning to think dialectically certainly might have some transferable skill that would allow students to evaluate questions of governance, no such transfer is even necessary. Students are directly debating questions of policy and evaluating the effectiveness, morality, and desirability of different governmental actions along with the possibility of non-governmental alternatives. Because all debates begin with an affirmative indictment of the status quo, all policy debates invoke questions of what the current social order is like and how it can be improved. Even when debating the negative, students may offer "counter-plans" that provide alternative policy arrangements, or philosophical critiques that ask the judge to "re-think" social orders and evaluate the affirmative plan in a new light. The research intensive nature of debate facilitates all these processes, and not only requires that students develop a broad base of knowledge about particular policy questions but also teaches them how to obtain knowledge on any policy question that they encounter.

#### 6: Turn: effective policymaking necessarily entails exploring and problematizing how power structures such as colonialism effect actors and constrain policy outcomes.

Raymond Duvall [Professor of political science University of Minnesota: “Power in International Politics” Cambridge Journals Vol. 5, No. 2 39-75) 2003.]

The failure to develop alternative conceptualizations of power limits the ability of international relations scholars to understand how global outcomes are produced and how actors are differentially enabled and constrained to determine their fates+ One certainly needs to know about the ability of actors to use resources to control the behavior of others+ The United States is able to use its military power to compel others to change their foreign policies, and in the contemporary period transnational activists have been able to shame multinational corporations and abusive governments to alter their economic and human rights policies, respectively Any discussion of power in international politics, then, must include a consideration of how, why, and when some actors have “power over” others+ Yet one also needs to consider the enduring structures and processes of global life that enable and constrain the ability of actors to shape their fates and their futures+ The extension of sovereignty from the West to the developing world gave decolonized states the authority to voice their interests and represent themselves, and the emergence of a human rights discourse helped to make possible the very category of human rights activists who give voice to human rights norms+ Analysis of power in international relations, then, must include a consideration of how social structures and processes generate differential social capacities for actors to define and pursue their interests and ideals+10

#### 7: Any criteria that separated “policy” from a “kritik” alternative would ultimately be arbitrary to privilege their advocacy to allow them exclusively to link, which doesn’t have any specific educational merit – this is done merely to exclude, not to take the moral high road.

#### 8: Regardless of the legitimacy of the policymaking good arguments they read, they fail to meet their standard.  Policymakers usually don’t read ethical framework arguments justified by philosophers with cards while making arguments in Senate and House, so they fail to meet the standard, too, so it shouldn’t factor into your decisionmaking.

# 

# Pre-Fiat

## XT – Prefiat First

#### [Extend card]

#### This should come first – all framework arguments make an assumption about how to evaluate framework. Your arguments assume we should begin with reasoned arguments and determine the most true framework – my argument indicts that and says the judge should ignore reasons for framework and instead discuss racism because it’s important. If racism is bad and we always somehow assume it, then the role of the judge should be to question those assumptions, not begin with them.

## More Cards

### INTELLECTUAL CHALLENGES KEY

### 1NC Bilgin

#### Beginning discussions at the intellectual level is more productive—causes better social change which their engagement can’t access—this is empirically proven so prefer it over their evidence

Bilgin 5 Assistant Prof of International Relations at Bilkent University, REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE, p54-

The point is that a broader security agenda requires students of security to look at agents other than the state, such as social movements, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and individuals, instead of restricting their analysis to the state’s agency. This is essential not only because states are not always able (or willing) to fulfil their side of the bargain in providing for their citizens’ security, as noted above, but also because there already are agents other than states – be it social movements or intellectuals – who are striving to provide for the differing needs of peoples (themselves and others). This is not meant to deny the salience of the roles states play in the realm of security; on the contrary, they remain significant actors with crucial roles to play.25 Rather, the argument is that the state’s dominant position as an actor well endowed to provide (certain dimensions of) security does not justify privileging its agency. Furthermore, broadening the security agenda without attempting a reconceptualisation of agency would result in falling back upon the agency of the state in meeting non-military threats. The problem with resorting to the agency of the state in meeting non-military threats is that states may not be the most suitable actors to cope with them. In other words, the state being the most qualified actor in coping with some kinds of threats does not necessarily mean it is competent (or willing) enough to cope with all. This is why students of critical approaches aim to re-conceptualise agency and practice. Critical approaches view non-state actors, in particular, social movements and intellectuals, as potential agents for change (Cox 1981, 1999; Walker 1990b; Hoffman 1993; Wyn Jones 1995a, 1999). This echoes feminist approaches that have emphasised the role of women’s agency and maintained that ‘women must act in the provision of their own security’ if they are to make a change in a world where their security needs and concerns are marginalised (Tickner 1997; also see Sylvester 1994). This is not necessarily wishful thinking on the part of a few academics; on the contrary, practice indicates that peoples (as individuals and social groups) have taken certain aspects of their own and others’ security into their own hands (Marsh 1995: 130–5; Turner 1998). Three successful examples from the Cold War era – the Nestlé boycott, the anti-apartheid campaign for South Africa and the campaign against nuclear missile deployments in Europe – are often viewed as having inspired the social movements of the post-Cold War era (Lopez et al. 1997: 230–1; Marsh 1995). Christine Sylvester (1994) has also pointed to the examples of the Greenham Common Peace Camp in Britain (1980–89) and women’s producer cooperatives in Harare, Zimbabwe (1988–90) to show how women have intervened to enhance their own and others’ security. These are excellent examples of how a broader conception of security needs to be coupled with a broader conception of agency. It should be noted here that the call of critical approaches for looking at the agency of non-state actors should not be viewed as allocating tasks to preconceived agents. Rather, critical approaches aim to empower nonstate actors (who may or may not be aware of their own potential to make a change) to constitute themselves as agents of security to meet this broadened agenda. Nor should it be taken to suggest that all non-state actors’ practices are emancipatory. Then, paying more attention to the agency of non-state actors will enable students of security to see how, in the absence of interest at the governmental level (as is the case with the Middle East), non-state actors could imagine, create and nurture community-building projects and could help in getting state-level actors interested in the formation of a security community. It should, however, be noted that not all non-state actors are community-minded – just as not all governments are sceptical of the virtues of community building. Indeed, looking at the agency of nonstate actors is also useful because it enables one to see how non-state actors could stall community-building projects. In the Middle East, women’s movements and networks have been cooperating across borders from the beginning of the Intifada onwards. Women’s agency, however, is often left unnoticed, because, as Simona Sharoni (1996) has argued, the eyes of security analysts are often focused on the state as the primary security agent. However, the Intifada was marked by Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish women’s adoption of non-zerosum, non-military practices that questioned and challenged the boundaries of their political communities as they dared to explore new forms of political communities (Mikhail-Ashrawi 1995; Sharoni 1995). Such activities included organising a conference entitled ‘Give Peace a Chance – Women Speak Out’ in Brussels in May 1989. The first of its kind, the conference brought together about 50 Israeli and Palestinian women from the West Bank and Gaza Strip together with PLO representatives to discuss the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The follow-up event took place in Jerusalem in December 1989 where representatives of the Palestinian Women’s Working Committees and the Israeli Women and Peace Coalition organised a women’s day for peace which, Sharoni noted, ‘culminated in a march of 6,000 women from West to East Jerusalem under the banner “Women Go For Peace”’ (Sharoni 1996: 107). Aside from such events that were designed to alert public opinion of the unacceptability of the Israel/Palestine impasse as well as finding alternative ways of peacemaking, women also undertook direct action to alleviate the condition of Palestinians whose predicament had been worsening since the beginning of the Intifada (Mikhail-Ashrawi 1995). In this process, they were aided by their Western European counterparts who provided financial, institutional as well as moral support. In sum, women’s agency helped make the Intifada possible on the part of the Palestinian women, whilst their Israeli- Jewish counterparts helped enhance its impact by way of questioning the moral boundaries of the Israeli state. The Intifada is also exemplary of how non-state actors could initiate processes of resistance that might later be taken up by policy-makers. The Intifada began in 1987 as a spontaneous grassroots reaction to the Israeli occupation and took the PLO leadership (along with others) by surprise. It was only some weeks into the Intifada that the PLO leadership embraced it and put its material resources into furthering the cause, which was making occupation as difficult as possible for the Israeli government. Although not much came out of the Intifada in terms of an agree- ment with Israel on issues of concern for the people living in the occupied territories, the process generated a momentum that culminated in 1988 with the PLO’s denouncement of terrorism. The change in the PLO’s policies, in turn, enabled the 1993 Oslo Accords, which was also initiated by non-state actors, in this case intellectuals (Sharoni 1996). The point here is that it has been a combination of top-down and bottom-up politics that has been at the heart of political change, be it the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, or Intifada in Israel/Palestine. Emphasising the roles some non-state actors, notably women’s networks, have played as agents of security is not to suggest that all non-state agents’ practices are non-zero-sum and/or non-violent. For instance, there are the cases of Islamist movements such as FIS (the Islamic Salvation Front) in Algeria and Hamas in the Occupied Territories that have resorted, over the years, to violent practices as a part of their strategies that were designed to capture the state mechanism. However, although they may constitute threats to security in the Middle East in view of their violent practices, what needs to be remembered is that both FIS and Hamas function as providers for security for some peoples in the Middle East – those who are often neglected by their own states (Esposito 1995: 162–83). In other words, some Islamist movements do not only offer a sense of identity, but also propose alternative practices and provide tangible economic, social and moral support to their members. However, the treatment women receive under the mastery of such Islamist movements serves to remind us that there clearly are problems involved in an unthinking reliance on non-governmental actors as agents for peace and security or an uncritical adoption of their agendas. Middle Eastern history is replete with examples of non-state actors resorting to violence and/or adopting zero-sum practices in the attempt to capture state power. In fact, it is often such violent practices of nonstate actors (that is, terrorism or assassination of political leaders) that are mentioned in security analyses. Nevertheless, the fact that not all non-state actors are fit to take up the role of serving as agents of emancipatory change should not lead one to downplay the significant work some have done in the past, and could do in the future. After all, not all states serve as providers of security; yet Security Studies continues to rely on their agency. Then, in order to be able to fulfil the role allocated to them by critical approaches, non-state actors should be encouraged to move away from traditional forms of resistance that are based on exclusionist identities, that solely aim to capture state power or that adopt zero-sum thinking and practices. Arguably, this is a task for intellectuals to fulfil. This is not to suggest that intellectuals should direct or instruct non-state actors. As Wyn Jones (1999: 162) has noted, the relationship between intellectuals and social movements is based on reciprocity. The 1980s’ peace movements, for instance, are good examples of intellectuals getting involved with social movements in bringing about change – in this case, the end of the Cold War (Galtung 1995; Kaldor 1997). The relationship between intellectuals and peace movements in Europe was a mutually interactive one in that the intellectuals encouraged and led whilst drawing strength from these movements. Emphasising the mutually interactive relationship between intellectuals and social movements should not be taken to suggest that to make a change, intellectuals should get directly involved in political action. They could also intervene to provide a critique of the existing situation, what future outcomes may result if necessary action is not taken at present, and by pointing to potential for change immanent in world politics. Students of security could help create the political space that would enable the emergence of a Gorbachev, by presenting such critique. It should, however, be emphasised that such thinking should be anchored in the potential immanent in world politics. In other words, intellectuals should be informed by the practices of social movements themselves (as was the case in Europe in the 1980s). The hope is that non-state actors such as social movements and intellectuals (who may or may not be aware of their potential to make a change) may constitute themselves as agents when presented with an alternative reading of their situation. Lastly, intellectuals could make a change even if they limit their practices to thinking, writing and self-reflection. During the Cold War very few security analysts were conscious and open about the impact their thinking and writing could make. Richard Wyn Jones cites the example of Edward N. Luttwak as one such exception who admitted that ‘strategy is not a neutral pursuit and its only purpose is to strengthen one’s own side in the contention of nations’ (cited in Wyn Jones 1999: 150). Still, such explicit acknowledgement of the political dimension of strategic thinking was rare during the Cold War. On the contrary, students of International Relations in general and Security Studies in particular have been characterised by limited or no self-reflection as to the potential impact their research could make on the subject of research (Wyn Jones 1999: 148–50). To go back to the argument made above about the role of the intellectual as an agent of security and the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice, students of critical approaches to security could function as agents of security by way of reflecting upon the practical implications of their own thinking and writing. Self-reflection becomes crucial when the relationship between theory and practice is conceptualised as one of mutual constitution. State-centric approaches to security do not simply reflect a reality ‘out there’ but help reinforce statism. Although it may be true that the consequences of these scholarly activities are sometimes ‘unintended’, there nevertheless should be a sense of selfreflection on the part of scholars upon the potential consequences of their research and teaching. The point here is that critical approaches that show an awareness of the socially constructed character of ‘reality’ need not stop short of reflecting upon the constitutive relationship between theory and practice when they themselves are theorising about security. Otherwise, they run the risk of constituting ‘threats to the future’ (Kubálková 1998: 193–201).

### COLONIALISM

### Anti-Colonial Methodology [Slemon]

#### Even though the ballot is obviously not going to end racism, it represents an instance of a methodology that must be adopted if racist ideology is ever to be effectively resisted. We must act to reject every instance we encounter locally. This is especially true in an academic setting.

Stephen Slemon [DE-SCRIBING EMPIRE: Post- Colonialism and Textuality “THE SCRAMBLE FOR POST-COLONIALISM”]

As for the second part of this credo, I believe that post-colonial studies needs always to remember that its referent in the real world is a form of political, economic, and discursive oppression whose name, first and last, is Colonialism. The forms of colonialist power differ radically across cultural locations, and its intersections with other orders of oppression are always complex and multivalent. But, wherever a globalized theory of the colonial might lead us, we need to remember that resistances to colonialist power always find material presence at the level of the local, and so the research and training we carry out in the field of post- Colonialism, whatever else it does, must always find ways to address the local, if only on the order of material applications. If we overlook the local, and the political applications of the research we produce, we risk turning the work of our field into the playful operations of an academic glass-bead game, whose project will remain at best a description of global relations, and not a script for their change. There is never a necessary politics to the study of political actions and reactions; but at the level of the local, and at the level of material applications, post- Colonialism must address the material exigencies of Colonialism and neo- Colonialism, including the neo- Colonialism of Western academic institutions themselves.

### Social Critics [Bruschke]

#### Students in academic debate must be social critics – the K comes first

Bruschke and Warner 1 [Assoc. Prof. Speech Comm @ CSUF – and – Assoc. Prof. Comm. @ Louisville – 2001 (Jon, Ph.D. and Ede, Ph.D., (“‘Gone on Debating:’ Competitive Academic Debate as a Tool of Empowerment,” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate 22, p. 6, SPS]

Second, empowered students must be social critics. Essentially, they must apply the same dialectical stance toward the world they live in and (he public policies they are asked to live by and participate in enacting. Academic debate facilitates the development of students as social critics because of its policy oriented and research intensive nature. Although learning to think dialectically certainly might have some transferable skill that would allow students to evaluate questions of governance, no such transfer is even necessary. Students are directly debating questions of policy and evaluating the effectiveness, morality, and desirability of different governmental actions along with the possibility of non-governmental alternatives. Because all debates begin with an affirmative indictment of the status quo, all policy debates invoke questions of what the current social order is like and how it can be improved. Even when debating the negative, students may offer "counter-plans" that provide alternative policy arrangements, or philosophical critiques that ask the judge to "re-think" social orders and evaluate the affirmative plan in a new light. The research intensive nature of debate facilitates all these processes, and not only requires that students develop a broad base of knowledge about particular policy questions but also teaches them how to obtain knowledge on any policy question that they encounter.

### Discussion [Peterson]

#### The conventional model of public debate excludes criticism of racist hegemony – it’s important to question these assumptions.

Peterson 92 [(Spike, Professor Department of Political Science, Arizona State University, Associate Fellow, Gender Institute, London School of Economics, Gendered States, pgs. 5-6. 1992)]

In contrast, recent literature examines the states’ role in cultural and ideological productions that selectively shape our understanding of power and its effects. Crucial to the state’s ability to rule effectively is “a claim to legitimacy, a means by which political organized subjection is simultaneously accomplished and concealed.” These studies place in the foreground “normalizing practices,” surveillance, “information storage,” and routines and rituals of rules” that makes the state’s coercive power by effectuating rule indirectly and rendering social hierarchies “natural.” Of note here is the state’s role in (re)configuring individual and collective identities, “new” histories, and “imagined communities.” Studies of nationalism particularly reveal these converging practices. This literature examines not only what kinds of choices are made but how numerous options are rendered invisible and/or erased—how alternatives are “forgotten” and legitimations of rule “naturalized” and internalized. From this perspective, states matter “because their organizational configurations, along with their overall patterns of activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation and collective political actions (but not others), and make possible the raising of certain political issues (but not other).” In sum, recent nonfeminist scholarship on the state, especially that of comparativists, is marked my commitments to historical, contextual, processual, interdisciplinary, and interpretative orientations. These commitments also surface repeatedly in feminist scholarship, and are visibly at work in this volume. More specifically, contributors elaborate and reframe themes and insights noted above by examining them through gender-sensitive lenses. By contrast, where neorealist accounts predominate in IR, the state continutes to be “taken for granted,” yielding less adequate theories of how the world we live in was made and how it is (“in reality”) reproduced.

### Must Examine [Shannahan]

#### Your framework arguments are not neutral – we can’t wish away these atrocities by refusing to discuss but we can examine them

William Shannahan [“Twilight of the Topical Idols: Kritik-ing in the Age of Imperialism”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 25 pg. 66-77)

Most importantly perhaps, debate’s invigorated reflexivity finally acknowledged that the process of interpretation was neither neutral nor innocent. For far too long however, debate ha[s]d proceeded as if affirmatives’ relationship to the topic was [is] unproblematic and did not require examination. This is not to say that our very erudite community failed to recognize how interpretation was “subjective,” but rather they failed to accept the very notion that subjectivity itself was tied to politics, ideology, and philosophical bent. Not surprisingly, debate’s insularity [has] fairly effectively prevented five decades of sustained criticism against the canons of Western philosophy and politics from entering into debate rounds and debate thinking, as if most of, for example, Continental philosophy had nothing to offer us. Even the most casual glance across a variety of disciplines demonstrated the irrefutable relevance of so-called post-structuralism and postmodernism to debate practice. For an activity that prides itself on its erudition, these theoretical oversights were conspicuous and disabling. How could such a sophisticated argumentative community fail to consider and evaluate the relevance of such far-reaching and important changes in academic scholarship?

He Continues:

Affirmative debaters’ relationship to the topic constituted them in particular, often undesirable ways. The topic was not simply some bounded space or a container from which to draw topical plans. Instead, the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications. That body in Washington, D.C. can no longer be isolated from brutal acts employed to make policy. Importantly, the second generation again allowed examination of the ethical relationship inherent in affirming, or refusing to debate, the interpellated, often virulent violence involved in such affirmation.

### Rejecting Education [Kumashiro]

#### The goal of education should not be the same as a typical generic education theory argument. I’m specifically talking about anti-oppressive education, which requires a confrontation of things we view as commonsense.

Kevin K. Kumashiro [professor of Asian Studies at the University of Illinois Chicago and Founder of the Anti-Oppression “’Posts’ Perspectives on Anti-Oppressive Education in Social Studies, English, Mathematics, and Science Classrooms”, Educational Researcher, Volume 30, No. 3, April 2001.]

Anti-oppressive education works against commonsense views of what it means to teach. Teachers must move beyond their preconceived notions of what it means to teach, and students must move beyond their current conceptions of what it means to learn. Anti-oppressive education involves constantly re-examining and troubling the forms of repetition that play out in one’s practices and that hinder attempts to challenge oppressions. It involves desiring and working through crisis rather than avoiding and masking it. It involves contesting the standards that currently deﬁne education in the disciplines. And it involves imagining new possibilities for who we are and can be.

### Framework Defense [Mills]

#### They generalize truth from too few – this is answers framework

Charles Mills [Prof. Philosophy, Northwestern University. Race and Racism In Modern Philospohy. “Kant’s Untermenschen” pg. 190]

Second, it could well be that these exclusions do in fact affect the thinker’s thought in other ways whose ramifications need to be worked out. In the case of gender, the connection is easier to make, in part because feminists have been boring on these questions longer than critical race theorists. If you have been generalizing about humanity on the basis of one half of it, then there will obviously be vast areas of history and experience that need to be brought in to correct for these omissions. Political theorists such as Susan Moller Okin have argued against a merely "terminological" gender neutrality, which contents itself with a self-conscious alternation of "he" and "she" without considering how the originally sexist theory's basic conceptual apparatus, assumptions, and pronouncements may have been shaped by these gender exclusions. Do crucial concepts such as "autonomy" need to be given a different emphasis, if a case can be made that a tacitly masculine experience has grounded their formation? Is the disdain for "inclination” linked with its identification with the body and the feminine? It could be argued similarly that genuine race neutrality requires careful rethinking of white philosophy's content in the light of racial domination. If nonwhite "savagery" is the negative antipode against which [to] civilized (white) humanity is going to define itself, then obviously the interlocking conceptual relationships are likely to shape how these concepts of "civilization," and what it is to rise above nature, develop. Both in the descriptive realm, where full humanity is conceptualized in Eurocentric and culturally loaded terms, and in the prescriptive realm, the implications could be far-reaching.

### Smith Card

#### I shouldn’t have to justify why oppression is bad – questioning oppression is harmful for debate and excludes minority participants

Smith 13 [(Elijah, CEDA and NDT champion) “A Conversation in Ruins: Race and Black Participation in Lincoln Douglas Debate” Victory Briefs Daily, 9/4/13] AT

At every tournament you attend this year look around the cafeteria and take note of which students are not sitting amongst you and your peers. Despite being some of the best and the brightest in the nation, many students are alienated from and choose to not participate in an activity I like to think of as homeplace. In addition to the heavy financial burden associated with national competition, the exclusionary atmosphere of a debate tournament discourages black students from participating. Widespread awareness of the same lack of participation in policy debate has led to a growing movement towards alternative styles and methods of engaging the gatekeepers of the policy community, (Reid-Brinkley 08) while little work has been done to address or even acknowledge the same concern in Lincoln Douglas debate. Unfortunately students of color are not only forced to cope with a reality of structural violence outside of debate, but within an activity they may have joined to escape it in the first place. We are facing more than a simple trend towards marginalization occurring in Lincoln Douglas, but a culture of exclusion that locks minority participants out of the ranks of competition. It will be uncomfortable, it will be hard, and it will require continued effort but the necessary step in fixing this problem, like all problems, is the community as a whole admitting that such a problem with many “socially acceptable” choices exists in the first place. Like all systems of social control, the reality of racism in debate is constituted by the singular choices that institutions, coaches, and students make on a weekly basis. I have watched countless rounds where competitors attempt to win by rushing to abstractions to distance the conversation from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day. One of the students I coached, who has since graduated after leaving debate, had an adult judge write out a ballot that concluded by “hypothetically” defending my student being lynched at the tournament. Another debate concluded with a young man defending that we can kill animals humanely, “just like we did that guy Troy Davis”. Community norms would have competitors do intellectual gymnastics or make up rules to accuse black debaters of breaking to escape hard conversations but as someone who understands that experience, the only constructive strategy is to acknowledge the reality of the oppressed, engage the discussion from the perspective of authors who are black and brown, and then find strategies to deal with the issues at hand. It hurts to see competitive seasons come and go and have high school students and judges spew the same hateful things you expect to hear at a Klan rally. A student should not, when presenting an advocacy that aligns them with the oppressed, have to justify why oppression is bad. Debate is not just a game, but a learning environment with liberatory potential. Even if the form debate gives to a conversation is not the same you would use to discuss race in general conversation with Bayard Rustin or Fannie Lou Hamer, that is not a reason we have to strip that conversation of its connection to a reality that black students cannot escape. Current coaches and competitors alike dismiss concerns of racism and exclusion, won’t teach other students anything about identity in debate other than how to shut down competitors who engage in alternative styles and discourses, and refuse to engage in those discussions even outside of a tournament setting. A conversation on privilege and identity was held at a debate institute I worked at this summer and just as any theorist of privilege would predict it was the heterosexual, white, male staff members that either failed to make an appearance or stay for the entire discussion. No matter how talented they are, we have to remember that the students we work with are still just high school aged children. If those who are responsible for participants and the creation of accessible norms won't risk a better future for our community, it becomes harder to explain to students who look up to them why risking such an endeavor is necessary.

## Frontlines

### A2 Debate Not Academic

#### The point of this evidence is that in a forum where there is an exchange of ideas, it’s important to examine how those ideas foster racism. In debate, we obviously exchange ideas through discourse. The warrants still apply

#### Debate is still an educational institution – schools host it, teachers coach it, and students do it. In a forum of teaching, it’s even more important to examine our racist assumptions since otherwise students will accept these lessons unquestioningly

# A2 Neg Positions

## A2 Democracy FW

### A2 Functional Ought

#### Cross-apply Wacquant 5 – this democracy was not created with blacks in mind –they were not part of the “we the people” of the Declaration of Independence. You should reject the “function of democracy” and change it in favor of a new function – to resist racism. The history of this nation means we shouldn’t abide by what the system was meant to do, which was to exclude blacks from the very start.

## A2 Autonomy NC

### FW

### Contention

#### It’s a collective action problem – that’s Harvard Law Review 7 – makes coercion justified since the reason blacks don’t vote is that the individual’s voice is diluted – group action solves

#### TURN: Political engagement is key to non-domination – the weak should govern for themselves instead of having the powerful govern them

Lardy 4 [Heather Lardy. University of Aberdeen. “Is there a right not to vote?” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Summer, 2004), pp. 303-321] AJ

Pursuing freedom as non-domination reduces the amount of uncertainty indi- viduals must live with, by reducing the capacity of authorities to interfere on an arbitrary basis. When non-interference is the ideal, individuals may be encouraged to promote that goal in inhibiting ways, such as, for example, displaying special deference or flattery to those in power.28 Further, the awareness that the more powerful retain the ability to interfere in an arbitrary fashion in the lives of the less powerful taints the freedom which the latter enjoy with a sense of inse- curity. The 'shared awareness of the asymmetry of power' renders their status unequal, even if they are currently enjoying similar levels of freedom as non- interference.29 Freedom as non-domination avoids this danger by promoting the equal standing of all.30 The idea of the right to vote is similarly about individuals asserting a shared standing as formal political equals, which status carries an entitlement to participate in the choice of those who will exercise political power. Those they so choose have the potential thereafter to dominate those whom they rule. This risk is in part checked by general public acknowledgement of the formally equal status of voters and those whom they elect. Of course, this is an imperfect restraint: elected governments do dominate; and voters may come to accept this domination as just another undesirable feature of the imperfect prac- tice of democracy. While it might be deemed quaint or just fanciful to suggest that voters are actually self-governing, their status as political equals, with a right not to be dominated by other voters (especially those elected to rule) expresses their possession of a liberty which exceeds the narrow vision of freedom as non- interference. The right to vote represents a freedom which cannot be diminished by being compelled because any exercise of the right, however it is initiated, contributes to the practice of freedom as non-domination. By voting, a person registers her status as a political equal, a full member of the democratic com- munity. She does this even if she votes reluctantly or apathetically, or because compelled to do so by law. On this account, non-voting brings with it a serious risk of domination by those classes which do vote regularly, and by the gover- nors whom they elect. To prevent this, voting may be compelled consistently with the idea of liberty as non-domination, and, therefore, with the idea of the right to vote.

#### We outweigh – it’s systematic exclusion from decisionmaking and ideological violence – coercion doesn’t have any lasting effects and it’s justified to prevent oppression – especially since secret ballots means voting requirements can’t be enforced

#### And CV is a smaller infringement than the justified violations we undergo daily – if the government can force you to wear a helmet to limit head injuries, it can force you to drive to the polls to limit systematic racism and oppression

Rovensky 8 explains the argument [(Jan, MA in Political Science and English and American Studies at Charles University Prague, Graduate of Doctoral Program in Political Theoy at LUISS Guido Carli) “Voting: A Citizen’s Right, or Duty?” Free International University of Social Studies Guido Carli, School of Political Science, Doctorate in Political Theory – PhD Thesis] AT

A rather serious argument that proponents of compulsion need to address is the objection that obliging people to vote is an infringement upon personal freedom. The advocates of CV are painfully aware of this evident problem; indeed, as Lijphart (1997: 16) acknowledges the fact that it cannot be denied that ‘compulsion of any kind limits individual freedom’ but at the same time maintains that forcing people to vote ‘entails only a very minor restriction.’ The supporters of compulsion argue that compliance with the duty to vote is something which has to be learned (the voting norm I have just mentioned), much as any other change in current legislation: they claim it amounts roughly to the same thing as paying mandatory health insurance, sending children to school, wearing a helmet while driving a motorcycle, jury duty, taxation or recycling (Feeley 1974: 241, Engelen 2007: 30). Furthermore, they point out that voting requires considerably less time and ‘[c]ompared to some of the obligations the state imposes on its citizens, the obligation to turn out every couple of years is a very light one’ (Keaney and Rogers 2006: 7) In this light Engelen and Hooghe (2007: 4) claim that ‘[g]iven the importance of democracy, we believe a government has every right and reason to demand this much from its citizens’ and they ‘believe that compulsory voting is a legitimate way of increasing turnout, since it does not violate any fundamental liberties and does not entail an all too onerous burden’. Proponents of CV on the whole readily acknowledge the fact that some citizens may feel that they are being illegitimately pushed into doing something they do not wish to do, but argue that even if compulsory voting does impose some commitments on behalf of the electorate ‘obliging people to enter a polling station or fill out a postal voting form every couple of years hardly represents a major infringement of freedom’ and that an ‘element of compulsion is generally held to be acceptable so long as the resulting public good is of sufficient value’ (Ibid: 9, 30). By the term ‘resulting public good’ Keaney and Rogers are most probably referring to the increased legitimacy and health of a democracy; such an increase of legitimacy seems certainly worth the cost involved, be it financial,35 administrative or psychological – supporters of CV point out that a government elected by a majority – albeit with the use of some level of coercion – is more democratic than an executive body which is voted into office by less than half of those registered to vote.36 Furthermore, as it has been pointed out in the Introduction, it is important to remember, the advocates of CV argue, that compulsory voting is a misnomer (Engelen 2007: 25; Keaney and Rogers 2006: 7, 26; Lijphart 1997: 17, footnote 3) – citizens are not required to vote but merely to turn up: it ‘is only registration and attendance at a polling place’ which is compulsory (Hill 2001: 130, see also Engelen and Hooghe 2007: 1, Hill 2006: 222). This means that they are free to spoil a ballot if they wish to do so or use the ‘none of the above’ option where available to them.37 Thus, due to the secret ballot the ‘right not to vote remains intact’ (Lijphart 1997: 17) and thus is congruent with democratic practice.

### A2 Turns Aff

#### [Doesn’t turn the aff] No link – the aff is about material oppression and ideological oppression – coercion links to neither one of those. They need an impact for this argument to matter and they don’t have one.

## A2 Value of the Vote

#### Non-unique – there’s no value of the vote now – extend Wacquant – blacks are already excluded and marginalized by the system, constructing them as a civically disabled threat to the nation – an anticitizen that must be marginalized and excluded.

## A2 States CP

#### Knafo is the net benefit – federal action is key since the states have a long history of racism – without federal oversight, the states are likely to implement compulsory voting in ways that only perpetuate racism. Specifically, the Cherry evidence proves the spillover to voter ID and registration laws won’t happen – after the decision on the Voting Rights, states continued to implement this same racist legislation. 2 reasons to prefer

#### The solvency is very specific to racism. [compare]

#### It’s grounded in centuries of history – southern states have a long legacy of racism that doesn’t get automatically erased with the fiat of a counterplan. Federal oversight has historically reduced racism – Jim Crow, Civil Rights, and abolition prove.

# A2 Kritiks

## General

#### And – independent solvency deficit to the alternative - without specific detailed description of how the alt can work towards solutions you should be highly skeptical of their critique---racism in our daily lives is a specific point of departure

Bryant 12 ( levi, prof of philosophy at Collins college, Critique of the Academic Left, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)

The problem as I see it is that this is the worst sort of abstraction (in the Marxist sense) and wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶ Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park:¶ The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶ Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Profit!¶ They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶ Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows:¶Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique¶Phase 2: ?¶Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!¶Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing?¶ But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done!¶ But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.¶ What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation.¶ “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.

## A2 Cap

### General Perms

#### Perm do both – it solves best – working within the system is key – fears of co-option marginalize the alternative and crush solvency

Zizek 08 (Slavoj Zizek, professor at the University of Ljubljana, Law and the Postmodern Mind, p. 92 )

Finally, the point about inherent transgression is not that every opposition, every attempt at subversion, is automatically "coopted." On the contrary, the very fear of being coopted that makes us search for more and more "radical," "pure" attitudes, is the supreme strategy of suspension or marginalization. The point is rather that true subver­sion is not always where it seems to be. Sometimes, a small distance is much more explosive for the system than an ineffective radical rejec­tion. In religion, a small heresy can be more threatening than an out­right atheism or passage to another religion; for a hard-line Stalinist, a Trotskyite is infinitely more threatening than a bourgeois liberal or social democrat. As le Carre put it, one true revisionist in the Central Committee is worth more than thousand dissidents outside it. It was easy to dismiss Gorbachev for aiming only at improving the system, making it more efficient—he nonetheless set in motion its disintegra­tion. So one should also bear in mind the obverse of the inherent trans­gression: one is tempted to paraphrase Freud's claim from The Ego and the Id that man is not only much more immoral than he believes, but also much more moral than he knows—the System is not only infi­nitely more resistant and invulnerable than it may appear (it can coopt apparently subversive strategies, they can serve as its support), it is also infinitely more vulnerable (a small revision etc, can have large unforeseen catastrophic consequences).

#### Specifically CV solves the kritik – more voices means more power, allowing minorities to advocate and vote on their own behalf – allows true revolution since mobilization is key to victory. This is precisely the kind of small revision Zizek talks about – CV is a foot-in-the-door for greater reforms

#### Alt fails and perm solves—only specific attainable demands on the system can change it – your co-option arguments prove since even the radical alternative would get co-opted – but small changes are key since it’s not perceived as a threat to the system

#### Perm do the plan and the alt in all other instances – double bind – either the alt is too weak to solve even by itself, or it’s strong enough to solve even when’s it’s advocated along with CV – the difference is marginal

### A2 Historical Materialism

#### Only combining specific struggles of racism and historical materialism can solve---the alt alone totalizes capitalism which makes resistance impossible

Leonardo 3 (Zeus, UC Berkeley Graduate School of Education, Associate Professor Language and Literacy, Society and Culture at UC Berk, Resisting Capital: Simulationist and Socialist StrategiesCritical Sociology, Volume 29, issue 2)

The dialectical tension between discourse and historical materialism is productive, but the “end of the real” thesis appears unsustainable, and worse, complicit with relations of exploitation. In fact, ludic postmodernists may have succeeded in dodging Scylla only to strengthen Charybdis. It is fair to assume that if the United States were to become a socialist state, white men will likely hold the important bureaucratic positions, therefore racism will still be a problem and women will ?nd themselves ?ghting for gender rights. The ugliest forms of racist and patriarchal relations may signi?cantly decrease through economic transformation, but race and gender relations will not become insignificant in socialist America (Hunter 2002). Thus, social theory must incorporate an analysis of differences, especially in their commodi?ed form. Here, postmodern theorizing has been helpful. Discourses of difference remind us that although gender, sexual, and race issues do not exist autonomously from material relations, they are articulated in meaningful ways that have their particular concerns. For example, we notice that socialist Cuba had to reconstruct the family, Mao’s China instituted the cultural revolution, and the elite in the former Soviet Union was all but male. Difference is in?ected by the economy, but is not determined by it in the orthodox sense of Marxism. To the extent that Marxist praxis neglects the specific discourses of identity formation, it is guilty of subsuming the social meanings that racialized, gendered, and sexualized subjects experience on a daily basis, some of which inform the epistemological work of revolutionary movements. Re- ducing identity politics to an individual’s experience minimizes the institu- tional aspect of a subject’s identity. But asserting identity in its traditionally vague way assumes an a priori sameness between those who invoke it, some of whom may experience a rude awakening when they discover the pane of difference (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Rather, the process of identi?- cation may be preferable to the apparent condition of having an identity. This is where Nancy Fraser’s (1998) ideas on the politics of (mis)recognition ameliorate the otherwise vulgar suggestion that identity is private and only particular. She deploys a neo-Weberian model for addressing the differ- ential status and rights of gays and lesbians in the context of heterosexist capitalism. This is an area where orthodox Marxism has been criticized for its refusal to address identity discourses with respect to rights, prestige, and status. Although Baudrillard’s theories did not create the notion of difference, they attend to its contours. The politics of identity is based on the notion that groups of people have been treated as merely different in patterned ways that have material sources and consequences (Leonardo 2000, 2002). For example, the social movement we know as the Civil Rights Movement was supra-individual. It was the recognition by masses of people of color, women, and gays and lesbians that the white, male, heterosexual state was deliberately thwarting their rights as groups of people. There is also a sense that the 1960’s identity politics movement extended beyond identity as politics-of-the-self when white Americans joined hands with people of color and acknowledged that minorities were being oppressed on the basis of their identity. Looked at in this way, we can avoid relegating identity politics to the margins of theory as a form of privatized discourse having no ties with material life. There is something to suggest that the “new identity politics” and materialist politics are compatible. For the very notion of identity is traceable to the material ?ow of life and how, for example, the black body is commodi?ed as the sexualized subject. In other words, a materialist identity politics is part of an overall and more complete transformation of objective life insofar as it leaves its stamp on our subjectivity. Identity is real because it is part of the productive process insofar as workers gain an identity through their practical activity. To the extent that identity is abstract, it is imagined. It is very much like the sort of thing that Levi-Strauss described as a “‘virtual center (foyer virtuel) to which we must refer to explain certain things, but without it ever having a real existence”’ (cited by Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 9; italics in original). Keeping in mind the dialectic between the real and imagined aspects of identity, theorists avoid a fetishism of either pole.

### A2 Cap Root Cause

#### Oppression isn’t that simple - No root cause arguments – these are utopianism

Morson 7 (Gary, Professor of Slavic Studies, Russian Literature and History at Northwestern, “Anna Karenina In Our Time: Seeing More Wisely,” P. 152-4)

If Levin resembled so may intellectuals in his time and ours, he might seek **“root cause”** (as we would call it today) of all these failures. Much as the generals an historians satirized in War and Peace mistakenly seek the cause of historical events in a single decision, an much as revolutionaries often **reduce** the **complexities of social ills to a single** conspiracy or institution, so **intellectuals** often **view complexity as a delusion to be explained away by a few simple underlying laws**. It is just **this** habit of thought that feeds utopianism, because **if** the **diversity of** evil an **misery had a** single cause, **then one could eliminate it by changing only one thing** **What could be easier**? **Abolish private property**, alter the way children are educated, pass laws to regulate morals according to a given code, **and evil will disappear** or, at least, radically diminish. Behold, I make all new things But Levin learns that there is no single cause for what has gone wrong. **Looking back on the twentieth century**, we may wonder whether the root cause of the worst human misery is the belief that there is a root cause of human misery. In fact, many things happen contingently, just “for some reason.” Friction When l.evin attends the elections, he tries to handle some business for his sister, but discovers that somehow it cannot be done. In Dostoevsky, the reason would be "administrative ecstasy," the sheer delight bureaucrats take in making petitioners cringe, plead, or wait. But nothing of the sort happens here, and the problem is not one of intent at all. No one has any interest in thwarting Levin, so he cannot understand what goes wrong. When conspiracy theorists find they cannot accomplish something as easily as expected, they typically ask cut bono? (who benefits?) ro discover the obstacle. Some person or group must have caused the failure. Defeat means sabotage. This way of thinking presumes that behind every action there must be an intent, whether conscious or unconscious. Such a view rules out the possibility that mere contingency or friction accounts for the difficulty. flic military theorist Carl von Clauscwitz deemed friction, in this special metaphorical sense, an essential concept in understanding armies. Without using this word, Tolstoy regarded the same phenomenon as pertaining not just to war but to everything social. "If one has never personally experienced war," Clauscwitz explains, one cannot understand in what difficulties constantly mentioned really consist. . . . Everything looks simple; the knowledge required docs not look remarkable, the strategic options are so obvious that by comparison the simplest problem of higher mathematics has an impressive scientific dignity. Once war has actually been seen the difficulties become clear; but it is extremely difficult to describe the unseen, all-pervading element that brings about this change of perspective. Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. 'Die difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war. (Clausewitz, 119) The unseen, all-pervading element: For Tolstoy, similar difficulties arise when dealing with bureaucracy, introducing changes in agriculture, and implementing reforms. A Tolstoyan perspective is easily imagined today. Social problems look so simple: people in underdeveloped countries are poor, so give their governments foreign aid; workers arc unemployed, so hire them to perform needed government services; schools do not educate, so raise teachers' salaries; the state regulatory commission keeps energy prices too high, so partially privatize the system: answers seem so obvious, but in practice reforms rarely have the intended effect. They produce unintended consequences, which themselves have consequences; and, as Isaiah Berlin liked to point our, no one can foresee the consequences of consequences of consequences. Experience may teach one to expect certain kinds of difficulties, but some can never be anticipated, lhcrc is always friction: "Countless minor incidents —the kind you can never really foresee—combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal" (Clauscwitz, 119). No one is deliberately impeding Levin's efforts for his sister. By the same token, no one is trying to thwart his agricultural reforms. Sabotage is out of the question. "All this happened not because anyone felt ill will toward Levin or his farm; on the contrary, he knew that they [rhe peasants] liked him [and] thought him a simple gentleman (their highest praise)" (340). Friction defeats the reforms. But where does this friction come from and how might one best deal with it? TTic Elemental Force 'Ihe bailiff and peasants recognize in advance when a plan is bound to fail, and at lasr l.evin, instead of growing angry, pays artention to what they say: The bailiff listened attentively, and obviously made an effort to approve of his employer's projects. But still he had that look Levin knew so well that always irritated him, a look of hopelessness and despondency. That look said: " Ihat's all very well, but as God wills." Nothing mortified Levin so much as that tone. But it was common to all the bailiffs he had ever had. They had all taken up that attitude toward his plans, and so now he was not angered by it but mortified, and felr all the more roused ro struggle against this, as it seemed, elemental force continually ranged against him, for which he could find no other expression than "as God wills." (165) Ihe elementalforce: this concept is central to both Tolstoy's great novels. Tolstoy uses a few similar terms for it. In War and Peace, he refers to an elemental force shaping individual lives (W&P, 648) and to "the elemental life of the swarm" constituting the cumulative effect of countless people's small actions governed by no overarching law. In Anna Karentna, he calls the elemental force a "brutal force" when its outcome is cruel. Ih rough equivalent of friction for Clause-witz, the elemental force applies more widely. Clauscwitz's explanation stops at friction, but Tolstoy takes the elemental force as a starting point fo understanding why some plans arc more likely to fail than others. **In order to grasp** the course of **events more easily**, **we** tend to **reduce** the **countless infinitesimal forces** making up the elemental force to a single cause. After all, it is impossible to enumerate innumerable actions. And **so** historians and **social scientists** naturally **look for some** **super-cause that sums up all those small actions.** They may presume laws or postulate narrative neatness. Tolstoy relentlessly exposed the **logical fallacies in** both forms of **simplification**, which, at some point, either **assume what is to be proven or proceed as if it were already proven**. Historians, **social theorists**, and biographers **favor generalizations** or symmetries **permitting a** clear analysis or simple story. **They find what they seek**, their success demonstrates not that complexity has been adequately explained but that **when a discipline demands a certain sort of explanation it is bound to be “discovered.”** **In disciplines pretending to be social sciences**, it is repeatedly discovered that things are not as complex as they appear.

#### CV’s the only way to solve – you can’t solve racism with one quick fix, but empowerment allows the oppressed to advocate on their own behalf and resist oppression in many ways.

#### Monocausal focus on root cause justifies violence and tyranny

Achterhuis 2. [Hans, Professor of Philosophy @ Twente University, Peace Review, vol. 14, p. 158]

At base, each person who has-or claims to have-a single account for violence is proceeding in an extremely violent manner. Those who claim to know the origin of violence, to know the root of all evil, give themselves at the same stroke the moral right to reach back and root it out-thus providing, via a chain of reasoning with which we are all familiar, the justification for using violence in order to drive violence from the world. If we know where its origin lies, what could be wrong with using violence for the (sole) purpose of obtaining eternal peace and prosperity? This is a violent chain of reasoning. Implicitly or explicitly, it entails the call for a relentless struggle against the discovered origin of evil, whether that be said to lie in a particular class, nation, or ethnic group; a particular social structure such as capitalism or socialism; or a particular condition such as poverty. Whenever or wherever such an origin is posed, violence is alread 'resent for it inevitably sets up the argument that violence is permitted in order to achieve peace. It is a means-ends logic: the noble ends sanctify the violent means. From Valkenberg I learned that we cannot think about violence as a means-ends logic, but only in the form of a dialogue between human beings. If readers sense a strong reaction on my part against monocausal theories, I readily admit that the reaction is first of all directed against myself. For it is a lesson I learned only through trial and error. Once upon a time I too thought that I had located the origin of violence and could thus revolutionize the world. But this, in my opinion, is the greatest temptation for the political thinker. Many political philosophers have proposed totalitarian therapies based on philosophical analyses that attribute the origin of social evil to a single root. But single philosophical answers to the question of violence can never be more than partial. Such answers are but pieces of a dialogue.

#### *Capitalism isn’t the root cause of social problems and the alt doesn’t solve*

*Martin 90 Brian Martin, Department of Science and Technology Studies, University of Wollongong, Australia, Uprooting War, 1990 edition* [*http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw13.html*](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw13.html)

*The discussion so far concerns capitalist firms within a particular state. The wider question is, what role does the world capitalist system play in the war system? When examining particular wars, the immediate role of profit and accumulation are often minimal. Examples are World War Two, the Indochinese War and the many Middle East wars. Even in many colonial empires, immediate economic advantages for the capitalist class have played a minor role compared to issues of expansion and maintenance of state power. The role of capitalism mainly entered through its structuring of economic relations which are supervised separately and jointly by capitalist states. The main military service of the state to capitalists in the international system is to oppose movements which threaten the viability of capitalist economic relations. This includes state socialism and all movements for self-management. At the same time, the way this state intervention operates, namely through separate and potentially competing state apparatuses, can conflict with the security of capitalism. Wars and military expenditures can hurt national economies, as in the case of US government expenditures for fighting in Vietnam. Only some struggles against capitalism have potential for challenging the war system. Efforts to oppose capital by mobilising the power of the state do little in this direction. In particular, promotion of state socialism (the destruction of capitalism within a state mode, with the maintenance of bureaucratic control and military power) does little to address the problem of war. The trouble here is that much of the socialist left sees capitalism as the sole source of evil in the world. This approach is blind to the roots of social problems that do not primarily grow out of class domination, including racism, sexism, environmental degradation and war. Because of this blindness, even the struggle against capitalism is weakened, since attention is not paid to systems of power such as patriarchy and bureaucracy which are mobilised to support capitalism as well as other interests.*

### Racism Solves Cap

#### Other way around – solving racism solves capitalism

D’Amato 9 [(Paul, managing editor of the International Socialist Review and author of The Meaning of Marxism, an introduction to the ideas of Karl Marx) “Where oppression comes from” Social Worker, October 9, 2009 Issue 707]

Capitalism needs oppression. The Industrial Workers of the World used to have a saying that if all the workers of the world spit at the same time, the tiny capitalist class would drown. In order to prevent such a scenario, the working class is split apart and set against itself, by means of race, sex, nationality, sexual preference and so on. Without these divisions, capitalism could not survive. At the moments they are overcome, capitalism is threatened. The origins and specific features of each form of oppression is different, but they are all tied together by their utility to the system. This is not to say that capitalism invented oppression. But capitalism has taken older forms, and reshaped and remolded them to its own needs, as well as creating new ones. Divide-and-rule no doubt predates capitalism, but capitalism perfected it. The British deliberately fostered enmity between Hindus and Muslims as a means of maintaining their rule in India. "I am sorry to hear of the increasing friction between Hindus and Mohameddans," wrote a British official to Lord Elgin in 1897. "One hardly knows what to wish for; unity of ideas and action would be very dangerous politically. Divergence of ideas and collision are administratively troublesome. Of the two the latter is the least risky." Karl Marx wrote of how in Britain itself, the capitalist class stoked the fires of hatred between English and poorly paid Irish workers, the English worker being encouraged to see the Irish worker as a "competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he feels himself a member of the ruling nation and so turns himself into a tool of the aristocrats and capitalists of his country against Ireland, thus strengthening their domination over himself." Marx compares the attitude of the English worker to the Irish worker to that of poor whites in the South to the former Black slaves: This antagonism is artificially kept alive and intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short, by all the means at the disposal of the ruling classes. This antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class, despite its organization. It is the secret by which the capitalist class maintains its power. And that class is fully aware of it. The U.S. 19th century robber baron Jay Gould was more blunt, stating, "I can get one half of the working class to kill the other half."

## A2 Feminism

### Colonialism K

#### Wrong focus – feminists start with gender relations to explain violence but this only allows oppression to continue

Tobin 8 [(Theresa, The Philosophy Department, Faculty, Theresa W. Tobin, Marquette University.) “Using Rights to Counter Gender-Specific Wrongs” 23 July 2008, Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2008] AT

Because culture and religion are so often used to justify the oppression of women, the triumph of Beijing was to secure a set of gender-specific rights to combat genderspecific wrongs wherever they may be occurring and despite whatever cultural or religious justification might be offered in their defense. One danger, however, is that these rights’standards becomes fixed or static moral starting points for a kind of topdown approach to moral reasoning in the global arena. We start with a particular set of rights, which presuppose that “[the premise that] violence against women is a manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between men and women” that derive “essentially from cultural patterns,” and then apply these across a wide variety of contexts in order to identify morally egregious practices that perpetuate this kind of violence. This model of reasoning discourages the idea that a thoroughly historical and cultural analysis of FGC is relevant to a moral analysis of FGC. Instead, we start out “knowing” that these practices constitute human rights violations and even 2 Beijing Platform, p. 59. 3 Ibid, p. 60. 524 T. W. Tobin“knowing” their root cause—patriarchy. Contextual details may be invoked at the level of implementation, but they are not typically viewed as relevant to the moral analysis. Yet, the cultural and historical information a top-down approach belies may in fact be vital for an accurate moral evaluation of the practices under scrutiny. In order to see, this, I want to offer a culturally and historically laden analysis of FGC as practiced among the Maasai. This analysis of Maasai gender relations reveals that FGC is in fact not best understood as primarily gender-based violence that derives essentially from Maasai cultural patterns. Rather, the link between FGC and the oppression of Maasai women is the product of complex historical interactions between already existing Maasai social relations and a distinctively Western patriarchal ideology imposed on Maasai social life through formal colonization. The Maasai are primarily pastoralists who make their living by raising and herding cattle. They live on homesteads, practice polygamy, and circumcise both boys and girls at around the same age. Age and gender are the two primary axes of social organization among the Maasai and determine the distribution of roles, rights, and responsibilities in Maasai culture. Anthropologist Dorothy Hodgson notes that, historically, Maasai gender relations were neither dualistic nor hierarchical but were based on notions of complementarity and interdependence. While it is possible to distinguish between a domestic sphere of home and homestead and a public space outside the homestead, these areas were not gendered as primarily female and male. Instead both men and women occupied sections of domestic and public space (Hodgson 1999, 2001). Hodgson likens Maasai social organization to spikes in a bicycle wheel, in which each “category of person, whether young boys or old women, was required to fulfill its responsibilities for livestock and for each other to ensure survival and progress of Maasai households, homesteads, and communities” (Hodgson 1999, p. 50). For girls, the Maasai practice what the WHO calls type II circumcision or excision, which includes the removal of the clitoris and the labia minora. A girl’s circumcision is arranged by her parents usually just after her first menstruation when it is determined that she is ready for marriage and the responsibilities associated with womanhood. The practitioners are elder women, and the ritual involves exclusively women and includes weeks of preparation as girls spend time with their mothers and other elder women learning about the rights and responsibilities that attach to Maasai womanhood. The Maasai believe that circumcision plays an important role in the sexual maturity of a girl by marking the final stage in a gradual process through which a girl becomes a woman. While a “girl” is sexually immature (i.e., literally not yet fertile) and socially unprepared to bear and raise children, a “woman” is fertile, ready for and open to reproduction, and socially equipped to assume the privileges and responsibilities that attach to Maasai womanhood. The Maasai believe that circumcision protects and promotes a woman’s fertility and marks the actualization of her biological capacity to reproduce. Yet, importantly, it also indicates a certain level of social responsibility. In an interview with anthropologist Barbara Hoffman, Alice, a Maasai woman, explains that even if a girl has had ten kids, if she has not been circumcised, she will still be considered a child (Hoffman 2002, film). In the period prior to formal colonization, the social responsibilities associated with Maasai womanhood included a significant amount of economic and political power. Though each homestead belongs to an elder man, each house within a Using rights to counter “gender-specific” wrongs 525homestead belongs to the woman who built it (Aud Talle 1998, xx, p. 133). Each wife erects her own house according to the order in which she was married, and she controls access to her house, including the access of her husband. As anthropologist Aud Talle notes, occupancy and ownership of a house is a “sign of female maturity and is the base from which female agency is most successfully exercised” (Aud Talle 1998, xx, p. 133). In a very literal sense, ownership of a house gives a woman authority to act. For example, though male elders were the primary arbiters of community and clan disputes, a married Maasai woman, well established in her home, enjoyed a fair amount of political power, as she was able to initiate and testify at judicial proceedings and often conferred with her husband in resolving disputes both within and between homesteads (Hodgson 1999, p. 48). As pastoralists, the care and management of livestock is absolutely crucial to community survival, and so perhaps the most significant of all the rights associated with Maasai womanhood were economic rights. While elder men made broad managements decisions about the timing and location of grazing and watering herds and ilmurran (i.e., the young male warrior class) were responsible for guarding the herd from animal attacks or thieves, married women had primary responsibility over livestock products. Once well established in her house, a Maasai woman controlled the production and distribution of milk, which is the primary food staple for the Maasai and plays a crucial role in the ritual life of the community. A Maasai woman milked her cattle twice a day, kept the milk in gourds to which she alone had access, and then determined the distribution of milk among herself, her children, her husband, visitors, strangers, and even enemies when milk was used to establish a peace agreement. Moreover, Maasai women were also the primary traders in the community traveling to markets outside the homestead in order to barter surplus milk and hides in exchange for other important goods. Husbands and wives also shared overlapping cattle rights deciding together whether to slaughter, trade, or give away an animal (Hodgson 1999, p. 48). However, only a married woman could own a house and assume the responsibilities and privileges that attach to milk and cattle rights, and only the circumcised are considered women and marriageable. Thus, cultural logic dictated the importance of circumcision in a woman’s ability to become a fully participating and relatively powerful member of her community. Despite the rigidly defined social roles for both males and females, however, social relations between the sexes were premised not on domination and subordination but on mutual respect and relative autonomy within those roles. Indeed, Hodgson concludes that “‘patriarchal’ may be a deeply problematic term by which to characterize Maasai gender relations during this period. Although men, especially elder men, served as primary leaders and arbitrators for their communities, the responsibilities and interactions of men and women were complementary and interdependent” (Hodgson 1999, p. 50). Gender relations among the Maasai shifted dramatically, however, during and after formal colonization by the British (c. 1920–1961). The British brought with them assumptions about gendered division of labor in which men were dominant in the public realm of work and political decision making and women were primarily responsible for child rearing and other domestic chores. As Hodgson notes, British authorities “mapped their gender ideologies on to their understandings of and interventions in Maasai life,” creating “the male domains of public and political in opposition and superior to the female domains of private and domestic” (Hodgson 1999, p. 57). The colonial policies infused with this ideology, while devastating for all Maasai, were particularly catastrophic for Maasai women. The three most significant colonial policies that altered gender relations among the Maasai were (1) the implementation of indirect rule, (2) the transformation of a barter economy into a cash economy, and (3) the imposition of a new tax system. The policy of indirect rule aimed at identifying a central authority to represent the Maasai and to act as an intermediary between the Maasai and British authorities. Assuming that male elders were already “the” political leaders, these policies reshaped Maasai political life by extending the authority of select male elders over both junior men and women, strengthening and consolidating their power. Thus, rather than having political authority somewhat dispersed and at least somewhat shared among Maasai men and women, indirect rule created a centralized male authority and women lost whatever political power they may have previously enjoyed (Hodgson 1999, pp. 53–55). Needing to create a cash economy in order to produce tax revenue for the crown, the British also transformed a previously femalebased barter economy into a newly male-dominated cash economy. Livestock was now to be bought and sold on the market for cash. Assuming that males were the “owners” of cattle, Maasai men were integrated into the new economy as buyers and sellers of livestock, while Maasai women were dispossessed from their previously shared cattle rights. Furthermore, women “could generally only gain access to cash indirectly through gifts from men or the sale of cattle by their sons or husbands” and thus went from being primary agents in the Maasai economy to economically dependent on male elders (Hodgson 1999, p. 57). The third policy, which followed directly from the second, was to implement a new system of taxation. This system designated male elders as “tax payers” and “heads of household,” who were now required to pay a hut tax or “plural wives” tax for “dependent” women living on their homestead (Hodgson 1999, p. 58). The combined effect of these policies over time was severe material disenfranchisement, political and economic disempowerment, and conceptual devaluation of women. Women went from enjoying at least some political and economic authority and autonomy to being completely dependent on men and, through the system of taxation, to being viewed as property rather than persons (Hodgson 1999, pp. 64–65).

#### Permutation - women should be seen as a genealogy, not a social group. We should embrace that being a woman is the intersection of many social experiences – this better motivates feminist political activism and solves the kritik.

Stone 4 [((Allison Stone, Centre for Philosophy, Furness College, Lancaster University) “On the Genealogy of Women: A Defence of Anti-Essentialism” Third Wave Feminism: A Critical Exploration - Edited by Stacy Gillis, Gillian Howie and Rebecca Munford. Palgrave Macmillan, 2004] AT

Within feminist philosophical and theoretical contexts, third wave feminism may be defined as encompassing ‘all critical work . . . that points . . . to the homogenizing or exclusive tendencies of earlier dominant feminisms’ (Heyes, ‘Anti-Essentialism’ 161).1 Third wave feminists object, in particular, to exclusive tendencies within the dominant feminist theories of the 1970s and 1980s, theories that emerged more or less directly from second wave feminism as a political movement (e.g. Catherine MacKinnon’s critique of pornography reflecting feminist activism around the sex industry). Subsequent feminist thinkers, writing in the later 1980s and 1990s, articulated their objections to these exclusive tendencies primarily through critiques of ‘essentialism’. The central target of anti-essentialist critique was the belief – arguably widely held amongst second wave feminists – that there are shared characteristics common to all women, which unify them as a group. Anti-essentialists of the third wave repeatedly argued that such universalising claims about women are always false, and function oppressively to normalise particular – socially and culturally privileged – forms of feminine experience.2 The widespread rejection of essentialism by feminism’s third wave generated problems in turn. Ontologically, the critique of essentialism appeared to imply that women do not exist at all as a distinct social group; and, politically, this critique seemed to undercut the possibility of feminist activism, by denying women the shared identity or characteristics that might motivate them to engage in collective action. The central problem of third wave feminist theory, then, is that it risks undermining feminism both as a political practice and as a critique of existing society premised on the ontological claim that women constitute a (disadvantaged) social group. Confronting this problem, I argue that feminists could fruitfully reconceive women as a social group of a particular type: a genealogy. This would allow feminists to oppose essentialism without undermining either political activity or claims about women as a definite social group. I defend a ‘genealogical’ conception of women in the following stages. I begin by reviewing critiques of essentialism, offering a brief account of the ontological and political worries86 Sex and Gender these critiques have raised. I then assess two notable feminist responses to these worries: strategic essentialism and Iris Marion Young’s idea that women form a series. I suggest that neither response satisfactorily resolves the problems generated by anti-essentialist critiques. I then argue that, without sharing any common characteristics, women can still exist as a distinctive social group, susceptible to political mobilisation, insofar as they constitute a genealogy.3 I derive the project of a feminist appropriation of the concept of genealogy from Judith Butler, whose professed aim in Gender Trouble is to outline a ‘feminist genealogy of the category of women’ (5; emphasis in original). Tracing this concept of genealogy back to Friedrich Nietzsche, I suggest that all cultural constructions of femininity re-interpret pre-existing constructions and thereby compose a history of overlapping chains of interpretation, within which all women are situated. Thus, although women share no common understanding or experience of femininity, they are nevertheless assembled into a determinate social group through their location within this complex history. I conclude that a genealogical approach could enable third wave feminist theory to overcome its earlier problems and stimulate, rather than deter, feminist political activism.

#### This answers the kritik – it shouldn’t be about feminist liberation. You can’t weigh feminism impacts against the K because that is what I’m criticizing.

#### Judge has an obligation to reject colonialism

Dei [Anti-Colonialism and Education 2006]

The anti-colonial classroom must always be a de-colonizing space. This is both a[n] physical and intellectual imperative, affecting both the set up and use of space, as well as the delivery of the instructor's program. The teacher, as well as the students, should address the meanings of knowledge and learning. Within anti-colonial education, the teacher is responsible for presenting knowledge as counters to hegemonic power The first step in doing so lies within the exchange of knowledge, i.e. the learning process. The teacher/facilitator must not be understood (by herself/himself or by the students) as "in charge" of the knowledge. While she/he may be the custodian of certain knowledges, this by no means translates into ownership thereof. Working with bell hooks' (1994) understanding of decolonization as [is] a process wherein we depart from our customary paradigms, and reject the ways in which our reality and experience have been shaped by hegemonic cultural discourse[.], we can arrive at a critical learning moment The most dangerous of all delusions is to think that your social reality is the only reality worth talking about. To do so is to [which] engage[s] in a colonizing mental exercise, characterized by profound intellectual arrogance. This is the problem with the Eurocentric epistemology that characterizes so much [in] dominant curricula. The subversion thereof is thus an act of mental liberation. To truly embrace and work with a multicentric framework requires axiological, ontological and epistemological de-centering. We must return here to the notion and necessity of humility in the teaching and learning processes.

## A2 Essentialism

### Blackness not Biological

#### Ontological blackness is not based on biological race

Kubic 8 [(Micah, has won national and international acclaim as a community builder, non-profit administrator, scholar, and activist, Program Officer at Greater Kansas City Local Initiatives Support Corporation, Legislative Director for former Kansas City, Missouri Councilman Troy Nash) “Metaphorical Modes of Blackness: James Cone, Ronald Walters, and the Barack Obama Phenomenon” MicahKubric.com, Oct 2008] AT

From the outset, it should be noted that neither ontological blackness nor political blackness is in any way dependent on phenotype. Neither is in any sense essentialist, reductionist, or even vaguely related to discredited and immoral theories of “scientific racism,” which ascribe various personality and emotional traits to “the races,” a concept which is itself a biological absurdity (Hirschman 2004). Both Cone and Walters have been criticized for “racism,” because their work speaks to the specific needs of black peoples, but such criticism comes exclusively from those who deliberately misinterpret the scholars’ ideas. Cone and Walters are both concerned about the plight of black people, as a racial group that has encountered intense, ongoing oppression and discrimination from whites. However, in postulating their respective modes of blackness as desirable models for leaders and the masses alike, neither puts forward a racially exclusive formulation. Blackness here is entirely dependent on behavior, ideas, values, and voluntary identification, not on phenotype. These metaphorical modes of blackness arise from the unique experience of a cohesive but not monolithic African-American community and speak to its resultant needs, but neither limits nor demands membership in blackness for those with a physical or hereditary claim to “racial” blackness. Individuals of any and all races can qualify for – or choose not to participate in – these modes of blackness, hence their designation here as metaphorical.

### A2 Black Culture Essentialist

#### Also it’s not about culture – it’s about identification with oppressed groups

Kubic 8 [(Micah, has won national and international acclaim as a community builder, non-profit administrator, scholar, and activist, Program Officer at Greater Kansas City Local Initiatives Support Corporation, Legislative Director for former Kansas City, Missouri Councilman Troy Nash) “Metaphorical Modes of Blackness: James Cone, Ronald Walters, and the Barack Obama Phenomenon” MicahKubric.com, Oct 2008] AT

So as to preclude confusion, let it be clear that ontological blackness is not merely “cultural blackness,” where participation in black social activities and institutions or broad identification with black culture is by itself sufficient to be deemed black. That type of cultural participation and identification is necessary for Cone, but his ontological blackness is primarily a moral construct with cultural and political components. It extends beyond traditional conceptions of blackness by subordinating them to a moral view in which complete identification with the oppressed, active participation in institutions that define black daily life, resignation of privilege in order to secure the end of oppression, and total commitment to liberation activity are the central tests. Ontological blackness is also about trust, as an extension of the moral question. It poses two basic queries: Who should one trust to participate in the life and politics of the community of the oppressed? Who should one trust to represent the community? The answer is one who not only identifies with the community, but who feels a moral obligation to fight for the community. Once granted, this trust does not require dogmatic adherence to a set of positions, but rather an unwavering promotion of certain core principles. A great deal of leeway is extended to individuals, because they have passed an extended, rigorous, and collectively administered test for entry into blackness. This permits significant degrees of heterodoxy and vigorous debate within the black community on any given issue. This trust extends to other issues which may not be directly related to the question of oppression (although it is unclear that Cone believes any such unrelated issues exist), as a person who does not challenge black oppression is perceived as unlikely to be able to make moral distinctions or wise choices on those matters either. While ontological blackness involves politics and policy, it includes no list of positions on issues which one must take in order to qualify. Instead, a moral connection and commitment to black liberation, especially when joined by the collective decision-making that Cone suggests should be dominant, is presumed to be sufficient.

### Political Blackness

#### Explanation of political blackness

Kubic 8 [(Micah, has won national and international acclaim as a community builder, non-profit administrator, scholar, and activist, Program Officer at Greater Kansas City Local Initiatives Support Corporation, Legislative Director for former Kansas City, Missouri Councilman Troy Nash) “Metaphorical Modes of Blackness: James Cone, Ronald Walters, and the Barack Obama Phenomenon” MicahKubric.com, Oct 2008] AT

Walters’ ideas are similarly fashioned by personal experience, especially his role in organizing the 1972 Gary National Black Political Convention and as deputy manager of the 1984 Jesse Jackson presidential campaign. His idea of “political blackness” is most explicitly articulated in a recent article on Obama (Walters 2007), but is strongly linked to his long-standing arguments on the need for “independent leverage” in black presidential politics (Walters 1988). Blackness here is predicated on pursuing a policy agenda that unabashedly promotes black interests and supports individual policy positions held by most blacks. In this formulation, particular positions on highprofile issues, especially those that are race-specific or which disproportionately impact blacks (such as affirmative action or poverty), are of paramount importance. Political blackness is considered by Walters to be only one possible dimension of blackness, but the one with the most salience for political decision-making. It is distinct from “cultural blackness,” which is understood as primarily about involvement in black culture and institutions and devoid of political character. Individuals who are politically black have no inhibitions about speaking up as champions for specifically black causes. The nature of American racism and the persistence of a uniquely black culture have caused African-Americans to be more unified on a whole host of policy issues (including ones with no immediately obvious racial character) than any other demographic group, without requiring the affixation of the dreaded label “monolithic.” Without diminishing the very real diversity of opinion which exists within the community, this permits articulation of a “black position” on policy. Political blackness is primarily a matter of holding the “black position” on vital issues, but it also entails a commitment to mobilizing blacks (including those who feel disenfranchised or powerless) for political activism and a deep understanding of the black experience to form and inform those positions. In addition, political blackness is influenced by rhetoric and approach. Holding the “black position” on an issue is not sufficient for political blackness if one simultaneously seeks to distance oneself from the black community or to cast that position in universalistic, rather than race-specific, terms. Race-specificity and explicit appeals for racial justice are central to both an independent leverage strategy and political blackness. Race-specificity does not mean that an individual is unconcerned about the broader social welfare, nor does it imply a racial chauvinism that asserts primacy of place for African-Americans. Instead, it means treating issues that do have a racial component or are tied to America’s history of white supremacy as such and not purely as “social justice” problems where racial disparities are coincidental, irrelevant, and unmentioned. Race specificity also encourages the mobilization of racial or ethnic groups to secure tangible benefits for 7 those groups that have, by design and social policy, been cut off from prosperity and equal opportunity – a tactic nearly universally regarded as not only permissible but desirable when pursued by conventional interest groups. Indeed, competing theories of interest groups comprise the very foundation of many contemporary understandings of American politics (Dahl 1961, Olson 1965, Schattschneider 1960), but many disdain these same practices when they take on a racial cast

## A2 ID Politics Bad

### New K Link

#### Their claim of identity politics de-legitimizes real attempts for policy change – it’s a new link

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Arguments of this nature have often been dismissed as shallow “identity politics.” But the modes of blackness described above are no such thing, predicated as they are on a set of behaviors and ideas, not arbitrary standards or biological qualities. The term identity politics has been increasingly used to attack the claims made on the system by blacks, Latinos, women, gays and lesbians, and other marginalized groups. Such posturing paints legitimate calls for policy action to remedy inequality as mere self-interest in pursuit of special privilege, obscuring the self-interest that is the primary reason that dominant groups resist those demands. In any event, the demonization of “identity politics” distracts from the fact that all politics is identity politics. Identity, in all of its 14 many forms, is the very foundation of political behavior, with conflict arising when the ideas and values inherent within identities clash or when different identities are activated against one another, at both the individual and communal levels. Indeed, even policy perspectives widely thought to be divorced from identity politics are quite closely tied. All political actions are closely bound up in individuals’ perceptions of themselves, their priorities, and the actions subsequently required of them – in a word, in their identities.

### You Link

#### And you link too – all politics is identity politics

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### No Link

#### And my version of identity politics specifically is good – doesn’t link to their offense but it does allow resistance to racism

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Arguments of this nature have often been dismissed as shallow “identity politics.” But Error! Not a valid link.of blackness described above are no such thing, predicated as they are on a set of behaviors and ideas, not arbitrary standards or biological qualities. The term identity politics has been increasingly used to attack the claims made on the system by blacks, Latinos, women, gays and lesbians, and other marginalized groups. Such posturing paints legitimate calls for policy action to remedy inequality as mere self-interest in pursuit of special privilege, obscuring the self-interest that is the primary reason that dominant groups resist those demands. In any event, the demonization of “identity politics” distracts from the fact that all politics is identity politics. Identity, in all of its 14 many forms, is the very foundation of political behavior, with conflict arising when the ideas and values inherent within identities clash or when different identities are activated against one another, at both the individual and communal levels. Indeed, even policy perspectives widely thought to be divorced from identity politics are quite closely tied. All political actions are closely bound up in individuals’ perceptions of themselves, their priorities, and the actions subsequently required of them – in a word, in their identities. It is true that identity politics can be degenerative, particularly when constructions of identity are inherently hostile towards others or actively seek the denigration and domination of others (Schneider and Ingram 2005). When identities are not narrowly constructed around “essential” features or arbitrarily stigmatized behavior but rather around ideas and values, as the modes of blackness described above are, they can serve a useful purpose indeed. Instead of denouncing blackness as an organizing principle of Black Politics and black political behavior without pausing to ask what the term means, it behooves scholars and activists to investigate. There is a reason that one of the most accurate and insightful questions found in polling on public figures is, “Does X care about people like you?” In similar fashion, the notion of blackness serves as a shorthand reassurance that an individual of any race cares about the black community and will promote its interests. Candidates of all races are evaluated on the basis of this blackness shorthand, with the candidate able to establish the strongest and most meaningful connection with the black community likely to win the largest share of the black vote. Blackness of any variety is not the sole criteria used in making electoral decisions – experience and charisma, among others, also matter – but it is an important one. Obama’s overwhelming success in winning black votes is a testament to the fact that he has established a sufficient claim on blackness. The question then becomes, through which mode of blackness has Obama won black voter support?

## A2 Black-White Binary K

#### 1. The focus on epistemology turns the kritik – by challenging White supremacist knowledge production, the 1AC opens the debate to all other forms of race-based epistemologies

Scheurich and Young 97 [(James Joseph Scheurich, Professor in the Department of Educational Administration and Human Resource Development at Texas A&M University; Michelle D. Young, Associate Professor, Department of Educational Administration. Executive Director, University Council for Educational Administration) “Coloring Epistemologies: Are Our Research Epistemologies Racially Biased?” Educational Researcher, Vol. 26, No. 4. (May, 1997), pp. 4-16.] AT

It is not our intention, however, to privilege some of the race-based epistemologies over others. The ones we have briefly introduced here are those we have become most familiar with and those that we increasingly see being used in educational research. There are other efforts to develop these new race-based epistemologies and extensive arguments among scholars of color about these episte- mologies, but a comprehensive survey of these race-based epistemologies and current discussions of them would require an entire article (an article we would certainly like to read). Our point is that these new epistemologies exist and that they need to be understood, respected, and discussed, just as those epistemologies that have been produced by the dominant race are understood, respected, and discussed.

#### 2. Progress is progress – challenging racism, even while failing to do so fully, is far better than accepting racism – the 1AC took a stand against racism and that should be sufficient

#### 3. You are worse – challenging movements for not doing enough destroys progress and allows racism to live on unscathed since we’d never make any real achievements without the perfect advocacy, which is impossible. Even if the Civil Rights movement didn’t do enough we should recognize that it did something.

## A2 Speaking for Others

#### Your argument destroys the possibility of critique in public debate – that’s key to social change

Sells 97 [Laura Sells, Instructor of Speech Communication at Louisiana State University, “On Feminist Civility: Retrieving the Political in the Feminist Public Forum”, this paper was presented at a Roundtable on "Public Speaking and the Feminist Public Sphere: Doing Difference Differently," at the Western States Communication Association conference, 1997]

In her recent article, "The Problems of Speaking For Others," Linda Alcoff points out the ways in which this retreat rhetoric has actually become an evasion of political responsibility. Alcoff's arguments are rich and their implications are many, but one implication is relevant to a vital feminist public forum. The retreat from speaking for others is politically dangerous because it erodes public discourse. First, the retreat response presumes that we can, indeed, "retreat to a discrete location and make singular claims that are disentangled from other's locations." Alcoff calls this a "false ontological configuration" in which we ignore how our social locations are always already implicated in the locations of others. The position of "not speaking for others" thus becomes an alibi that allows individuals to avoid responsibility and accountability for their effects on others. The retreat, then, is actually a withdrawal to an individualist realm, a move that reproduces an individualist ideology and privatizes the politics of experience. As she points out, this move creates a protected form of speech in which the individual is above critique because she is not making claims about others. This protection also gives the speaker immunity from having to be "true" to the experiences and needs of others. As a form of protected speech, then, "not speaking for others" short-circuits public debate by disallowing critique and avoiding responsibility to the other. Second, the retreat response undercuts the possibility of political efficacy. Alcoff illustrates this point with a list of people--Steven Biko, Edward Said, Rigoberta Menchu--who have indeed spoken for others with significant political impact. As she bluntly puts it, both collective action and coalition necessitate speaking for others.

#### We are the one who benefit from colonialism – that creates a special obligation to speak for others – my entire position acknowledges my own complicity in the colonial project, and it is from here kritik should begin – once this recognition is made speaking for others is a form of empowerment

Kothari, Rite, Professor of Post Colonial Studies at St Xaviers, interventions, V1 N1, p35-6

Now to some of the more specific questions raised by Young: the issue of representation of minorities and recognizing them, a crucial aspect of postcolonialism, invests elite sections with an opportunity and onus of doing the recognizing.  That is what happens in practice.  Baldly stated, the postcolonial predicament is academic capital for metropolitan theoreticians in the first world, or for Third World theorists now resident in the metropolis.  Similarly, the situations of groups within the postcolonial nation-spaces are fodder for theorization by mainstream groups within that nation-space. If a member of the ‘oppressive’ group is engaged in the recognizing, chances are that she appropriates the voice of the colonized, representing them—thus engaging in another quasi-orientalist activity. The crucial difference is that the recognition is not only of the subaltern by the mainstream or oppressor group, but also a recognition by the oppressor of herself as complicit in the structure of oppression. This recognition points to an exercise of the imagination, and a sympathetic entry into the other life-world. The representation that follows such a preliminary recognition is not appropriation of a voice but a description of how that voice might sound once it begins to speak. The balance between facilitating voice to the silent ones while remaining invisible is a delicate one and yet it is important to tread this path.

#### Turn: This argument ignores that many minority relatively powerless minorities would be without any voice. By definition, if they are silenced by dominant discourse, requiring them to be the only voice for themselves would kill social change.

## A2 Paternalism

#### It’s a Collective Action Problem – not a question of what we believe is best for them. Extend the Harvard Law Review 7 evidence – racist policies dilute the power of the individual but the entire group still has political influence. Voting is still not in an individual’s interest but coercion as a group is beneficial.

## A2 Radical Reform

#### Compulsory voting better allows citizens to express dissent

Cherry 9 [(Ceridwen, Law Clerk at United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Voting Rights Intern at The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Intern at Office of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, University of Michigan Law School and Harvard University Kennedy School of Government) “Maximizing Participation: what the US can learn from compulsory voting” FairVote June 8, 2009] AT

Introducing compulsory voting would also make it easier to determine whether voters were dissatisfied with the available candidates or stayed away from polls due to disenfranchisement or inconvenience. If required to vote, many voters unhappy with the available candidates may opt to cast a "donkey vote" or purposefully spoiled ballot. An invalid ballot is actually a very strong political message and is much easier to interpret than non-attendance because it requires a positive act. A noticeable number of invalid ballots indicate that politicians are not addressing the needs of a significant portion of the electorate and thus can actually be a powerful tool for voters. Implementing a system of mandatory voting would certainly illicit opposition, particularly concerning the "right to abstain." However, due to the internationally respected right to secret ballot, the most a government can do is require its citizens to attend a polling station. Thus "compulsory voting" is a misnomer and is more accurately termed "compulsory turnout". For those who do not wish to vote for any of the candidates a "none of the above" option should be added to the ballot. This would further indicate to the candidates that they were not addressing the needs of their electorate.

## A2 Speaking for Others Bad

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#### OR [If reading Alcoff] They are missing the point – this argument only supports the kritik – speaking for others might be entangled with social location, but you assume you can retreat from this entanglement by refusing to speak – retreat from the kritik only allows the dominant discourses of coloniality to reinforce their dominance – it’s better to speak against colonialism than to speak about something else or not to speak at all

Linda Alcoff 92, Cultural Critique, Winter 1991-92, pp. 5-32, Professor of Philosophy, Women's Studies and Political Science and currently the Director of Women's Studies at Syracuse University, [http://www.alcoff.com/content/speaothers.html](http://www.alcoff.com/content/speaothers.html" \t "_blank)

I certainly agree that in some instances speaking for others constitutes a violence and should be stopped. But there remains a problem with the view that, even within a restricted, supportive community, the practice of speaking for others can be abandoned. This problem is that Trebilcot's position, as well as a more general retreat position, presumes an ontological configuration of the discursive context that simply does not obtain. In particular, it assumes that one can retreat into one's discrete location and make claims entirely and singularly based on that location that do not range over others, that one can disentangle oneself from the implicating networks between one's discursive practices and others' locations, situations, and practices. (In other words, the claim that I can speak only for myself assumes the autonomous conception of the self in Classical Liberal theory-that I am unconnected to others in my authentic self or that I can achieve an autonomy from others given certain conditions.) But there is no neutral place to stand free and clear in which one's words do not prescriptively affect or mediate the experience of others, nor is there a way to decisively demarcate a boundary between one's location and all others. Even a complete retreat from speech is of course not neutral since it allows the continued dominance of current discourses and acts by omission to reinforce their dominance. As my practices are made possible by events spatially far from my body so too my own practices make possible or impossible practices of others. The declaration that I "speak only for myself" has the sole effect of allowing me to avoid responsibility and accountability for my effects on others; it cannot literally erase those effects.

#### 2: Turn: This argument ignores that many minority relatively powerless minorities would be without any voice. By definition, if they are silenced by dominant discourse, requiring them to be the only voice for themselves would kill social change.

#### 3: We are the one who benefit from colonialism – that creates a special obligation to speak for others – my entire position acknowledges my own complicity in the colonial project, and it is from here kritik should begin – once this recognition is made speaking for others is a form of empowerment

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Now to some of the more specific questions raised by Young: the issue of representation of minorities and recognizing them, a crucial aspect of postcolonialism, invests elite sections with an opportunity and onus of doing the recognizing.  That is what happens in practice.  Baldly stated, the postcolonial predicament is academic capital for metropolitan theoreticians in the first world, or for Third World theorists now resident in the metropolis.  Similarly, the situations of groups within the postcolonial nation-spaces are fodder for theorization by mainstream groups within that nation-space. If a member of the ‘oppressive’ group is engaged in the recognizing, chances are that she appropriates the voice of the colonized, representing them—thus engaging in another quasi-orientalist activity. The crucial difference is that the recognition is not only of the subaltern by the mainstream or oppressor group, but also a recognition by the oppressor of herself as complicit in the structure of oppression. This recognition points to an exercise of the imagination, and a sympathetic entry into the other life-world. The representation that follows such a preliminary recognition is not appropriation of a voice but a description of how that voice might sound once it begins to speak. The balance between facilitating voice to the silent ones while remaining invisible is a delicate one and yet it is important to tread this path.

## A2 Wilderson

[these frontlines were all generic. Akhil and I didn’t cut these ourself so we didn’t include it in here]

## A2 Dirty Word K’s

#### These are just ploys to limit the discussion of racism

Hunter 2 [(Margaret, Department of Sociology, Loyola Marymount Universit) “Rethinking epistemology, methodology, and racism: or, is White sociology really dead” Race & Society 5 (2002) 119–138] AT

But what happened to the radical critiques of sociology through the lens of race initiated in the 1970s? The backlash of the 1980s, both popular and academic, led by the presidencies of Reagan and Bush Sr., neutralized any discussion of race as “racist” in and of itself (Giroux, 1993). This era ushered in the imperative of colorblindness, which cloaked the agenda to reverse civil rights gains of the 1960s and 1970s (Bonilla-Silva, 2001; Crenshaw, 1997). The discourse of colorblindness, ﬁrmly established in the 1980s, and policed by the vilifying accusation of “political correctness,” set the backdrop for the neo-liberal positivist epistemology that I will describe in more detail shortly

# Random other cards

## Some Cards

#### Voting is a form of empowerment – failure to expand voting excludes blacks from our democracy

Weatherspoon 7 [(Floyd, expert in African-American males and the law, published in law journals and newspapers, associate dean for Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs, member of the National Bar Association and the American Bar Association, external Administrative Judge for the EEOC) “The Mass Incarceration of African-American Males: A Return to Institutionalized Slavery, Oppression, and Disenfranchisement of Constitutional Rights” 13 Texas Wesleyan Law Review 599 (2007)] AT

The mass incarceration of African-American males has resulted in the subordination of their constitutional rights of freedom and equal protection under the law. The struggle continues for African-American males to find their rightful place in society. The massive disenfranchisement of African-American males in this country further isolates them from the general public. The isolation of African-American males is already evident in employment and education. The denial of voting further subordinates their status socially, economically, and politically. Without the right to vote, African-American males are devalued by the various political systems that promulgate policies that disproportionately impact their constitutional rights. Re-enfranchising African-American males will empower them to actively participate in our system of democracy. A failure to do so reverts African-American males to second class citizens, or even worse, subordinates them to a system of de facto slavery.

## Examples of Oppression

### Disenfranchisement + It’s Bad

#### Disenfranchisement today – it is oppressive

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Approximately 1.4 million African-American males' ability to vote in this country has been abridged temporarily or permanently. States have promulgated voting laws which prohibit prisoners, parolees, and ex-felons from voting. State disenfranchisement laws represent the new poll tax, literacy test, grandfather clause, and property ownership requirements that were previously used to exclude African-Americans from exercising their right to vote. The exclusionary voting policies of states were exposed in the 2000 presidential election, when it was determined that more than 200,000 African-American males of voting age in Florida were denied the opportunity to vote. Extensive legal scholarship has been published on voter disenfranchisement laws, and the devastating impact of such laws on African-American males. However, states have been slow to modify their disenfranchisement statutes to ensure that all their citizens have the opportunity to vote, as guaranteed by the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. States that have established procedures to re-enfranchise ex-felons have made the process highly complicated or too costly for ex-felons to pursue. There have been a number of unsuccessful constitutional challenges of state felon disenfranchisement laws. In Wesley v. Collins, an African-American male alleged that Tennessee's disenfranchisement law violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The court denied there was any violation of the Act. The court stated that [the state] may disqualify convicted felons from voting public without unlawfully interfering with equal opportunity of blacks to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. Recently, the Circuit Court of Jefferson County in Alabama held in Gooden v. Worley that an Alabama law denying the right to vote to citizens convicted of moral turpitude was void until the legislature decided what crimes fall under this definition. The ruling may provide felons the right to vote. The Supreme Court in Richardson v. Ramirez, held there was no Fourteenth Amendment limitations on states promulgating disenfranchisement laws. Justice Marshall in a dissenting opinion stated: It is doubtful . . . whether the state can demonstrate either a compelling or rational policy interest in denying former felons the right to vote. The individuals involved in the present case are persons who have fully paid their debt to society. They are as much affected by the actions of government as any other citizens, and have as much of a right to participate in governmental decision-making. Furthermore, the denial of the right to vote to such persons is a hindrance to the efforts of society to rehabilitate former felons and convert them into law-abiding and productive citizens. A majority of states prohibit individuals in prison, on probation, or on parole from voting. During the past decade, most states have eliminated the lifetime prohibition of ex-felons from voting. However, Florida, Kentucky, and Virginia disenfranchise ex-felons for life, even though African-American males are disproportionately harmed by such laws. According to the Sentencing Project, nine other jurisdictions--Alabama, Arizona, District of Columbia, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, Tennessee, and Wyoming--have laws that partially disenfranchise ex-felons. Interestingly, the states that disenfranchise ex-felons for life are located in the South. The greatest concentration of slaves was also located in the South. And those slaves were also denied the right to vote. Moreover, the southern states have the highest percentage of African-American males incarcerated in the country. After Reconstruction, southern states in particular, as well as other states, passed disenfranchisement voting laws to control and limit blacks' right to vote. For example, the State of Georgia restricts people from voting if they are in prison, on probation, or on parole, resulting in approximately 66,000 African-American males being denied the opportunity to vote. The present-day effect on African-American voters, and particularly African-American male voters, is still prevalent. For example, in Virginia, it is estimated that 110,000 African-American males are unable to vote, 100,000 in Alabama, 200,000 in Florida, 150,000 in Texas, and 80,000 in Mississippi. African-American males continue to face state restrictions on their right to vote. State disenfranchisement laws are not limited to just voting but also to employment, housing, and the opportunity to serve on a federal jury. For example, many employers have policies which prohibit the employment of individuals with criminal records. Again, African-American males are adversely impacted by such laws and policies, similar to periods of slavery and past Reconstruction. The mass numbers of African-American males who are incarcerated will face the collateral effect of imprisonment once they are released and seek to exercise their constitutional rights. Even though the concentration of the most severe voter disenfranchisement laws is in the South, other parts of the country have similar laws. Rhode Island had the most restrictive felon disenfranchisement laws in New England. Approximately 2% of the voting-age population are unable to vote due to having a felony conviction, whereas 20% of African-American males of voting age are prohibited from voting. Similarly, the State of Washington's disenfranchisement and restoration policies were challenged by racial minorities in Farrakhan v. Gregoire. Even though there was compelling evidence that there was a racial bias in Washington's criminal justice system which impacts minority ex-felons' right to vote, the court held that the State of Washington's felon disenfranchisement law did not violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. III. Conclusion The mass incarceration of African-American males has resulted in the subordination of their constitutional rights of freedom and equal protection under the law. The struggle continues for African-American males to find their rightful place in society. The massive disenfranchisement of African-American males in this country further isolates them from the general public. The isolation of African-American males is already evident in employment and education. The denial of voting further subordinates their status socially, economically, and politically. Without the right to vote, African-American males are devalued by the various political systems that promulgate policies that disproportionately impact their constitutional rights. Re-enfranchising African-American males will empower them to actively participate in our system of democracy. A failure to do so reverts African-American males to second class citizens, or even worse, subordinates them to a system of de facto slavery.

### Hispanic People

#### Hispanic people are being disenfranchised

Shen 12 [(Aviva, Reporter-Blogger for ThinkProgress, wrote for Smithsonian Magazine, Salon, and New York Magazine, B.A. from Barnard College.) “Forum Post: Voter Suppression Laws May Discourage 10 Million Hispanics, Study Finds” Think Progress 24 September 2012] AT

A new study by the Advancement Project estimates that voter purges and ID requirements being enacted in over 20 states could disenfranchise at least 10 million Hispanic citizens. The analysis found about 6.3 million Hispanic citizens were not registered to vote in 2010, while 10.8 million, about half the voting bloc, said they did not vote. The number is bound to swell as new efforts to limit the vote in states with large Latino communities use outdated information to remove suspected noncitizens: Those states are home to nearly 5.5 million registered Latino voters, and 1.1 million naturalized citizens from Latin America. Colorado and Florida identified voters for possible purging by comparing their voter registrations with driver’s license databases that show which voters indicated they were immigrants – thereby creating a problem, the report said. “Naturalized citizens typically received their driver’s licenses when they were legal immigrants but before becoming naturalized citizens (and before registering to vote); therefore, this method generates lists of voters to be checked that targets naturalized citizens,” the report said. Colorado has since called off its voter purge, but not before sending semi-threatening letters to suspected non-citizens telling them they needed to prove their citizenship. Florida has restarted a new purge with impossible deadlines for voters to prove their citizenship. Voter ID laws throw up more obstacles, as many naturalized citizens will now be asked for additional paperwork to prove their eligibility, a requirement researchers called “onerous and sometimes expensive.” Both presidential candidates have been fighting for Hispanic votes, making their case at the Univision forum in Florida last week. But Mitt Romney, considered the most anti-immigrant candidate during the Republican primary, has had trouble winning over Hispanics, who are overwhelmingly in favor of Obama. In order to win the election without picking up any minority votes, Romney would need to carry 61 percent of white voters to make up for this crucial demographic.

### Voter ID

#### Black people are being disenfranchisement by voter ID

Lee 12 [(Trymaine, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, senior reporter at the Huffington Post covering national stories that impact the black community) “Voter ID Laws Could Disenfranchise 1 Million Young Minority Voters: Study” Huffington Post 9/13/12] AT

An estimated 700,000 young minority voters could be barred from voting in November because of photo ID laws passed across the country in recent years, according to a new study. The number of minority voters under the age of 30 likely to be disenfranchised by these new voting laws -- passed overwhelmingly by Republican-led legislatures across the country -- is a conservative estimate, according to the study's authors. The actual number of voters in that category who could be disenfranchised is probably closer to 1 million, they said. The projections include African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, Native Americans and Pacific Islanders. “It’s a reminder that our voting rights have always been under attack and probably always will be,” said Cathy Cohen, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago who co-authored the report, Turning Back the Clock on Voting Rights: The Impact of New Photo Identification Requirements on Young People of Color. The study was created by the Black Youth Project, a nonpartisan, not-for-profit organization that aims to increase civic engagement and voter participation among minority youth. “I don’t think this is new, but I think the scale of it is new… I think the brashness of hearing elected officials talk about how these laws will guarantee a win in their state for [Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney],” Cohen told The Huffington Post. “And I think there is a willingness to be visible and vocal, which I think is new for us in the modern era.” The study estimates that the new laws, passed in 17 states, could cut turnout among young people of color in those states by between 538,000 and 696,000 voters, levels below turnout figures for those groups in the last two presidential elections. In 2004, 44 percent of blacks between 18 and 24 turned out to vote, the Associated Press reported. The Latino turnout for that year was 20.4 percent, and Asian Americans voted at a rate of 23.4 percent. In 2008, turnout among these groups exploded, with 52.3 percent of young blacks, 27.4 percent of young Latinos and 27.8 percent of young Asian Americans voting, according to the AP. An overwhelming number of these voters cast ballots for President Barack Obama and Democrats. Following the massive minority turnout in 2008, many states have passed stricter voting laws, which have included cutting early voting options and adding photo ID requirements. Minorities, including African Americans, Latinos and Asians, are less likely than their white counterparts to have a government-issued ID. Twenty-five percent of African Americans and 16 percent of Latinos lack such identification, compared to 9 percent of whites, according to the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University. The new study offers insight into just how many voters could be turned away due to new restrictions on ID. According to the report: Between 170,000 and 475,000 young black voters; 68,000 and 250,000 young Hispanic voters; 13,000 and 46,000 young Asian-American voters; 1,700 and 6,400 young Native American voters and 700 and 2,700 young Pacific Islander voters could be denied the right to vote or turned away at the polls for not having the proper credentials. But Cohen said there is data that suggests that rates valid ID ownership among people of color younger than 30 could be even lower than estimated. If younger minority voters have valid IDs at a rate of only 50 percent, she said, the impact of restrictive ID laws is more acute. “We wanted to write a report that would really focus on young people of color, in part to draw a contrast between 2004 and 2008, where we saw a really dramatic increase of young people of color going to the polls, expanding the democracy,” Cohen said. “Now we face a situation where in fact maybe 700,000 or more young people could be immobilized.” The study’s authors estimate that the drop in turnout among these groups could not only have an impact on those able to cast a ballot in the presidential election, but could also affect a number of hotly-contested House races.

### End of VRA Bad

#### End of VRA has furthered black oppression

ACLU 95 [(American Civil Liberties Union) “Reaffirmation or Requiem for the Voting Rights Act?” A Public Policy Alert from the American Civil Liberties Union (May 1995)] AT

As Reconstruction drew to a close more than 100 years ago, the several hundred African Americans elected to serve in Southern state legislatures and in Congress had dwindled to a handful, and the enactment and enforcement of a range of discriminatory laws that excluded black people from the mainstream of life -- the system known as "Jim Crow" -- had become pervasive. Reversing this pattern of exclusion has taken most of the 20th century. In the present decade alone, thanks to districting changes made after the 1990 census, progress has been astonishing. Today, Congress has a critical mass of 40 black members who comprise the influential Congressional Black Caucus, and nearly 5,000 African Americans hold elective office across the South. This sea change is the direct result of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, probably the most effective civil rights law ever enacted. The Act immediately outlawed the worst Jim Crow laws, such as literacy tests and other devices that kept African Americans out of the voting booth. Through active federal enforcement and the persistent efforts of civil rights groups, including the ACLU, the Act has begun to meaningfully empower racial minorities. And gradually, through court decisions and Congressional amendments, it has become a weapon against the more subtle schemes that have rendered minority votes all but meaningless. The most common of these schemes is the at-large election, which effectively drowns the will of minority voters in a sea of white majority voices. When, as has usually been the case, the white majority votes as a racial bloc that is hostile to all minority candidates, none of the latter can be elected. To counter that situation, the Voting Rights Act has been used to compel the creation of multiple districts within a jurisdiction, with minorities being the majority of voters in some of those districts. It is these predominantly minority districts that almost exclusively elect minorities to office. The right to choose one's representatives in the voting booth is the linchpin of a free society, without which it is often impossible to exercise other rights. But just as the doors to the halls of government have begun to open, whites across the South, abetted by the United States Supreme Court, are rushing to close them again. If they succeed, this century will end as it began: with the demise of a second "Reconstruction," and a return to the days of all-white government.

### Voter Id, Redistricting

#### New tactics have excluded voters

Starr 11 [(Terrell Jermaine Starr, Journalist for NewsOne) “Top Black Voter Disenfranchisement Tactics” News One, Dec 8, 2011] AT

In 1873, a gang of whites in Colfax, Louisiana murdered more than 100 blacks who were assembled to defend Republican officeholders—this was, of course, back when Republicans had some sense. Federal prosecutors indicted three of them, but the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the indictments in U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) Source: The Geography Of Race In The U.S. Literacy Tests Perhaps the first literacy test aimed at keeping blacks away from the ballot box was South Carolina’s notorious “eight-box” ballot, adopted in 1882. The test, as explained in “The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South” by J. Morgan Kousser and “The Law of Democracy,” by Samual Issacharoff, Pamela Karlan and Richard Pildes went as follows: Voters had to put ballots for separate offices in separate boxes. A ballot for the governor’s race put in the box for the senate seat would be thrown out. The order of the boxes was continuously shuffled, so that literate people could not assist illiterate voters by arranging their ballots in the proper order. The adoption of the secret ballot constituted another implicit literacy test, since it prohibited anyone from assisting an illiterate voter in casting his vote. In 1890, Southern states began to adopt explicit literacy tests to disenfranchise voters. This had a large differential racial impact, since 40-60% of blacks were illiterate, compared to 8-18% of whites. Poor, illiterate whites opposed the tests, realizing that they too would be disenfranchised. Source: The Geography Of Race In The U.S. Poll Taxes If you didn’t have money, you didn’t have a vote: Georgia initiated the poll tax in 1871, and made it cumulative in 1877 (requiring citizens to pay all back taxes before being permitted to vote). Every former Confederate state followed its lead by 1904. Although these taxes of $1-$2 per year may seem small, it was beyond the reach of many poor black and white sharecroppers, who rarely dealt in cash. The Georgia poll tax probably reduced overall turnout by 16-28%, and black turnout in half (Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics, 67-8). The purpose of the tax was plainly to disenfranchise, not to collect revenue, since no state brought prosecutions against any individual for failure to pay the tax. Sources: Voting Rights: The Poll Tax, Marion Butts Collection, Dallas Public Library and The Geography Of Race In The U.S. Ridiculous Registration Practices Even if blacks could read or had money, racist registration practices were created to make their efforts to vote miserable: Southern states made registration difficult, by requiring frequent re-registration, long terms of residence in a district, registration at inconvenient times (e.g., planting season), provision of information unavailable to many blacks (e.g. street addresses, when black neighborhoods lacked street names and numbers), and so forth. When blacks managed to qualify for the vote even under these measures, registrars would use their discretion to deny them the vote anyway. Alabama’s constitution of 1901 was explicitly designed to disenfranchise blacks by such restrictive and fraudulent means. Despite this, Jackson Giles, a black janitor, qualified for the vote under Alabama’s constitution. He brought suit against Alabama on behalf of himself and 75,000 similarly qualified blacks who had been arbitrarily denied the right to register. The Supreme Court rejected his claim in Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). Source: The Geography Of Race In The U.S. Today’s tactics are a drastically different, more sophisticated but no less obvious. Voter ID Some states, like Wisconsin for example, are trying to pass laws that are requiring people to present birth certificates to certify their eligibility to vote when they never had to before. Take, for example, how this will hurt one senior citizen as reported by the Center for American Progress Action Fund: For 63 years, Brokaw, Wisconsin native Ruthelle Frank went to the polls to vote. Though paralyzed on her left side since birth, the 84-year-old “fiery woman” voted in every election since 1948 and even got elected herself as a member of the Brokaw Village Board. But because of the state’s new voter ID law, 2012 will be the first year Frank can’t vote. Born after a difficult birth at her home in 1927, Frank never received an official birth certificate. Her mother recorded it in her family Bible and Frank has a certification of baptism from a few months later, along with a Social Security card, a Medicare statement, and a checkbook. But without the official document, she can’t secure the state ID card that the new law requires to vote next year. “It’s really crazy,” she added. “I’ve got all this proof. You mean to tell me that I’m not a U.S. citizen?” But state officials have informed Frank that, because the state Register of Deeds does have a record of her birth, they can issue her a new birth certificate — for a fee. And because of a spelling error, that fee may be as high as $200: Though Frank never had a birth certificate, the state Register of Deeds in Madison has a record of her birth. It can generate a birth certificate for her — for a fee. Normally, the cost is $20. Redistricting Every ten years, county commissions, state House and Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives are redrawn based on population changes reported in the U.S. Census, the Detroit Free Press reports. The problem with this is that GOP leaders see population growth in black and Latino communities that vote heavily for Democrats and want to spit these Democratic voting bases. Take the state of Michigan for example, as reported by the Detroit Free Press: Several groups representing African-American and Latino voters have filed a lawsuit challenging the new maps that define the 110 districts for the state House of Representatives. The state Legislative Black Caucus, the NAACP, UAW and the Latino Americans for Social and Economic Development, along with several individuals filed suit in U.S. District Court in Detroit today. They’re asking for a temporary restraining order, halting the new districts from taking effect while a new map is drawn and approved. “This is a coordinated assault on our voting rights,” said Wendell Anthony, president of the NAACP Detroit branch. The groups have two main complaints: the new map will force eight Detroit incumbent legislators to run against each other; and a district that now encompasses most of the primarily Latino population in southwest Detroit has been split into two districts. The game is the same, but the tactics have changed. Click on the links to learn how not to be swindled by the GOP disenfranchisement machine.

#### End of Voting Rights Act --- causes racism

[“Welcome to the Promised Land: Obama, the Voting Rights Act, and the Death of Racial Justice in America” ReignFall June 26, 2013] AT

Yesterday, in a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court gutted the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Back in the day, before racism was over, certain states and municipalities adopted various strategies which prevented blacks from voting. The Voting Rights Act sought to rectify that by first establishing a formula to determine if a given jurisdiction had discriminated against black voters (Section 4) and then by stipulating that any changes to voting laws in those jurisdictions had to be precleared by the federal government (Section 5). Yesterday the court ruled that the formula established by Section 4 was outdated and, therefore, unconstitutional. With no formula to determine which jurisdictions should fall under its purview, the federal government has lost the ability to regulate voting laws in areas with a history of racial discrimination. Now 9 states (mostly in the south) and many more counties in other states can change their voter laws as they see fit. Texas, one of the nine states freed from federal oversight, wasted little time (two hours actually) in advancing a voter ID law and a redistricting map that had previously been blocked for discriminating against blacks and Latinos. The Voting Rights Act (along with the preceding Civil Rights Act of 1964) was the crown jewel of the Civil Rights Movement; a decade-long mass movement whereby black Americans finally achieved legal equality with whites and the most blatant forms of racial discrimination were outlawed. Barack Obama’s road to the white house was paved by the Voting Rights Act and, when he was first elected president in 2008, his elections was hailed by many as a signal that black Americans had finally reached “the promised land” that MLK had prophesied 40 years earlier. I Am The DreamWelcome to the promised land. The promised land where black unemployment is steady at 13.5% (more than double the white unemployment rate). The promised land where people of color make up only 30% of the population but comprise 60% of the prison population (1 in every 15 black men and 1 in every 36 Latino men are incarcerated compared to 1 in every 106 white men). The promised land where school closures disproportionately impact black students. The promised land where affirmative action is dead in some states and almost died nationally two days ago. And now, the promised land where states and counties can pass racist voter laws without federal oversight.